

# THE GLOBAL POSTURE REVIEW OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES STATIONED OVERSEAS

---

---

108

Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG.108-854

The Global Posture Review of Un


BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 23, 2004

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

23-080 PDF

WASHINGTON : 2005

---

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office  
Internet: [bookstore.gpo.gov](http://bookstore.gpo.gov) Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800  
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001



# THE GLOBAL POSTURE REVIEW OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES STATIONED OVERSEAS

---

---

108  
Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG.108-854

The Global Posture Review of Un

BEFORE THE


COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 23, 2004

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

23-080 PDF

WASHINGTON : 2005

---

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office  
Internet: [bookstore.gpo.gov](http://bookstore.gpo.gov) Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800  
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

JOHN WARNER, Virginia, *Chairman*

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma

PAT ROBERTS, Kansas

WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada

JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina

ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina

JOHN CORNYN, Texas

CARL LEVIN, Michigan

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut

JACK REED, Rhode Island

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii

BILL NELSON, Florida

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

EVAN BAYH, Indiana

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

JUDITH A. ANSLEY, *Staff Director*

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, *Democratic Staff Director*

# CONTENTS

---

## CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

### THE GLOBAL POSTURE REVIEW OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES STATIONED OVERSEAS

SEPTEMBER 23, 2004

	Page
Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., U.S. Secretary of Defense .....	6
Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff .....	16
Jones, Gen. James L., Jr., USMC, Commander, United States European Com- mand and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe .....	18
Fargo, Adm. Thomas B., USN, Commander, United States Pacific Command ..	26
LaPorte, Gen. Leon J., USA, Commander, United Nations Command, Repub- lic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command, Commander, United States Forces Korea .....	28

(III)



# THE GLOBAL POSTURE REVIEW OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES STATIONED OVERSEAS

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2004

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe, Allard, Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Talent, Chambliss, Graham, Dole, Cornyn, Levin, Kennedy, Lieberman, Reed, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor.

Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and Benjamin L. Rubin, receptionist.

Majority staff members present: Brian R. Green, professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; Elaine A. McCusker, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Paula J. Philbin, professional staff member; and Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBoges, Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Maren R. Leed, professional staff member; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; and William G.P. Monahan, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Alison E. Brill, Andrew W. Florell, Catherine E. Sendak, and Nicholas W. West.

Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul, assistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Darren Dick, assistant to Senator Roberts; Jayson Roehl, assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; D'Arcy Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to Senator Talent; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Meredith Moseley, assistant to Senator Graham; Christine O. Hill, assistant to Senator Dole; Sharon L. Waxman and Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator E.

Benjamin Nelson; Rashid Hallaway, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER,  
CHAIRMAN**

Chairman WARNER. The committee meets today to receive the testimony on the Global Posture Review of the United States military forces stationed overseas. We welcome our witnesses: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; General James Jones, Commander of the U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; Admiral Thomas Fargo, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command; and General Leon LaPorte, Commander of United States Forces, Korea. We welcome each of you.

We are here this afternoon to receive this testimony on the proposed changes to the U.S. global defense posture. One month ago, August 16 I believe it was, President Bush announced a new plan for deploying America's Armed Forces, and he stated: "Over the coming decade, we will deploy a more agile and more flexible force, which means that more of our troops will be stationed and deployed from here at home."

This plan is the result of the administration's comprehensive 3-year review of America's global force posture—the numbers, types, locations, and capabilities of U.S. forces around the world. Extensive consultations with our allies and our friends have taken place, and it was an integral and important part of this plan.

The plan represents the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces stationed overseas, currently numbering approximately over 200,000, since the end of the Korean War. It represents the final chapter, in my judgment, of this Nation's efforts to transform our global defense posture away from the outdated Cold War strategies and missions to better meet today's and tomorrow's very complex, very different threats to our Nation's security.

Mr. Secretary, I am pleased that you agreed to appear before this committee on this important matter before Congress adjourns. I along with Senator Levin and Senator McCain and others thought it important that you appear here to discuss this significant change in the U.S. overseas military basing prior to this Congress adjourning.

Let me take a moment also, Mr. Secretary, to thank you and General Myers—and you were joined yesterday by Ambassador Negroponte, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, and General Abizaid in briefing I think I estimated at one time, almost three-quarters of the Senate were in room S-407 of the Capitol. It was a very far-ranging, in-depth discussion of those serious issues confronting us today. There was ample opportunity for questions and exchange of views from many of those Senators who were present, and I think personally it was one of the better meetings that we have had in some time.

Today we are returning again to this subject. I want to also pause for a moment to pay tribute to the Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Allawi. He is the head of the Interim Iraqi Government, and I was privileged to join some others here just moments ago to have



a smaller meeting with him. He provided the world with a powerful, moving speech of optimism about a nation and a people yearning to be free.

Prime Minister Allawi acknowledged the challenges ahead, but showed the determination of the Iraqi people to succeed. They will, as he said, need our further help and they want our help. They will, I hope, Mr. Secretary and others, they will have our help. I think our President has made that very clear.

To those who feel things have not gone well in Iraq, Prime Minister Allawi had the following reassuring words, and I quote him: "We are succeeding in Iraq and will take a giant step forward with free and fair elections in January."

The subject of this hearing, however, is the Global Posture Review. In the course of your delivery of testimony, I hope the witnesses will touch on at least some of these issues: How will the proposed changes to the U.S. global force posture strengthen—underline, "strengthen"—our U.S. national security? What will be the impact of the proposed force structure changes on our ability to carry out contingency operations in a more efficient and expeditious manner wherever necessary on the globe? How will the proposed changes affect U.S. relations, commitments, and treaty obligations with our longstanding allies and our friends, and particularly some of the new nations that have long wanted to break the bonds of the Warsaw Pact and join the free world? Given that consultations with other nations was an important part of this plan, what is the status of the negotiations with our allies and friends under this program?

Further, it is my understanding the changes recommended by the review will result in the closure of significant numbers of U.S. facilities overseas and the likely movement of 60,000 to 70,000 military personnel, together with their many family members, from overseas locations to installations in the United States within the next decade.

It is also my understanding that the review will in no way cause a delay or be grounds for a delay in the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. I personally feel very strongly that we have in place a law which sets forth a timetable and I believe it is imperative we stay on that timetable, and I hope, Mr. Secretary, you can provide in your testimony today the basis for us to continue on that timetable, because there are some challenges before this committee as we work through the final days of the conference with the other body and prepare a report for action in both bodies and a national defense authorization bill to be sent to the President prior to the adjournment of this Congress.

Finally, this committee takes very seriously its solemn responsibility to provide for the wellbeing of the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces. The President has stated that, as a result of this restructuring, "Our service members will have more time on the home front, more predictable and fewer moves over their career, our military spouses will have fewer job changes, greater stability, more time for their children to spend with their families at home." It is a very powerful and reassuring statement to our men and women in the Armed Forces, and I hope you will provide us with the facts which underlie the integrity of that statement.

We ask a lot of our men and women in uniform and their families, and if this plan leads to an increase in their "quality of life," there is a compelling reason for us to support the plan, in my personal view.

Again, we welcome you and look forward to your testimony.

I now seek the comments of my distinguished ranking member.

#### STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses this afternoon to discuss the Department's global basing strategy, but also to discuss current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. I understand that they have been informed that that would also be a subject that members will be asking them about.

Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, General Jones, Admiral Fargo, General LaPorte, it is good to have all of you here today. As we meet today, hundreds of thousands of our men and women in uniform are serving superbly in dangerous and demanding conditions around the globe. Their courage is inspiring and we are immensely proud of their service.

However, the situation in Iraq is far from encouraging and appears to be worsening. American soldiers and marines continue to die at the rate of one or two each day and sometimes more. Considerably more are suffering devastating wounds. Casualties among Iraqis are numbered in the scores on an almost daily basis. American and other contractors are being taken hostage and murdered in the most brutal fashion.

The lack of security is having a profound effect on reconstruction and on the effort to establish a stable Iraqi government. In fact, the administration has requested that billions of dollars be shifted from reconstruction to security.

The security situation is now such that there are a number of cities and towns in Iraq where the U.S. and coalition forces do not go. In the absence of a presence on the ground in places like Fallujah, which has been taken over by insurgents, the U.S. military has resorted to air power to strike safe houses and other places where intelligence indicates that the insurgents are located, but which reportedly then results in death and injuries to innocent Iraqi civilians as well. The result is an even greater lack of support for U.S. and coalition presence in Iraq and for the Interim Iraqi Government which supports and relies upon our presence. Moreover, assassinations, kidnappings, and beheadings are becoming more and more frequent.

In that context, even Iraqis who would like to cooperate with us are deterred from doing so and we are then denied the intelligence that we need to fight the insurgency.

It is difficult to discern a strategy that is being followed for Iraq. For instance, Marine General Jim Conway publicly criticized the orders that he received with respect to Fallujah after four U.S. security contractors were killed and their bodies mutilated. First, he was ordered to go in and clean out the insurgents, which went against the Marine Corps strategy of engagement with the civilian population. Then, after the Marines were halfway to securing the city and after the loss of many marines, orders were reversed, to

withdraw from the city and turn over control of the city to a local security force, which quickly lost control.

The chaos in Iraq puts scheduled Iraqi elections at risk. The United Nations (U.N.) Special Representative for Iraq reported to the Security Council on September 14 that, "the vicious cycle of violence," as he put it, "and the lack of security" was undermining the world body's effort to assist in elections set for January.

This is compounded by the fact that the administration has so far been unable to convince any country to provide the troops needed to protect the U.N. presence in Iraq. Consequently, a scant 4 months before nationwide elections are to be held, there are only 35 U.N. staff members in Iraq, far short of the 200 required to support the election.

The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) is worried by events in Iraq. The July 2004 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq reportedly sets out three possible scenarios for Iraq, including a worst case of developments that could lead to civil war and where in the best case security will remain tenuous.

This pessimistic estimate would appear to bear out the assessment of former President George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft in the 1998 book, "A World Transformed," concerning the question of whether to march to Baghdad in the 1991 Gulf War. They wrote that, "To occupy Iraq would instantly shatter our coalition, turning the whole Arab world against us. It would have taken us way beyond the imprimatur of international law bestowed by the resolution of the Security Council." They wrote further that doing so would commit our soldiers to "urban guerrilla war and plunge that part of the world into even greater instability and destroy the credibility we were working so hard to reestablish."

If we insist that things are going just fine or if we pretend, as the President incredibly enough put it yesterday, that we are dealing with just a "handful of people who are willing to kill," we will be less willing to search for ways to change the negative dynamic which has been unleashed in Iraq and we will be less willing to look for ways to motivate Iraqi factions and leaders and Islamic countries to become more involved in and willing to take the risks necessary to build a democratic nation in Iraq.

Surely, unless Iraqis want a democratic nation for themselves as much as we want it for them, unless they suppress the violent ones inside their own communities and the terrorists who want to prevent the election in January from happening, our presence would be more destabilizing than stabilizing.

We also meet today to discuss the Department's proposal to reposition our forces with the goal of further enhancing our capabilities. When the President announced the outline of these changes a month ago, he stated that "The new plan will help us fight and win these wars of the 21st century," and it will reduce the stress on our troops and our military families, and that the taxpayers will save money.

These are laudable goals we all share and I certainly hope all these assertions prove true. But to date the Department has not shared the details that would allow us to tell whether they are. I look forward today to getting some of those details. The briefings we have gotten to date have explained what the Department in-

tends to do, but not provided enough information about why, and have provided virtually no specific information about the impact on our military capabilities that would result from these moves.

I also hope and expect that we will be informed today on the overarching military and national security strategies underlying this plan, on the costs to implement this plan, and on the implications for our military capability. For example, I hope the Department can articulate how these proposals would affect our ability to respond and carry out missions such as the current ones in Afghanistan and Iraq should the need arise in the future.

I look forward to hearing our witnesses today describe how they believe that the relocation proposals will advance these common objectives.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Levin.

You will recall that when we discussed some weeks ago the need for this hearing you were strongly urging we have this hearing on this global strategy, and we did have the opportunity—I realize you were otherwise engaged—yesterday to hear from the Secretary and the Chairman and many others extensively on the situation in Iraq.

Secretary Rumsfeld.

#### STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. We appreciate this opportunity to discuss the work of some 3-plus years to transform the Department of Defense. I will abbreviate my remarks and ask that the full statement be put in the record.

Chairman WARNER. Without objection, the full statement of all witnesses will be placed in today's record.

Secretary RUMSFELD. History is traced by major events. It is important to learn from them, as we all know. As we look back on the wars of the last few centuries, we can see some key moments, turning points, and the statesmen and legislative leaders who played roles in helping to make the world more secure and helping freedom spread. I am not certain that our work with this committee and Congress in carrying out the vision for transforming our military is one of those milestones, but it could prove to be so, and indeed it is important that that be the case.

Today I will mention some of the elements of reform, even revolution if you will, that fit under the somewhat pedestrian term of "transforming." General Jim Jones of the European Command, Admiral Tom Fargo of the Pacific Command, and General Leon LaPorte, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, are here today along with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Dick Myers, to discuss these proposals.

Rearranging our global posture is only part of our considerably broader set of undertakings, essential to transforming our military into a more agile and more efficient force.

It is said that Abraham Lincoln once equated reorganizing the Army with bailing out the Potomac River with a teaspoon. He was, I suppose, expressing the truth that change is not easy. Yet,

throughout our history Americans have shown a talent for innovation and invention and the providence of finding the right leaders for the right times. General Ulysses S. Grant made skillful use of the rifle, the telegraph, and railroads to help win the Civil War. After World War I, visionaries like Billy Mitchell predicted the rise of air power as critical to future battles and Generals Patton and Eisenhower's awareness of the importance of the tank and armored warfare helped prepare for World War II. In Afghanistan our forces utilized a creative combination of cutting edge satellite technology and old-time cavalry charges to liberate a country with a minimal loss of life.

America today remains the world's preeminent military power because our leaders have properly challenged assumptions and the status quo, invested in and made use of new technologies, and were willing to abandon old certainties and strategies when freedom's defense required it.

The changes we propose to our defense strategies are not precipitous. They are part of a broad strategy that, as this committee knows, has been in the making and will be implemented over the next 6, 7, or 8 years. This administration has consulted extensively with our allies. We have sought the advice of Congress.

But let me set out where we are at this point in the journey. We have increased the size of the U.S. Army and we are reorganizing it into more agile, lethal, deployable brigades with enough protection, fire power, and logistics assets to sustain themselves. We are retraining and restructuring the active and Reserve components to achieve a more appropriate distribution of skill sets, to improve the total force's responsiveness to crisis, and so that individual reservists and guardsmen will mobilize less often, for shorter periods of time, and with somewhat more predictability. Already, the Services have rebalanced some 10,000 military spaces both within and between the active and Reserve components, and we are projected to rebalance 20,000 more during 2004.

We are increasing the jointness between the Services. We are improving communications and intelligence activities. We have significantly expanded the capabilities and missions of the Special Operations Forces. We have established new commands and restructured old ones. We are working to maintain a regular review of plans, challenging our own assumptions, and keeping the plans fresh and relevant, as they must be in a fast-changing world.

Today we have tens of thousands of uniformed people doing what are essentially non-military jobs. Yet we are calling up Reserves to help deal with the global war on terror. We are converting some of these jobs filled by the uniformed personnel to positions supported by Department of Defense (DOD) civilians or contractors. The Department has identified over 50,000 positions to begin conversion and we plan to carry out this conversion at a rate of about 10,000 positions per year.

So when we talk about changes to our country's global posture, it is important to look at these changes as part of the broader transforming of our way of doing things, and one cannot succeed without the other.

If our goal is to arrange the Department and our forces so we are prepared for the challenges of the new century, the newer enemies,

and the increasingly lethal weapons we face, it is clear that our existing arrangements are seriously obsolete. We are still situated in large part as if little has changed for the last 50 years, as if, for example, Germany is still bracing for a Soviet tank invasion across the northern German plain. In South Korea, our troops were virtually frozen in place from where they were when the Korean War ended in 1953.

So we have developed a set of new concepts to govern the way we will align ourselves in the coming years and decades. A first notion is that our troops should be located in places where they are wanted, where they are welcomed, and where they are needed. In some cases, the presence and activities of our forces grate on local populations and have become an irritant for host governments. A good example is our massive headquarters in some of the most valuable downtown real estate in Seoul, Korea's capital city, long a sore point for many South Koreans.

In the last few years we have built new relationships with countries that are central to the fight against extremists in places such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, to offer a few examples. We also have strong partnerships with the newly liberated nations of Eastern Europe. We believe it makes sense to try to work out arrangements with countries that are interested in the presence of the U.S. and which are in closer proximity to the regions of the world where our troops are more likely to be needed in the future.

A second governing concept is that American troops should be located in environments that are hospitable to their movements. Because U.S. soldiers may be called to a variety of locations to engage extremists on short notice, we need to be able to deploy them to trouble spots quickly. They are for the most part unlikely to be fighting where they are stationed. They will have to move and they will have to be able to be moved.

Yet, over time some host countries and/or their neighbors have imposed restrictions on the movement and use of our forces. So it makes sense to place a premium on developing more flexible legal and support arrangements with our allies and partners where we might choose to locate, to deploy, or to exercise our troops.

Third, we need to be in places that allow our troops to be usable and flexible. As the President has noted, the 1991 Gulf War was a stunning victory, but it took 6 months of planning and transport to summon our fleets and divisions and position them for battle. In the future we cannot expect to have that kind of time.

Because training and operational readiness are also essential elements of deterrence, U.S. forces operating abroad must have reasonably unrestricted access to ample training areas. This includes access across the spectrum of land, sea, and airspace. Host nations will need to guarantee unfettered access to training areas and airspace free of encroachment and unreasonable restrictions.

Finally, we believe we should take advantage of advanced capabilities that allow us to do more with less. In this century, we are shifting away from a tendency to equate sheer numbers of things—tanks, troops, bombs, et cetera, with capability. We can, for example, attack multiple targets with one sortie rather than requiring multiple sorties to attack one target. The Navy's response time for surging combat ships has been shortened to the point that we will

likely not need a full-time carrier strike group present in every critical region.

As a result of these new ways of thinking, we have developed plans for a more flexible and effective force posture for the 21st century. For example, main operating bases in places like Germany, Italy, the U.K., Japan, and Korea will be consolidated but retained. In Asia, our ideas build upon our current ground, air, and naval access to overcome vast distances while bringing additional naval and air capabilities forward into the region.

In Europe, we seek lighter and more deployable ground capabilities and strengthened Special Operations Forces, both positioned to deploy more rapidly to other regions as required.

In the broader Middle East, we propose to maintain what we call "warm facilities" for rotational forces and contingency purposes, building on cooperation and access provided by host nations during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In Africa and the Western Hemisphere, we envision a diverse array of smaller cooperative security locations for contingency access. Of course, we welcome comments and suggestions as these negotiations with potential host countries proceed.

One additional benefit to the proposed new arrangements is that they will significantly improve the lives of military families. Over the coming period of years, we plan to transfer home to American soil up to 70,000 troops and some 100,000 family members and civilian employees. In addition, deployments of the future should be somewhat shorter, families should experience somewhat fewer permanent changes of station and thus less disruption in their lives.

A word on the base realignment and closure, or BRAC, process. The global posture decision process and BRAC are tightly linked. Indeed, they depend on each other. They both will be critical instruments for stability in the lives of service members and their families and will help provide more predictability in assignments and rotations.

The progress made to date on global posture enables DOD to provide specific input on overseas changes for BRAC 2005. That input will allow domestic implications of the Global Posture Review with forces and personnel either returning to or moving forward from U.S. territory to be accounted for as effectively as possible within the BRAC decisionmaking process.

Finally, as was the case with previous BRAC rounds, the U.S. will retain enough domestic infrastructure to provide for difficult to reconstitute assets, to respond to surge needs, and to accommodate significant force reconstitution as may be necessary, including all forces based within or outside of the United States.

Any initiative as complex as the proposed global posture realignment will stimulate questions, especially in an election year, I suppose. Some ask, for example, will reducing overall force levels in Korea reduce our ability to come to its defense. General LaPorte will comment on this in some detail, but in fact our partnership with the Republic of Korea is a good example of what we hope to accomplish. The Defense Department has been investing in and making arrangements for improved capabilities, such as long-range precision weaponry, to be available on the Korean Peninsula. As a result, as we are increasingly able to transfer some responsibilities

to Korean forces, we will be able to reduce U.S. troop levels. The combined capabilities of the U.S. and the Republic of Korea will make our defense of Korea stronger than before.

As in Western Europe, the situation in Korea is notably different from what it was 50 years ago, back when South Korea was an impoverished and virtually destroyed country. Today South Korea is an economic powerhouse with a modern military force of 600,000 troops and a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 18 times that of North Korea. Our proposed global force posture initiative will make it clear that the U.S. and the Republic of Korea are working together as partners, each bringing important capabilities to our shared challenges.

Another question is, does realigning our posture send a dangerous message to North Korea about our commitment to the South? The answer is an emphatic no. We know that sheer numbers of people are no longer appropriate measures of commitment or of capability. As I have noted, our capabilities in defending the Republic of Korea are increasing and they are not decreasing.

One of the members of your committee, Senator Lieberman, said it well in an interview a few weeks ago. He noted that: "Kim Jong Il is not under any misconceptions. We have enormous power at sea and in the air and on the ground in the Asian Pacific region and on the Korean Peninsula, and if he tries to take aggressive action against South Koreans he will pay a very heavy price." The Senator is correct.

Should we have given earlier warning to our allies? In fact, we have met with officials in foreign governments on a variety of levels on all of these concepts. Secretary Powell and I have spoken many times with our counterparts abroad, as have our staffs. In fact, when we issued the Quadrennial Defense Review, as required by Congress, in September 2001, one of the chapters was on reinventing, reorienting the U.S. military global posture. So this is nothing new.

Our foreign counterparts have appreciated that their input was sought before key decisions were made. They understood our global long-term view and the strategic rationale for conducting the review at this time. Indeed, we have available many very positive quotes from various foreign countries that are affected by this.

Another question is, if we will be sending more troops home from theaters in Europe will it weaken our ability to surge quickly to trouble spots? Actually, the opposite is probably closer to the truth. Presence is important, but forward stationing does not mean optimal stationing. Forces in Europe, for example, are only closer to the Middle East if they can deploy rapidly to the south, not if they have to go north first. If those same forces have to deploy to the north through the Baltic or North Sea, then to the Atlantic, then to the Mediterranean, then we can move roughly as fast from the United States.

We also know that our forces will need to move to the fight, wherever it is. That means that command structures and capabilities must be expeditionary. If there are legal or political restrictions on the movement of our troops where they are stationed, the difficulties in using them quickly multiply.



This week I had the privilege of participating in one of our regular meetings in Washington with the combatant commanders. They are impressive. Three of them are here. Yesterday we spent 3 hours on the Hill with General Abizaid, as you pointed out, and Ambassador Negroponte giving every Member of the House and Senate an opportunity to talk about Iraq.

The individuals are impressive. They follow in the footsteps of the visionary military leaders of the past. This plan was undertaken with the benefit of their military advice. One day future generations will look back at these combatant commanders and the military leadership of our country with gratitude for what they have accomplished in the last few years in helping to transform the Department of Defense and also in the struggle against global extremists. Our task is to see that one day historians and generations will look back at what is being done today and what is being accomplished and say that our actions, this committee and the Department together, also have helped to make the world more peaceful and our military more formidable and our freedom more secure.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:

We thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work of some 3½ years to transform the Department of Defense.

History is traced by major events. It is important to learn from them. As we look back now on the wars of the last few centuries, we see the key moments, the turning points, and the statesmen and legislative leaders who played critical roles in helping to make our world more secure and allowing freedom to spread.

I am not certain that our work, together with this committee and Congress, in carrying out the President's vision for transforming of our military is one of those milestones.

But it could prove to be so.

I hope it is. Indeed, it is important that that be the case.

Today I will mention some of the elements of reform—even revolution—that fit under the somewhat pedestrian term of “transformation” or “transforming.” We all can look back with some satisfaction on how much has been achieved, and look forward with encouragement, as we seek to do still more.

We meet as the brave men and women in uniform are defending the American people against those who seek to terrorize and intimidate civilized societies and to attack our freedoms. The folks in uniform represent the best our country has to offer. They have not wavered in meeting the tough challenges we face.

While I know the committee agrees that our responsibility is to ensure that they have the tools they need to fight this war, and a military structure that helps them win it, we need to do still more.

Rearranging our global posture, the subject of today's hearing, is essential to our success. General Jim Jones, Admiral Thomas Fargo, and General Leon LaPorte are here today with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dick Myers, to discuss these important proposals.

It is important to note that rearranging our global posture is only part of our considerably broader set of undertakings. What we are doing is changing mindsets and perspectives.

Essential to this is transforming our military into a more agile, more efficient force that is ready and able to combat the asymmetric challenges of this new and uncertain time.

This is a sizable undertaking. It is said that Abraham Lincoln once equated reorganizing the Army with “bailing out the Potomac River with a teaspoon.” He was expressing the truth that change is not easy.

But history has long warned great nations of the perils of seeking to defend themselves by using the successful tactics and strategies of the last war. The French experienced this with the Maginot Line.

Throughout our history, Americans have shown a talent for innovation and invention, and the providence of finding the right leaders for the times. General Ulysses S. Grant made skillful use of the rifle, the telegraph, and railroads to win the Civil War. At the turn of the 20th century, President Theodore Roosevelt recognized the potency of deterrence and used naval power to project American strength.

After World War I, visionaries like Billy Mitchell predicted the rise of air power as critical to future battles. Patton and Eisenhower's awareness of the importance of the tank and armored warfare helped to prepare for World War II.

In Afghanistan, our forces utilized a creative combination of cutting edge satellite technology and old-time cavalry charges to liberate that country with a minimal loss of life.

America today remains the world's preeminent military power because our leaders have properly challenged assumptions and the status quo, invested in and made use of new technologies, and abandoned old certainties and strategies when freedom's defense required it. Ours are the military forces that have been on the cutting edge of new ideas. So we must be today.

Members of the committee, we do not propose changes to our defense strategies lightly or precipitously. They are part of a broad strategy that, as this committee knows, has been years in the making. These proposals will take place over the next 6 to 8 years. There will be no grand announcement. This administration has consulted extensively with our allies—new and old—on a multitude of levels, every step of the way. We have sought the advice of Congress. We recognize that no one has a monopoly on wisdom.

The course we have charted is not novel or sudden. Key points were designated by the President, before he was even elected.

In a 1999 speech at the Citadel, then-Governor Bush warned of the rise of terrorism, the spread of missile technology, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—a "world of terror and missiles and madmen."

Calling for a "new spirit of innovation," he outlined ambitious goals: "to move beyond marginal improvements—to replace existing programs with new technologies and strategies. Our forces in the next century must be agile, lethal, readily deployable, and require a minimum of logistical support. We must be able to project our power over long distances, in days or weeks, rather than months."

Mr. Chairman, I realize these goals are not new to you or to this committee. We have been working on these changes together for a number of years.

But let me set out where we are at this point of our journey:

- We have increased the size of the U.S. Army and are reorganizing it into more agile, lethal, and deployable brigades—light enough to move quickly on short notice, but also with enough protection, firepower, and logistics assets to sustain themselves;
- We are retraining and restructuring the active and Reserve components to achieve a more appropriate distribution of skill sets, to improve the total force's responsiveness to crises, and so that individual reservists and guardsmen will mobilize less often, for shorter periods of time, and with somewhat more predictability. Already the services have rebalanced some 10,000 military spaces both within and between the active and Reserve components in 2003, and are projected to rebalance 20,000 more during 2004.
- We are increasing the jointness between the Services. Instead of simply deconflicting the armed services and members of the Intelligence Community we are integrating them to interact as seamlessly as possible.
- We are improving communications and intelligence activities. This includes, for example, the development of Space-Based Radar (SBR) to monitor both fixed and mobile targets deep behind enemy lines and over denied areas, in any kind of weather. We also are at work on the Transformational Communications Satellite (TSAT) to provide our joint warfighter with unprecedented communication capability. To give you an idea of the speed and situational awareness the TSAT will provide, consider this: transmitting a Global Hawk image over a current Milstar II, as we do today, takes over 12 minutes. With TSAT it will take less than a second.
- The Department is constructing three new state-of-the-art guided missile destroyers to patrol the seas; 42 new F/A-18 fighter aircraft to guard the skies; and new C-17 strategic air lifters, which will improve our ability to move forces quickly over long distances.
- We have significantly expanded the capabilities and missions of Special Operations. SOCOM has moved from exclusively a "supporting" command to both a "supporting" and a "supported" command, with the authority to plan and execute missions in the global war on terror.
- We have established new commands and restructured old ones:

- the Northern Command, dedicated to defending the homeland;
  - the Joint Forces Command, to focus on continuing transformation; and
  - the Strategic Command, responsible for early warning of and defense against missile attack, and the conduct of long-range attacks.
- We are working with NATO in an effort to make the Alliance more relevant and credible in this post-Cold War era, shedding redundant headquarters and creating a new rapid response force.
  - It used to be that operational and contingency plans were developed, then placed on the shelf for years. We're working to maintain a regular review of plans, challenging our own assumptions and keeping the plans fresh and relevant.
  - The Department is changing its approach to infrastructure and installations. When the administration arrived, facilities were funded at a rate and level that reflected an expectation that they would be replaced only every 175 to 200 years. Our goal was and remains to cut it down to a more realistic recapitalization rate closer to 70 years.
  - We are making progress in changing the culture in the Department and the military from one of "risk avoidance" to one that rewards achievement and innovation.

Let me mention another example of an activity underway that on its own may seem minor, but is crucial to the process of transforming.

Today we have tens of thousands of uniformed people doing what are essentially non-military jobs. Yet we are calling up Reserves to help deal with the global war on terror. The same benefit as we achieve with an increase in military personnel is already coming from converting some of these jobs filled by uniformed personnel to positions supported by DOD civilians or contractors. The Department has identified over 50,000 positions to begin such conversion and plans to carry out this conversion at a rate of about 10,000 positions per year. We are also continuing to review thousands of other positions for possible conversion.

To support this, we are working with Congress and the unions to improve our civilian personnel systems so we can fill these converted positions expeditiously. This is an enormously complicated matter and there is a great deal more work to be done. But when fully implemented, the National Security Personnel System, should:

- Expedite the hiring process for civilian employees;
- Recognize and reward outstanding civilian individuals;
- Make it easier to provide merit-based promotions and reassignments; and
- Streamline the complex webs of rules and regulations that currently frustrate efficient management of the Department.

When we talk about changes to our country's global posture, it is important to look at those changes—as part of the broader transforming of our way of doing things. One cannot succeed without the other.

If our goal is to arrange the Department and our forces so we are prepared for the challenges of this new century—the newer enemies and the more lethal weapons—it is clear that our existing arrangements are seriously obsolete.

We have entered an era where enemies are in small cells scattered across the globe. Yet America's forces continue to be arranged essentially to fight large armies, navies, and air forces, and in support of an approach—static deterrence—that does not apply to enemies who have no territories to defend and no treaties to honor.

We are still situated in a large part as if little has changed for the last 50 years—as if, for example, Germany is still bracing for a Soviet tank invasion across its northern plain. In South Korea, our troops were virtually frozen in place from where they were when the Korean War ended in 1953.

So we have developed a set of new concepts to govern the way we will align ourselves in the coming years and decades. Though this should not be news to many on the committee since we have offered extensive briefings to members and staffs, let me reiterate some of the concepts.

A first notion is that our troops should be located in places where they are wanted, welcomed, and needed. In some cases, the presence and activities of our forces grate on local populations and have become an irritant for host governments. The best example is our massive headquarters in some of the most valuable downtown real estate in Seoul—Korea's capital city—long a sore point for many South Koreans. Under our proposed changes, that headquarters will be moved to a location well south of the capital.

In the last few years, we have built new relationships with countries that are central to the fight against extremists—in places such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan, to offer a few examples. We also have strong partnerships with the newly-liberated nations of Eastern Europe. We believe it makes sense to try to work

out arrangements with countries that are interested in the presence of the U.S. and which are in closer proximity to the regions of the world where our troops are more likely to be needed in the future.

A second governing concept is that American troops should be located in environments that are hospitable to their movements. Because U.S. soldiers may be called to a variety of locations to engage extremists at short notice, we need to be able to deploy them to trouble spots quickly. Yet over time, some host countries and our neighbors have imposed restrictions on the movement and use of our forces. So it makes sense to place a premium on developing more flexible legal and support arrangements with our allies and partners where we might choose to locate, deploy, or exercise our troops.

Many of our current legal arrangements date back a half a century or more. We need our international arrangements to be up-to-date—to reflect the new realities and to permit operational flexibility. They have to help, not hinder, the rapid deployment and employment of U.S. and coalition forces worldwide in a crisis. These legal arrangements should encourage responsibility and burdensharing among our partners and ourselves, and be certain to provide the necessary legal protections for U.S. personnel.

Third, we need to be in places that allow our troops to be usable and flexible. As the President has noted, the 1991 Gulf War was a stunning victory. But it took 6 months of planning and transport to summon our fleets and divisions and position them for battle. In the future, we cannot expect to have that kind of time.

Finally, we believe we should take advantage of advanced capabilities that allow us to do more with less. The old reliance on presence and mass reflects the last century's industrial-age thinking.

In this century, we are shifting away from the tendency to equate sheer numbers of things—tanks, troops, bombs, etc.—with capability. If a commander has a smart bomb that is so precise that it can do the work of eight dumb bombs, for example, the fact that his inventory is reduced from ten dumb bombs to five smart bombs does not mean his capability has been reduced—indeed his capability has been significantly increased.

The “old think” approach needs to be modernized. In terms of lethality, precision weapons have greatly expanded our capability, while significantly reducing the number of weapons needed.

We can, for example, attack multiple targets in one sortie, rather than requiring multiple sorties to attack one target. The Navy's response time for surging combat ships has been shortened to the point that we will likely not need a full-time carrier strike group presence in every critical region.

As a result of these new ways of thinking, we have developed plans for a more flexible and effective force posture for the 21st century. For example, main operating bases in places like Germany, Italy, the U.K., Japan, and Korea, will be consolidated, but retained. We hope to rely on forward operating sites and locations, with rotational presence and pre-positioned equipment, and to gain access to a broader range of facilities with little or no permanent U.S. presence, but with periodic service or contractor support.

In Asia, our ideas build upon our current ground, air, and naval access to overcome vast distances, while bringing additional naval and air capabilities forward into the region. We envision consolidating facilities and headquarters in Japan and Korea, establishing nodes for Special Operations Forces, and creating multiple access avenues for contingency operations.

In Europe, we seek lighter and more deployable ground capabilities and strengthened Special Operations Forces—both positioned to deploy more rapidly to other regions as necessary—and advanced training facilities.

In the broader Middle East, we propose to maintain what we call “warm” facilities for rotational forces and contingency purposes, building on cooperation and access provided by host nations during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

In Africa and the Western Hemisphere, we envision a diverse array of smaller cooperative security locations for contingency access.

Of course, we welcome comments and suggestions as negotiations with potential host countries proceed.

One additional benefit to our proposed new arrangements is that they will significantly improve the lives of U.S. military families. This is important. Over the coming period of years, we plan to transfer home, to American soil, up to 70,000 troops and some 100,000 family members and civilian employees. In addition, deployments of the future should be somewhat shorter, families should experience somewhat fewer permanent changes of station, and thus less disruption in their lives.

## BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE (BRAC)

The global posture decision process and Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) are tightly linked, indeed they depend on each other. They are both key components of the President's transformation agenda, and they both will be critical instruments for stability in the lives of service members and their families. Together, they will help to provide more predictability in assignments and rotations.

The progress made to date on global posture enables DOD to provide specific input on overseas changes for BRAC 2005. That input will allow domestic implications of the Global Posture Review—with forces and personnel either returning to or moving forward from U.S. territory—to be accounted for as effectively as possible within the BRAC decisionmaking process. Finally, as was the case with previous BRAC rounds, the U.S. will retain enough domestic infrastructure to provide for difficult-to-reconstitute assets to respond to surge needs, and to accommodate significant force reconstitution as necessary, including all forces based within or outside the United States.

Any initiative as complex as the proposed global posture realignment will stimulate questions—especially in an election year.

I appreciate this opportunity to address a few of the myths and misconceptions that seem to be lingering out there about what is contemplated.

*For example, will reducing overall force levels in Korea reduce our ability to come to its defense?*

In fact, our partnership with the Republic of Korea is a good example of what we hope to accomplish. The Defense Department has been investing in and making arrangements for improved capabilities—such as long range precision weaponry—to be available on the Korean peninsula. As a result, as we are increasingly able to transfer responsibility to Korean forces, we will be able to reduce U.S. troop levels. The combined capabilities of the U.S. and the Republic of Korea will make our defense of Korea stronger than before.

As in Western Europe, the situation in Korea is different from what it was 50 years ago, back when South Korea was impoverished and virtually destroyed. Today South Korea is an economic powerhouse, with a modern military force of some 600,000, and a GDP per capita of 18 times that of North Korea. Our proposed global force posture initiatives make it clear that the U.S. and the Republic of Korea are working together as partners, each bringing important capabilities to our shared challenges.

*Has the administration prepared the public—and informed Congress—about these changes?*

As I mentioned, these concepts were outlined years ago—first in a 1999 speech before President Bush took office and then a number of times since.

The Global Posture Review had its origins in the 2001 Report of the Statutory Quadrennial Defense Review. On November 25, 2003, President Bush announced that the U.S. would intensify consultations with friends, allies, and partners overseas.

We have made significant progress during 2003–2004, and these proposals have been shared frequently with the congressional leadership, committee leadership and members, and with committee staffs.

I'm told that in the past 2 years the Department of State and this Department have provided at least:

- Four briefings to House committee staffs and one each to members of the House Armed Services Committee and House Appropriations Committee—Defense Subcommittee;
- Four briefings to individual Senators;
- Nine briefings to Senate committee staffs or members' personal staffs; and
- This year alone, I took part in five breakfast meetings on the subject with Congressmen and Senators, including one on April 29, 2004, with Chairman Warner and Senator Levin.

*Should we have given earlier warning to our allies?*

In fact, we have met with officials in foreign governments on a variety of levels on these concepts. Secretary Powell and I have spoken many times with our counterparts abroad, as have our staffs.

The results of multiple consultations by Under Secretary of Defense Feith, his State Department colleague Marc Grossman, and others at NATO and in key European, Asian and other capitals helped to create understanding and cooperation regarding our posture realignment.

Our foreign counterparts have appreciated that their input was sought before key decisions were made and they understood our global, long-term view and the strategic rationale for conducting the review at this time.

*Does realigning our posture send a dangerous message to North Korea about our commitment to the South?*

The answer is an emphatic "no." We know that sheer numbers of people are no longer appropriate measures of commitment or capabilities. As I have noted earlier, our capabilities in defending the Republic of Korea are increasing, not decreasing.

Senator Joe Lieberman said it well in an interview a few weeks ago. He noted that: "Kim Jong Il . . . is not under any misconceptions. We have enormous power at sea, in the air, on the ground, in the Asian Pacific region and on the Korean peninsula. If he tries to take aggressive action against the South Koreans, he will pay a very, very heavy price." The Senator is correct.

*Will sending more troops home from theaters in Europe weaken our ability to surge quickly to trouble spots?*

Actually, the opposite is closer to the truth. Presence is important, but forward stationing does not mean optimal stationing. Forces in Europe, for example, are only closer to the Middle East if they can deploy rapidly to the south. If those same forces have to deploy to the north, through the Baltic and North Seas, then to the Atlantic and Mediterranean, then we can move roughly as fast from the United States. We do not expect our forces to fight where they are stationed. We know that our forces will need to move to the fight, wherever it is. That means that command structures and capabilities must be expeditionary. We need well-developed transportation networks. We need materiel and supplies along transportation routes.

So, if there are legal or political restrictions on the movement of our troops where they are stationed, the difficulties in using them quickly multiply.

Additionally, the more flexible arrangements we are seeking with our allies will allow us to make changes as changes are needed. Area commanders don't own forces. Our country does. We have no hesitation in moving forces from one region to another as circumstances change and require—and we do frequently.

Critics of these proposed moves seem trapped in the thinking of the last century. In some ways, that is understandable. It is difficult to part with thoughts that one has harbored for decades. But the world changes and updated thinking is needed.

We owe an up-to-date defense posture to our troops in the field and the generations that may be called to battle in the future.

This week, I had the privilege of participating in one of our regular meetings in Washington with the combatant commanders, some of whom are here today. They are impressive. They follow in the footsteps of the visionary military leaders of the past. This plan was undertaken with the benefit of their military advice.

One day future generations will look back at them with gratitude for what they have accomplished in the last few years in the struggle against global extremists.

Our task is to see that one day historians and generations will look back at what is being done today, at what is being accomplished, and say that our actions also helped to make the world more peaceful, our military more formidable, and our freedom more secure.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  
General Myers.

#### **STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

General MYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important program with you.

First, I want to thank you for your dedication to protecting our Nation against current and future threats, as well as improving the quality of life of our service men and women, priorities that I certainly share with you.

I firmly believe that this approach to our global defense posture is in the best interest of both our national security and our troops. This plan will leave us better positioned to engage our allies and

promote regional stability and better positioned to prevail in combat when war cannot be prevented.

When I started my Air Force career nearly 40 years ago I was stationed in Germany, flying F-4s. My squadronmates and I spent many hours studying the enemy's weapons and tactics. We knew exactly who the threat was, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and we knew exactly what our mission would be, to defend Europe by ensuring air superiority and supporting the massive North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ground force. As General Jones knows very well, our troops stationed in Europe today have to deal with a lot more uncertainty. They have to look beyond the Fulda Gap, beyond the long-established war plans, to new missions in new places like Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa.

Our Armed Forces have to fight a completely new kind of war, the war on terrorism or against extremism. They have to be ready for future threats that are still unknown.

So we are transforming our forces to better confront these challenges and threats, and we must have a global posture that is aligned with the key tenets of a transformed military. Those are agility, flexibility, and speed.

We also have a unique opportunity right now, one that we must seize. Because we won the Cold War, many of our former adversaries, the same ones I studied as a lieutenant, have become valued allies and partners. I travel to Eastern Europe and Central Asia and meet with my counterparts and I can tell you that they could not be more willing to engage with us. They understand the value of freedom and democracy because it is in many cases so newly won, and they are ready to join the international team.

This global posture strategy engages these new allies in very positive ways, allowing us to create effective new partnerships.

The situation on the Korean Peninsula has also changed dramatically. When I sat alert at Osan Air Base as a captain in the 1970s, our F-4s were parked alongside Korean War-vintage F-86s from the Korean Air Force, and the Republic of Korea's economy, as the Secretary said, was on par of the world's poorer nations. Now they have F-16s that can drop precision bombs and their economy is ranked 11th in the world, ahead of many European Union (EU) nations. They have a stable democracy and a highly-capable military.

Our own military capabilities have also changed dramatically: precision weapons, long-range strike capabilities, networked command and control, our ability to get to the fight more quickly, and, perhaps most importantly, our ability to fight as an integrated, joint, and coalition team.

Yet, as Secretary Rumsfeld said, U.S. forces in Korea are positioned exactly where we were at every base camp and station when the armistice was signed 51 years ago. The calculus has changed completely and this global posture strategy accounts for that fact in Korea and across the globe.

We owe it to our troops to position them for success and at the same time to support their families. Not so long ago, I visited several spouse support groups in the First Armored Division in Germany. I was extremely impressed by them and the network they

had built to take care of one another. Working with the division's leadership, they were very energetic and creative in dealing with family issues while the division was deployed in Iraq.

But their challenges were even tougher because they were overseas. It is much easier at home with immediate access to extended families, friends, and other support networks and job opportunities for family members.

As the Secretary said, the Joint Chiefs and combatant commanders have been fully involved in these ongoing studies and discussions over the last 3 years. We know it will take time to implement and the end state is designed to flex and adapt in a dynamic world. But we cannot wait any longer to move forward with this important task. We owe it to our troops, our allies, and to the American people.

I appreciate this opportunity to answer your questions and I thank you for your continued strong support of our brave and selfless men and women in uniform. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.  
General Jones.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES L. JONES, JR., USMC, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE**

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee: I am pleased once again to appear before you to discuss the strategic transformation proposals of the United States and in particular the United States European Command. If approved either in whole or in part, I am convinced that our proposals will increase the strategic effect of our forces who are assigned to operate on the European and African continents and in their contiguous waters. We have an historical opportunity, it seems to me, to adjust our basing and operating concepts in such a way as to make them much more capable and useful to our national, coalition, and alliance goals.

I believe it is important to state as emphatically as possible that this effort should not be characterized as an indication that the United States is demonstrating a lesser interest in Europe or Africa, losing interest in leading or participating as fully as we have in the past in NATO, or withdrawing capability from our many bilateral relationships and commitments throughout our expanding area of interest, or that we now embrace diminished appreciation of the value of forward basing. Nothing could be further from the truth.

On the contrary, we should affirm the clear opposite, which is to say that transformation will better enable the United States to strategically impact its 91-country area of responsibility and its new challenges in a manner unprecedented since the end of World War II. United States European Command's (EUCOM) strategic transformation will create an agile and more usable permanent force in theater, augmented by dedicated expeditionary rotational forces, all operating aboard a family of three new basing concepts, and anchored on radically modernized prepositioned equipment locations on land and at sea.



Mr. Chairman, I consider it an honor to be able to be a part of this effort and I look forward to answering your questions on this very important and exciting subject. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Jones follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. JAMES L. JONES, USMC

I. INTRODUCTION

Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, distinguished members of the committee—It is my privilege to appear before you as Commander, United States European Command (EUCOM), to discuss our strategic theater transformation plans and to discuss the way forward for both EUCOM and the NATO Alliance. On behalf of all the men and women in EUCOM and their families, all of whom proudly serve this Nation, I want to thank the committee members and staff for your unwavering support since my assignment began in January 2003. During this time I have had several opportunities to appear before you, to meet with members and staff in a number of different venues, both here and in theater, and to share the vision for the transformation of the 91 nation European and African theater. Your insightful and candid appraisals of this important endeavor have been instrumental in refining a plan that will enable us to do our part to protect our democracy, contribute to the security of our Nation, support the 26 nation NATO Alliance, and help improve security and stability conditions within our area of responsibility. Your dedication and efforts on our behalf are both recognized and greatly appreciated.

In 2001, the Secretary of Defense initiated a comprehensive, strategy-based review of the U.S. global defense posture, and subsequently directed all combatant commands to evaluate their structure, organization and processes in order to gain transformational efficiencies and develop new capabilities to meet emerging requirements. The efforts we are undertaking to meet the objectives laid out by the Secretary represent the most extensive adjustments to the European theater in its history. The changes we are proposing contain broad and far-reaching implications for our Nation, our allies, and our military. As we embark upon this important endeavor, we must be mindful of the unique leadership responsibilities we enjoy in the community of nations, and we must ensure that the measures we undertake will, in its end state, increase our strategic effectiveness. In a world full of uncertainty and unpredictable threats, the United States continues to be viewed as an influential leader in providing stability and security. It is a responsibility this Nation has not merely accepted, but has embraced for more than half a century. As we map a course for the future we must remain cognizant of the key elements that enabled us to be successful in the last century and be wise enough to recognize the new security challenges we face. Our ability to be successful in fighting the global war on terrorism and achieve a force posture necessary to operate across the broad spectrum of potential conflict requires innovative thought and comprehensive coordination at all levels of our Government. I look forward to working with you and your staff as we set about this important enterprise that will ultimately establish the framework for a new capability for a new and different era.

II. THE RATIONALE FOR CHANGE

EUCOM's greatest contribution to security and stability lies as much in preventing conflict as it does in prevailing on the battlefield. This is accomplished through influence, forward presence and engaged leadership. It is sustained only through our enduring and visible presence and commitment in our theater.

EUCOM's current structure is still centered based on a threat-based, defensive, and static philosophy facing east. Happily, this threat has passed, and the continuous flux of the security environment since the end of the Cold War has rendered obsolete the foundation of making threat-based changes to our strategic posture. Our transformation vision, therefore, seeks to evolve to a capabilities-based strategy that supports the full range of military operations better suited to meet new challenges. The strategic and operational environment and mission direction have changed radically, and EUCOM must change as well.

The fall of the Berlin Wall marked a significant turning point in the national strategy and in the utilization of the resources required to support our theater security objectives. The United States has periodically changed its overseas defense posture as strategic circumstances themselves evolve. In the post-Cold War period, EUCOM significantly reduced its force structure while simultaneously increasing its stability and contingency operations. For example, EUCOM force structure has been

reduced from 315,000 troops and 1,421 installations to 112,000 troops and approximately 500 installations concentrated in Western Europe since 1991.

The operational environment within EUCOM's area of responsibility (AOR) continues to evolve in ways that were largely unforeseen and difficult to predict just a few short years ago. The global war on terrorism, expanding Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) requirements, instability in Africa, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and NATO expansion largely define recent changes and necessitate a transformational shift in EUCOM's theater strategy for new challenges and realities in a new century. In contrast to the Cold War-era monolithic threat and its linear battlefield, EUCOM and NATO can expect to face global, multiple, and asymmetric threats in the 21st century. The new security menace is transnational, characterized by enemies without territory, without borders, and without fixed bases. Today's security environment includes threats such as the export and franchising of terrorism, eroding control of weapons of mass destruction, narcotrafficking, unanticipated and uncontrolled refugee flow, and illegal immigration. Many of these threats are nurtured in misgoverned or even ungoverned regions as terrorists and extremist organizations seek to find new havens from which to operate.

We must change our posture to reflect the realities of the 21st century (Figure 1). Our remaining forces, now at less than 40 percent of our Cold War force, are not necessarily equipped or sited to adequately address the emergence of an entirely new array of threats and security requirements. EUCOM is transitioning east and south to engage these emerging threats. In order for EUCOM to be better postured to achieve national interests in theater, we must significantly change the manner in which we execute our new missions in response to our new challenges. The foundation of EUCOM's transformation should be evaluated in the context of seeking to dramatically increase our strategic effect, retain our historical leadership role in the NATO Alliance, enhance our ability to develop our growing bilateral relationship, and underscore the significant benefits of forward deployed forces.




Figure 1

### III. THE STRATEGIC BASIS OF EUCOM'S TRANSFORMATION

EUCOM's theater transformation is based on the assumptions that the United States:

- Desires to maintain its current position as a nation of global influence through leadership and the efficient and effective application of informational, military, economic, and diplomatic power

- Remains committed to its friends and allies through global, regional and bilateral organizations and institutions, and supports treaties and international agreements to which it is a signatory
- Pursues a global strategy, a cornerstone of which is increased access and forward presence in key areas, which contributes to the first line of defense for peace, stability, and order
- Supports in-depth transformation of its Armed Forces and basing structure to respond to 21st century asymmetrical threats and challenges
- Seeks ways to mitigate or offset obstacles posed by 21st century sovereignty realities through a re-orientation of its land, maritime, air and space presence
- Recognizes current U.S. basing within EUCOM may not adequately support either the strategic changes attendant to an expanded NATO Alliance, or the national requirements of a rapidly changing AOR
- Seeks to preserve those assets which have enduring value to its missions, goals, and national interests
- Continues to enhance and build defense relationships enabling the United States, allies, and friends to respond effectively

These assumptions, if agreed to, serve as the cornerstone which underpins EUCOM's Theater Transformation Plan.

#### IV. EUCOM'S CRITICAL THEATER CAPABILITIES

EUCOM's success hinges on maintaining critical capabilities as both a supported and a supporting combatant command. These capabilities include: as much freedom of action as possible within our many agreements with nations who host our forces; power projection; bases for our operations; command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C<sup>4</sup>I); alliances and coalition partners; theater based and rotational forces; and facilities for joint and combined training opportunities. EUCOM gains and maintains freedom of action and the ability to build alliances and coalitions through its security cooperation efforts and an effective interagency process.

Power projection platforms and associated bases must optimize our limited strategic air and sea-lift, maximize available intra-theater lift, leverage existing enduring bases, and well-maintained pre-positioned equipment. EUCOM should preserve our critical capabilities by maintaining select (Joint) Main Operating Bases where currently located, and by establishing new (Joint) Forward Operating Sites and (Joint) Cooperative Security Locations where needed. The temporary and semi-permanent expeditionary installations established throughout the AOR will provide essential facilities and equipment for expeditionary forces in proximity to the areas of interest, crisis, or conflict and will avoid saturation at key nodes and along lines of communication. Where possible, (Joint) Propositioned Stocks will provide additional means to rapidly project equipment to contingency response areas. By design, the inherent agility of these expeditionary forces will enable a more precise and rapid response, intervening into a crisis at its inception, thereby reducing the potential for larger scale operations requiring massive force. However, if a larger force is required in theater or in an adjacent theater, EUCOM's basing plan is flexible enough to allow for a rapid expansion of follow-on forces whenever needed. This built-in scalability will provide the initial agility necessary for EUCOM to effectively support a truly global strategy.

#### *Lexicon: Transformation Assets*

##### *(Joint) Main Operating Base (JMOB)*

By definition, this is an enduring strategic asset established in friendly territory with permanently stationed combat forces, command and control structures, and family support facilities. (J)MOBs serve as the anchor points for throughput, training, engagement, and U.S. commitment to NATO. (J)MOBS have: robust infrastructure; strategic access; established command and control; ready access to training areas; (Joint) Forward Operating Sites and (Joint) Cooperative Security Location support capability; and enduring family support facilities. As previously stated, these are already in existence.

##### *(Joint) Forward Operating Site (JFOS)*

An expandable host-nation "warm site" with a limited U.S. military support presence and possibly prepositioned equipment. It can host rotational forces and be a focus for bilateral and regional training. These sites will be tailored to meet anticipated requirements and can be used for an extended time period. Backup support by a (J)MOB may be required.

*(Joint) Cooperative Security Location (JCSL)*

A host-nation facility with little or no permanent U.S. presence. (J)CSLs will require periodic service through contractor and/or host nation support. (J)CSLs provide contingency access and are a focal point for security cooperation activities. They may contain prepositioned equipment. (J)CSLs are: rapidly scalable and located for tactical use, expandable to become a JFOS, forward and expeditionary. They will have no family support system.

*(Joint) Preposition Site (JPS)*

A secure site containing pre-positioned war reserve materiel (combat, combat support, combat service support), tailored and strategically positioned to enable rotational and expeditionary forces. They may be collocated with a (J)MOB or (J)FOS. JPSs are usually maintained by contractor support and may be sea based. They are an important component to our transformation efforts.

*"En Route" Infrastructure (ERI)*

A strategically located enduring asset with infrastructure that provides the ability to rapidly expand, project and sustain military power during times of crises or contingencies. ERI bases serve as anchor points for throughput, training, engagement, and US commitment. They may also be a (J)MOB or (J)FOS.

In addition to maintaining our traditional lines of communication and access, we will seek new access to facilities, and routine freedom of transit through nations of the east into the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Levant, and Africa in order to support current and future operations. In the near-term, attention will focus on Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, supporting similar near- to mid-term efforts in the Caucasus states.

*"En Route" Infrastructure*

A significant component of our ability to prosecute the war on terrorism and maintain operational access is the En Route Infrastructure Program. Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) have highlighted the importance of our primary en route bases in the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, and Italy. Enhancing their capabilities in the near- to mid-term is essential to our continued ability to deploy and sustain U.S. forces.

EUCOM will develop new installations for engaging the many threats we face today and that we will respond to in the future. Retention of critical JMOBs will preserve existing infrastructure for the Joint Reception, Staging and Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI) Center functions. Establishing JFOSs, CSLs, and JPSs in new countries will allow the command to develop and mature host-nation support and contractor agreements to support additional JRSOIs.

The ability to rapidly project military power during times of crises or contingencies is the central and most enduring premise of the concept of forward stationing of forces. The very presence of such forces, either forward based or rotational and the military capabilities they possess are powerful instruments of national influence. A robust "En Route" Infrastructure combined with an array of (Joint) Prepositioned Sites throughout the EUCOM theater, will enable the United States to have the strategic agility to operate across the spectrum of conflict. Beyond strict military significance, forward forces serve to strengthen U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy; demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security of U.S. friends and allies; demonstrate to potential challengers the resolve of the United States to meet its commitments; and bolster regional security through our theater security cooperation programs.

*Rotational Forces*

A key aspect of EUCOM's transformation plan is the reliance on "rotational" units as a significant portion of the forces in theater. By design, the inherent agility of these expeditionary forces will enable a more precise and rapid response, intervening in a crisis at its inception, thereby reducing the potential for larger scale operations requiring massive force. Further, rotational forces arrive trained and ready to operate immediately within the theater. As a force provider (supporting command), EUCOM can provide these rotational forces quickly in support of other combatant commands.

This combination of permanently-based and rotational forces will permit a full range of operational capability in areas and regions within our area of responsibility that are increasingly important. EUCOM's Service components will develop and execute effective plans to integrate and employ a combination of permanently assigned forces and rotational forces from continental United States (CONUS). The transfer of heavy forces to CONUS in no way reflects a reduced commitment or interest in our region, but rather a shift from conventional thinking and a desire to adopt new

methods to better protect our interests. The decrease in overall numbers in the theater will be offset not only by the retention of inherently expeditionary units such as airborne brigades, aviation units, and naval forces, but also by the introduction of our most modern transformed forces (e.g. Stryker Brigade), providing the agility needed to operate effectively in EUCOM's unpredictable and fluid international security environment.

The employment of rotational forces in the European theater is not a new concept. The Navy and Marine Corps deployed Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs) and Amphibious Ready Groups/Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEUs) to the Mediterranean throughout the Cold War, and the new Fleet Response Plan will continue the rotational presence of Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Groups (CSG/ESGs). The Army has had tremendous success with the use of rotational forces in support of operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Air Force's transformation to the Expeditionary Wing structure enabled rotational presence during operations in the Balkans and in support of Operation Northern Watch (northern Iraq no-fly zone enforcement). European Command's Theater Security Cooperation engagement today is conducted with rotational forces in Africa and the Caucasus. The efficacy of rotational forces is a tried and proven concept. The linchpin to EUCOM's theater transformation is the recognition that the continuing and expanded role of rotational forces is essential to increasing our strategic effectiveness in an area of responsibility that encompasses 91 countries in Europe and Africa.

#### *Joint Force Command and Control*

Reliance on rotational forward presence forces, new and enhanced bilateral and multi-national agreements, our leadership role in a transformed NATO, and the decisive execution of the global war on terrorism has transformed EUCOM's command and control structure and architecture.

In accordance with Secretary of Defense Guidance, EUCOM has established its Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) and the European Plans and Operations Center (EPOC). It will rapidly achieve an agile, proven command and control capability for joint and multi-national forces within EUCOM through the execution of command and control exercises. The EPOC will also be the cornerstone of the JCS-funded exercise program in EUCOM and will ensure multi-echeloned training of theater command and control headquarters.

Each component will be organized to participate and lead in the command and control of joint and multi-national forces as a joint task force (JTF) or a combined joint task force (CJTF) throughout the theater. At end state, EUCOM will have the ability to establish six JTF core headquarters. This represents a substantial increase from current capabilities and more accurately matches potential command and control headquarters requirements with emerging requirements, thus enabling joint solutions to emerging or existing crises.

Transformation will also afford theater components opportunities to leverage emerging technologies and doctrine and, in some cases, lead transformational command and control for the Department of Defense. Allies and coalition partners will experience similar gains as we assist their transformation efforts.

#### V. EUCOM AND THE NATO ALLIANCE

NATO, which has been the fulcrum of transatlantic and inter-European security since its inception, continues to transform in order to remain the preeminent security alliance in the world. During the recent NATO Summit in Istanbul, Turkey, the Alliance reaffirmed its new global commitment to undertake the necessary measures to confront present day threats. NATO's decision to expand the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, including the establishment of several more Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and its decision to assist the Interim Iraqi Government with the training of its security forces, underscores the level of transition occurring in the Alliance. Additionally, efforts to enhance the Mediterranean Dialogue program and to offer cooperation to the Greater Middle East is a testament to the desire of NATO to be fully engaged on issues that will help shape our common future.

Further, as the Alliance deploys beyond its members' boundaries, I believe that EUCOM can provide essential support with operationally focused, all-source intelligence. In concert with our NATO partners, EUCOM is standing up the NATO Intelligence Fusion Cell (NIFC), a dedicated intelligence element comprised of U.S. and other NATO personnel. This element will have a core of intelligence professionals operating under common tactics, techniques, and procedures, enhancing U.S. and NATO-nation intelligence interoperability. The NIFC will be co-located with our EUCOM Joint Analysis Center in the United Kingdom.

As I stated during my testimony before this committee in March of this year, the ongoing transformations in EUCOM and NATO are inextricably linked to the challenges inherent in today's international security environment. These simultaneous transformations are mutually supporting and complementary, the synthesis of which produces an effect greater than the sum of its parts. By its leadership and example, EUCOM supports both the Alliance in its transformation, as well as NATO member nations undergoing their own internal transformations.

A transformed posture in Europe—one that supports NATO's own transformation goals—requires forward forces that are rapidly deployable both within and beyond Europe. They must be able to perform the full range of military operations and serve as a deterrent, as well as a combat force. The NATO Response Force (NRF) is the transformational vehicle for the Alliance. The expeditionary standards and certification training serve to ensure the forces meet the desired level of capability and interoperability. Our NATO allies have fully embraced the NRF and we will achieve full operational capability early next month. The Alliance continues to work with member nations to ensure political decisions are made which will enable us to deploy the NRF within the timeframes established at the Prague Summit in 2002. These forces will train alongside other NATO forces to improve their interoperability and serve as a model to enhance the capabilities of the Alliance.

EUCOM facilities and activities also play a vital role in NATO's transformation. They provide both training opportunities and the power projection platforms necessary for joint and combined operations. One such example is the Joint and Combined Expeditionary Training Center at Grafenwohr, Germany. This advanced training facility, along with other high-capacity mobility and throughput infrastructure, i.e. Ramstein Air Base, Germany, will have an increasingly important role in the development of our allies' capabilities and our future European posture.

NATO's recent expansion to include seven new nations has shifted the Alliance's focus eastward. At the same time, long-term NATO member nations have improved their individual and collective ability for mutual defense and find themselves well ahead of the new member nations. While NATO welcomes new member nations, the Alliance recognizes that their military capabilities are not yet fully interoperable with NATO forces and will require significant investment. This is ongoing work.

Our new allies have offered extensive training opportunities and areas, as well as fewer restrictions on maneuver. Encroachment challenges at our current bases and training areas and the desire for increased training with our new allies lead EUCOM to pursue further Eastern European access. Increasing EUCOM's forward presence in Eastern Europe through operating sites, training, and exercises will increase security cooperation engagement, bolster these new members' military capabilities and pave the way for greatly enhanced future contributions to NATO. As these forces transform, they will become more expeditionary and better able to respond to global requirements.

Additionally, EUCOM forces will be in a position to exercise and maintain leadership roles in any new NATO force or command structure developed in Eastern Europe. Although EUCOM will maintain strong participation in established NATO countries through the recently approved NATO command structure, an eastward move will concurrently develop our constructive influence within the new NATO countries and allow the United States and our NATO partners to meet the goals of the Prague Summit more quickly.

#### VI. EUCOM'S THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION

EUCOM's Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) program forms the centerpiece of our efforts to promote security and deter aggression. The TSC program is indispensable in building relationships, enhancing allied and coalition capabilities, and providing access to en route infrastructure. This program will not only pave the way for our transformation plan, it will also be enhanced as the benefits from that transformation are realized.

Theater Security Cooperation builds and strengthens key relationships that promote U.S. strategic interests. These relationships involve interactions at multiple levels from heads of state to students who engage in the many and varied training programs provided by the U.S. and its allies. Capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations are enhanced by TSC and OPTEMPO demands on U.S. forces are reduced. Through the TSC, essential peacetime and contingency access and "en route" infrastructure is provided and the development of regional security organizations to prevent or mitigate conflicts with minimal U.S. participation is accelerated.

A number of programs are provided under the TSC umbrella including: bilateral and Partnership for Peace training events and exercises; Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET); the State Partnership Program (SPP); and foreign assistance pro-

grams such as International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Foreign Military Financing (FMF).

One extraordinarily successful example is the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP). This was a EUCOM executed program that trained Georgian tactical units to conduct up to company-level operations that were instrumental in enhancing Georgia's ability to protect its sovereignty and stabilize the region. Similarly, the Pan Sahel Initiative is an ongoing effort to assist four countries—Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania—in detecting and responding to the migration of asymmetric threats across and within their extensive and poorly controlled borders. Under this program, company-sized units are trained and equipped as rapid reaction units, providing them the mobility, communication, navigation, and individual soldier skills essential for border security, internal defense, and counterterrorism efforts.

Similar TSC programs include: training assistance in Poland to the OIF Polish Division rotations; training assistance to NATO ISAF training preparation in the NATO Joint Warfare Center in Stavanger, Norway; Exercise Bulwark '04 in Bulgaria featuring rotational forces from CONUS, permanently assigned forces from EUCOM, and Bulgarian forces in Novo Selo, Bulgaria; and the recently initiated Torgau exercise series with Russia being conducted both in Russia and in Germany. All of these programs are initiatives that require small investments, but that yield enormous dividends in our effort to promote peace, stability, and democracy. They are also an example of how rotational forces can operate at the tactical level and produce a strategic result.

Two current strategic initiatives that EUCOM continues to develop and expand include "Caspian Guard" and the "Gulf of Guinea Guard." These are two engagements that demonstrate a regional approach towards establishing stability and security in relatively remote areas within the theater susceptible to transnational threats.

Theater Security Cooperation programs have become critical enablers of EUCOM's proposed theater transformation by building and maintaining the key relationships that will allow us to establish new Forward Operating Sites and Cooperative Security Locations. These new sites will enable EUCOM to protect growing U.S. interests in areas of increasing importance to regional security and economic opportunity, while extending the global power and reach of U.S. forces. TSC effectiveness is directly linked to an effective and focused forward basing strategy.

#### VII. THE TRANSFORMATION TIMELINE

The process of transforming EUCOM requires a comprehensive, synchronized approach integrating many segments of our Government and those of our allies and partners to achieve our theater goals. The timeline and ability to implement our Strategic Theater Transformation plan is based on a number of interlocking variables that must be carefully considered, evaluated, and orchestrated in order to gain the greatest benefit. How we do this is as important as what we do. The underlying principles that guide our collective efforts should be the eight assumptions—discussed earlier—that formed the basis for the development of EUCOM's Strategic Theater Transformation plan.

The speed at which transformation will occur depends in large measure on the bilateral and multilateral legal arrangements we have with sovereign countries pertaining to our military personnel, installations, and activities. These legal arrangements constitute the formal framework for our military presence, access, and ability to conduct actions that enhance our operational readiness. Although EUCOM has worked extensively to identify existing installations that will be maintained and those that will need to be established, the final outcome will be predicated, in large measure, on renegotiating longstanding agreements already in place with current allies and negotiating new agreements with new allies or partners that share our concerns for global security. The Department of Defense and the Department of State have already conducted a series of consultations and are proceeding with negotiations to ensure present and future arrangements optimize our ability to train, deploy, and conduct missions in support of our National Security Strategy.

Several key determinates beyond our direct control will influence the transformation tempo in EUCOM. These include the Army's ability to source and deploy "rotational" forces to the theater; identifying and providing installations for units returning to CONUS; available funding to support the plan to establish Joint Forward Operating Sites, Cooperative Security Locations, and additional Joint Pre-positioned Sites throughout the AOR; and the relationship between operational imperatives within the theater and the support we provide to adjacent combatant commands.

While a decision has been made on the essential elements of the plan, considerable efforts to negotiate, resource, and implement the details of that plan remain.

This is not a turn-key operation that can be completed in a few short years. Rather, it is a deliberate, methodical process that will require several years of investment and a considerable degree of interaction on many levels within our Government and with the governments of our allies. Congress is an integral part of this process. We greatly appreciated the visits to EUCOM's theater by members and staff of this committee to learn more about our requirements and plans for the future.

#### VIII. CONCLUSION

We have historically unique opportunities before us. Our efforts over the past year to develop new basing and operational concepts have produced a consensus among our Services and our allies. If implemented, this new direction will enable us to move our capabilities more fully into the new century and away from some 20th century paradigms that are no longer relevant. The physical and visible presence of the United States military in the EUCOM theater is as important as it ever was, however, its character stems from new and different reasons. The security threats of the 21st century are no longer either linear or predictable. They require a "capabilities based" strategy at the core of our thinking with regard to transformation. Those who wish to draw false conclusions with regard to our national commitment to Europe and Africa will no doubt be increasingly vocal as we propose further reductions in our troop and family numbers permanently based in Europe. The response to such criticism is that the historical doctrine suggesting that "mass equals commitment" is no longer as valid a concept as it once was; what we now need is sufficiency and usability in our new basing doctrines. Augmented forward presence (the combination of permanently based, but increasingly expeditionary forward forces augmented by sufficient and predictable rotational forces) along with the war reserve material at Joint Pre-Positioned Sites, and a robust "En Route" Infrastructure will form the nucleus of our strategic presence across an expanding European-African theater. Such capability, while currently lacking, is urgently necessary. Our firm intent is to increase the strategic effect of our forward based and rotational forces in such a way as to form the basis of a vastly improved capability to respond to the new array of threats we face as a Nation, as a member of future coalitions, and as a member of NATO.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, General Jones.  
Admiral Fargo.

#### STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS B. FARGO, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND

Admiral FARGO. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and distinguished members of the committee: Thank you for this opportunity to address U.S. Pacific Command's (PACOM) planning to strengthen our global and theater defense posture. Let me add first my thanks for your outstanding support of our men and women in the Armed Forces today.

Two and a half years ago, I testified before this committee on our priorities for the PACOM. Two of these, reinforcing the constants in Asian Pacific security and promoting the change necessary for improving our defense posture, are key to our larger global strategy. Together these priorities reinforce the foundation of regional stability—our longstanding bilateral alliances, our friendships both old and new, and the presence of our forward-deployed combat forces—while optimizing capabilities of the PACOM to tackle the challenges of the evolving security environment.

The new threat context demands profound and enduring improvements in the way we command, equip, employ, and station our forces. Strengthening and rebalancing our security relationships with Japan and South Korea are vital to stability in north-east Asia. Each is working closely with us to secure peace and effect enduring solutions to mutual challenges associated with basing our forces while maintaining a strong deterrent posture.



Our other Asian treaty allies, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines, along with good friends such as Singapore, Malaysia, India, Indonesia, Mongolia, and many others, have also worked side by side with us to advance efforts in the war on terrorism.

During my service in the Pacific over the past 5 years, the pace of change has been stunning, certainly since the end of the Cold War and also since September 11. Globalization has added a dimension of speed to nearly every aspect of life. Crises clearly affect more people faster. Cyber, biological, and terrorist threats are present along with more traditional concerns, like the Korean Peninsula, the potential for miscalculation across the Taiwan Strait or in Kashmir, and a host of transnational threats. I mentioned terrorism earlier, but there is also proliferation and the trafficking of humans and drugs. We require a changed approach to meet these complex security challenges.

In Asia and the Pacific, the vibrant economies, burgeoning populations, maturing democracies, and military modernization only serve to add momentum to regional transformation and increase the need for new security strategies.

In response to this changing environment, PACOM undertook efforts with the direction of the Secretary and the Chairman to operationalize our National Security Strategy in the PACOM's area of responsibility and in support of other combatant commanders worldwide. For the U.S. PACOM, those efforts included updating our plans, strengthening command and control, increasing capabilities for immediate employment, creating new operational patterns and concepts, improving force posture, and diversifying access and in-or-out logistics.

Forward and expeditionary ground, sea, and air forces have enhanced our ability to immediately employ tailored power on short notice in new ways and will do so more in the future. For example, we are co-locating Stryker brigades with high-speed vessels and C-17 airlifters in Hawaii and Alaska. We are deploying rotational bomber elements to Guam. We are stationing once again submarines in Guam. We have proposed homeporting an additional carrier strike group forward in the Pacific.

Optimizing these immediately employable forces requires an appropriate footprint with more reachback, less infrastructure, and less burden on hosts. For instance, as part of the defense policy review initiative we are working closely with our ally Japan to reduce the overall number of U.S. troops there, remove longstanding noise encroachment concerns, and adjust force posture in Okinawa. As part of this process we will mature and strengthen the U.S.-Japan security alliance while assuring an enduring presence of critical forward forces and warfighting capability.

In the future of the Republic of Korea-United States alliance initiative, we are consolidating our footprint into two enduring hubs south of the Han River, which leverages both improved capabilities to enhance power projection, readiness, and deterrence, both on the peninsula and regionally. The United States will also redeploy troops from South Korea as combined forces are modernized and the Republic of Korea assumes a greater role in its own defense.

Finally, we are looking for access and logistics prepositioning opportunities throughout the theater that allow us to move forces

quickly to the location of greatest need. A network of cooperative security locations, places not bases, will provide avenues of critical access for contingency operations, expand Special Operations Force presence, and continue through our security cooperation efforts to strengthen the capacity of our allies and partners in the region.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am proud to represent the men and women of the United States Pacific Command, who work tirelessly on behalf of our Nation to put in place credible, flexible, and ready forces to secure our national interests at home and abroad.

I thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Admiral.  
General LaPorte.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. LEON J. LAPORTE, USA, COMMANDER,  
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, REPUBLIC OF KOREA/UNITED  
STATES COMBINED FORCES COMMAND, COMMANDER,  
UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA**

General LAPORTE. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and distinguished members of the committee: I am honored for the opportunity to appear before you today. Moreover, I am honored at the opportunity to represent the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who serve our Nation in the Republic of Korea (ROK).

I will briefly address how the new global defense posture is strengthening our deterrence and readiness on the Korean Peninsula through our enhance, shape, and align initiatives. These initiatives are the result of nearly 2 years of close consultation with our valued ally, the Republic of Korea. The Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America, signed over a half century ago, is the foundation for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command, created as a result of this treaty, is the cornerstone of our deterrence. This command is vigilant, well-trained, and ready to fight, tonight, and win.

Today deterrence is achieved by an integrated team of nearly 690,000 active duty troops and 3 million reservists from the Republic of Korea, combined with some 34,000 forward deployed United States military personnel on the Korean Peninsula. This combined force can be rapidly reinforced when needed from regional and strategic assets. Additionally, U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula are advantaged by extensive reachback capabilities to resources resident in the Pacific Command and the continental United States.

Historically, the metric of readiness has been the number of troops on the ground. However, what is truly important is the complementary deterrent and combat capabilities that each nation contributes to the security of the peninsula. Over the past several years there has been a tremendous improvement in the interoperability of our combined forces. Concurrently, the U.S. Armed Forces have transformed our capabilities in many areas, including strategic deployability, command and control, precision strike, and joint and combined operations.

These capabilities allow us to focus overmatching combat power when and where we choose to defeat armed aggression. United

States forces can now be sized to provide tailored capabilities that complement those of the Republic of Korea ally, providing overwhelming strategic deterrence. Our regional and strategic reinforcement capabilities allow us to defeat any potential North Korean aggression.

The Combined Forces Command continues to adapt to the changing security environment. This transformation is taking place through three key initiatives: enhancing combined capabilities, shaping combined Republic of Korea and United States roles and missions, and aligning U.S. forces for the future.

The most visible of these are the capability enhancements that we are now making throughout our combined forces modernization programs, that include more than 340 United States and Republic of Korea enhancements to greatly strengthen our combined deterrence and readiness capabilities, enhancements such as fielding the PAC-3 Patriot missile system, coupled with the stationing of a Patriot brigade headquarters and a second Patriot battalion with two additional Patriot batteries to strengthen our theater missile defense. The upgrade of our Apache helicopters to AH-64 Delta Longbows increases the combat capability of that weapons system by 400 percent. F/A-18 E and F Super Hornets, either carrier or land-based, provide precision strike capabilities day and night and in all weather. The introduction of high-speed vessels and C-17s facilitate rapid reinforcement of regionally positioned United States forces, such as the Marine Expeditionary Force or the Stryker brigade combat teams, by sea and by air. Additionally, our investment in prepositioned sets of equipment allows for rapid reinforcement.

The Republic of Korea Armed Forces are also enhancing their capabilities with the addition of the Multiple Launch Rocket System, the K-1 tank, the F-15 aircraft, the Aegis cruiser, and the K-9 howitzer, just to name a few.

As a result of our combined combat capability enhancements, the Republic of Korea-United States military committee agreed to transfer several Combined Forces Command missions from the United States forces to the Republic of Korea over the next 2 years. These mission transfers will shape the combined forces to leverage each nation's specific strengths, allowing the United States Forces Korea to tailor its capabilities on the peninsula and in the region.

Consolidating the majority of the United States forces in Korea into two enduring hubs is the final component of our transformation. This effort consists first of consolidation of forces and then their eventual relocation to the south, away from the Seoul metropolitan area, creating a less intrusive footprint and increasing the operational mission of our on-peninsula stationed forces.

Close consultation for the past 18 months between the United States and the Republic of Korea governments has brought this initiative closer to reality, as demonstrated by recent agreements detailing the specifics of consolidation and relocation.

The Republic of Korea's own national defense strategy extends far beyond equipment modernization. In its 2004 National Security Strategy, President Hyun declared his intention to promote a cooperative, self-reliant defensive posture when the Republic of Korea will assume a leading role in its national security. Minister of National Defense Yoon recently announced to restructure the Republic

of Korea armed forces, including a 40,000-person reduction, which reinforces our mutual confidence in our combined capability enhancements.

In conclusion, I want to reaffirm that the Combined Forces Command is trained and ready to fight and win, tonight. We are posturing the combined ROK-U.S. capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat any potential North Korean aggression. Our plan is on course to enhance the United States and Republic of Korea capabilities, to shape combined roles and mission by leveraging each alliance member's unique strengths, and while aligning the force for sustainable long-term United States military presence on the peninsula.

Your continued support of our transformation efforts will ensure our sustained ability to protect the security of the Republic of Korea and guarantee stability in Northeast Asia. Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, General.

Mr. Secretary, General Myers, and the combatant commanders, I commend you on a very strong case, one of the most important initiatives, Mr. Secretary, that you have undertaken in your administration.

Mr. Secretary, I am going to ask one brief question and I ask that you reply as briefly as you can because I wish to reserve the chairman's time of 6 minutes to be utilized by me as I see appropriate in the course of the subsequent questions. My one question, Mr. Secretary: Should Congress adjust the current BRAC schedule and constitute a delay, would that impair the implementation of this program and delay the return to home bases of our troops overseas?

Secretary RUMSFELD. It would be most unfortunate if there were to be any delay in BRAC. It would indeed delay forces being returned to the United States. The timing is fortuitous and had we not initiated this global review of our posture prior to a BRAC round, the BRAC round would be in the dark as to what might happen prospectively. Because we have the timing—we started 3 years ago to work on this—the timing is excellent and they are linked together tightly.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you. You might also in your expansion for the record talk about the implications for the negotiations with allies and other countries that are an integral part of this. I thank the Secretary.

I will reserve the balance of my time.

Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, about a year ago in November 2003, according to a New York Times article, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessed at that time that the situation in Iraq "is creating a more fertile environment for the anti-American insurgency" and that the insurgency is gaining strength. That was November 13, 2003. It seemed to be a correct assessment at that time.

The President the other day gave his reaction to the reported new intelligence assessment, and I am wondering what is your reaction to that reported assessment?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I have read it. It is now a number of months old. My recollection is a lot of the data was accumulated in April and May. I have not read it recently, but it took various approaches, worst case and medium case and best case, as I recall.

I think what I would say about it is that I recall data in there that pointed out that people did not like having foreign forces in their country, in Iraq, and that comes as no great surprise to me. I do not think many countries would like to have foreign forces in their countries for a prolonged period.

I have forgotten whether it was in that particular document, but my recollection is there was very strong support for elections and there also was a reasonably good level of support for having forces remain to assure that elections occurred.

A lot has happened since those months in April, May, and June when that was prepared. First, the Iraqi Governing Council is gone and the Interim Iraqi Government exists. There is a prime minister, there are cabinet ministers. The U.N. helped fashion that approach.

Second, they have recently had 1,000 people gather and select a 100-person constituent assembly.

Both of those steps, as well as the leadership that has been provided that the chairman mentioned with the prime minister who was here today, I think are vivid demonstrations to the Iraqi people about the seriousness of moving forward to elections and being able to continue to develop the Iraqi security forces and over time reduce the coalition forces, which are clearly what the estimate indicated was desired by the Iraqi people.

Senator LEVIN. Was your reaction that that estimate was too pessimistic?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I do not have a judgment on that. I would not say it was too pessimistic. I think there were various pieces of it that might prove over time to be too pessimistic, possibly some pieces too optimistic.

Senator LEVIN. Would you say that security is better in Iraq today than it was 3 months ago?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Clearly the incidents of violence are up, if that is what you mean by security. But the other thing that is up are the number of Iraqi security forces that are now trained and equipped, and that is a good thing.

Senator LEVIN. But overall would you say the security situation in Iraq is better today than 3 months ago?

Secretary RUMSFELD. First of all, it is hard to talk about—I should also add, Mr. Chairman, I was not aware that this was going to be on Iraq.

Senator LEVIN. I thought that was clarified with you. It was our understanding—

Secretary RUMSFELD. Not to me, and I would have been happy to have General Abizaid and Ambassador Negroponte join us here today.

Senator LEVIN. It was very clearly understood that Iraq would be included in the subjects to be covered here today. I am sorry that you were not informed. We were actually told specifically that you were and you did have that understanding.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Well, I do not. I did not.

Let me go ahead and try to respond to this question, because it is a fair question—

Chairman WARNER. Let me address the procedure here. Initially when we received a request from a number of colleagues to have a hearing on this important subject, I began to establish with you the hearing date. At that time it was the consideration that we would cover some of Iraq and some of the posture review.

But then when we arranged—and I urged the leadership to have you and General Abizaid and others up yesterday—it seemed to me that fulfilled the Senate's important need to have the opportunity to question you, and that took place extensively yesterday. So we revised the hearing notice to write very explicitly the hearing was for the purpose of receiving your report on this subject.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, there is clearly a misunderstanding, because that was not transmitted to us as being a private meeting yesterday as a substitute for a public meeting today. In any event, if the Secretary—

Secretary RUMSFELD. I am happy to answer. I am happy to answer.

The security situation has become—there is an increase in violent incidents, no question about that. I think that is to be expected. The intelligence has also suggested that, not just in Iraq but in Afghanistan and possibly other parts of the world. We have three elections coming up—ours, the Afghan elections, and the Iraqi elections, and we have seen a spike, somewhat of a spike, in Afghanistan as well.

There is no doubt but the people who are determined to not have a free system in Afghanistan or a free system in Iraq are doing things to try to prevent those free systems from being achieved. I think that we should probably look forward to a continued spike in activity between now and January when they plan to have elections, as the prime minister said today.

Senator LEVIN. Do you think that the increase in those attacks is evidence of desperation on the part of the insurgents?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Oh, goodness, I cannot climb in their minds. I would not say that myself. I basically rely on the intelligence I get, and I think that there is a determination on their part to—if you think of their targets they are trying to assassinate government officials, they are trying to prevent people from being recruited to join the security forces, they are trying to disrupt important infrastructure, to make the Iraqi people dissatisfied.

These are people who chop off people's heads. The kind of system they want in that country and for this world is not a system that anyone with any sense would want to have achieved.

Senator LEVIN. I think there is unanimity on that.

Relative to the security forces being trained and equipped, there has been a very slow delivery of weapons, vehicles, and communication devices. The figures that we have is that only half of the required weapons have been delivered. In terms of equipping Iraqi national security forces that we all want to be equipped—we are talking here about Iraqi national forces—less than a third of the vehicles have been supplied and less than a fifth of the communication devices have been supplied.

I am wondering if either you or General Myers might tell us why it is that we are behind where our deliveries were intended to be at this point, as well as the recruiting and training itself.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I would be happy to start and Dick Myers can finish. We started in effect with a need for security forces at the end of major combat operations. The numbers then went up from zero to about 206,000, and in the 206,000 were 74,000 facility protection services that were not under our control in any sense. They were part of the ministries. In addition, there were people in that number that were not trained fully, not equipped fully.

We now have a number of roughly 100,000 that are fully equipped and fully trained. So one reason that this has taken some time, obviously, is the fact that we have changed the goal. You used percentages. When General Casey went in, we sent in an assessment team to determine what numbers of police that country ought to have, what numbers of army, what numbers of border patrols. The original numbers that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi Governing Council had developed in my judgment proved to be too low. We raised those numbers. So the percentage of accomplishment has dropped. That is one reason.

A second reason is we have been basically functioning out there with peacetime rules and one of the major contracts I am told was challenged, which caused it to be delayed for some period of a number of weeks under the normal procedures that we have.

I personally have a high degree of confidence in General Casey and General Petraeus and the program they have in effect. I think it is about right. The Iraqi government has generally agreed, although they would prefer some more heavily mechanized units than may be in the current program. They have a timetable which is available on the web site for anyone to see as to what we think it will evolve over time. They are looking for in January, I believe, 145,000, up from the 100,000 today, and by August of '05 up to 202,000 that will be fully trained and equipped.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General MYERS. The only thing I would add to that is last spring—and I think we have testified in front of the committee on this before—it was decided, decided by those of us involved, that we needed a more holistic approach to the security forces. So the responsibility for training the police and the border folks all came under the Department of Defense.

Since that time, of course, we have General Petraeus over there. Equipment is now arriving at a fairly rapid rate. We said it would take until September to get the contracts in place and get the equipment started to move. It is moving fairly well right now.

The one item I think that is before Congress is the \$1.8 billion reprogramming—I think you mentioned it, Senator Levin—to reprogram some of the reconstruction money into the security sector because it is so important, and that is to meet the new force levels that the Interim Iraqi Government has decided it needs. They did it in consultation with us because we have division commanders on the ground that make very valuable inputs to this whole equation.

I think we are in pretty good shape right now. If we get the \$1.8 billion, if we can keep the contracts flowing, if we get the contract-

ing people over there that we need to get over there, we will be okay.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Levin, if I could add, at our luncheon meeting with the prime minister he specifically said, Mr. Secretary, that he approached our Government and said that he would want to increase substantially the number of battalions to meet his projected security needs and that, while you sent General Petraeus in with one level, when the Allawi government took charge they decided to raise that very substantially.

Secretary RUMSFELD. That is under discussion now.

Chairman WARNER. That is correct.

Secretary RUMSFELD. The other thing I would say, it is easy to count numbers of people manned, it is easy to count equipment, and it is easy to count number of weeks of training. The tough stuff is the soft stuff. It is the chain of command, it is the leadership structure, it is do you have generals and colonels and noncommissioned officers and people in an integrated, well-staffed capability that they can manage their affairs. That—in the ministry of interior and in the ministry of defense. Reality tells me that that is going to be the toughest part of this puzzle, not simply buying trucks and weapons.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. I want to thank the witnesses.

Mr. Secretary, I was very pleased to hear your comments in response to Senator Warner's question about the necessity of BRAC. Would you recommend a veto if the defense bill came to the President that had a 2-year delay in BRAC?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Oh, I certainly would. It would be a terrible thing, Senator.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, did you happen to see today's Reuters story, "The United States and Japan have detected signs that North Korea is preparing to launch a ballistic missile with a range capable of hitting almost all of Japan"?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I did not see the Reuters story. I have been told about that.

Senator MCCAIN. The reason why I bring this up is at a time of withdrawal of troops we obviously are seeing increasing bellicosity and lack of cooperation on the part of the North Koreans, who are unpredictable at best, which raises the whole issue of personnel that I am extremely concerned about.

I think we all appreciate that we are going to be in Iraq for a long period of time in significant numbers. We now, for the first time in history, have the largest percentage on a sustained basis of Guard and reservists as part of our Active-Duty Forces, some 40 percent in Iraq. We are calling up people on active duty who are members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), who thought that they would never ever be recalled to active duty. We have a thing that some call a back-door draft and that is a "stop loss" where people are being required to remain on active duty past their enlisted time.



Meanwhile, there are units, such as the Second Brigade of the Tenth Mountain Division, who have been home for 208 days between more than year-long deployments in Iraq. The impact of this, anecdotally, is very serious on recruiting and retention, and now facts are emerging. The Guard recruiting fell 12 percent below their goals in the first three quarters of 2004. The delayed entry program for the United States Army is well below its goals for this year.

We have authorized an increase and so has the House in active duty personnel. We have 30,000 individuals in addition on active duty through various ways that we have all been made aware of, 30,000 additional for some "temporary" time.

My point is, Mr. Secretary, that if something happens in Korea—the Iranians are now thumbing their nose at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in their Nonproliferation Treaty violations—that the strain on our active duty, Guard, and Reserve Forces are incredible as we speak, and there are very few people that I know who believe that we can sustain the level of deployments that we are having just to Iraq. Then we have a problem with Korea or with Iran or another flashpoint in the world and it is clear, at least to most observers, that we do not have sufficient personnel, despite the efficiencies which you have so well and graphically described.

Now, I can only quote Colonel Rob Baker, commander of the Second Brigade, First Armored Division, who knows something about the personal costs of extended combat tours. After spending 19 of the past 20 months deployed in Iraq and the Middle East, he recently returned home and found himself unable to pick out his youngest daughter in the "welcome home" crowd.

Baker said: "I know the strains that back to back deployments can put on a great relationship and a great family. There is a threshold beyond which people will say 'I just cannot give any more.'"

Now, we are hearing, Mr. Secretary, that good and decent and wonderful and brave and patriotic and sacrificing Americans who are serving in the military are saying that they cannot keep up this level of deployments. Much larger percentages of military personnel than was in past conflicts are married, and many of them with children.

Now, I am very concerned about the personnel situation in the military, and I would be glad to hear from General Jones and Admiral Fargo and General LaPorte as well.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you, Senator. This is an enormously important issue. It is true that there has been modest use of the individual ready reservists and there very likely will be somewhat additional use of individual ready reservists. They all knew from the beginning when they signed up, as I did, to be a reservist that for a period after you are in the Selected Reserve you are available in the Individual Ready Reserve.

With respect to stop-loss, that is not new. It has been used for decades, as I understand it, by the military, and it is aimed at unit cohesion. It has not had a significant effect to my understanding.

All of us are deeply sensitive to the things you are raising and that is why we have something like 30 different things going on to

reduce stress on the force. We mentioned some in my testimony: the movement of military jobs to civilian jobs so that more military are available; the rebalancing of the Guard and Reserve.

The fact is we have 1.4 million on active duty, we have 850,000 in the Selected Reserve, we have another 450,000 in the Individual Ready Reserve, for a total of over 2.5 million people, and we are only putting 250,000 in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility (CENTCOM AOR). So we have a lot of people that have not been called up in the Reserves ever. We have a lot of people who are not being used. What we need to do is better manage the force.

To the extent, as you also indicated, we have increased the total size of the force, we have had to under the President's emergency authority so that we could meet our demands.

If we need to increase the size of the force, we need to increase the size of the force, and I am all for it. It would pain me to do it when we have so many portions of the force that are not being properly used, and I would much prefer to see us do that.

I am not knowledgeable about the numbers you used in recruiting and retention, but when I talk to General Schoemaker he tells me that his recruiting and retention numbers are pretty good, quite good, except in one or two categories, and that he does not at the moment see a particular problem.

Do you want to comment, Dick?

Senator MCCAIN. I do not need General Myers' response. I know it will be exactly the same as yours. I would like the personal opinions—and I do not mean that as in any way a criticism, General Myers. I would like the personal opinions of the other combatant commanders if I could, since my time has expired.

Chairman WARNER. I think that I will grant from my time the opportunity for General Myers to reply.

General MYERS. I have a few numbers here that might help. Retention of Reserve Forces: They have targeted ceilings for loss. They are under those. They could be impacted, those numbers could be impacted, by stop-loss. When they come back and stop-loss is taken off that could change that.

The Army National Guard is the one area where the recruiting is the tightest right now. They probably will not make their goals this year. On the other hand, they are going to be within 2 percent of their end strength. So there are lots of numbers you could use to look at these things.

I think what Senator McCain said is very valid. What we have to do is look out beyond what we know and try to predict what our retention is going to be. This would be a very serious matter if we wind up in a year or 2 and we do not have the kind of force that we need, particularly in the Reserve component, because they are not built overnight and they are so essential, I think, to the way we do our military business in this country and connect us to our citizenry.

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Chairman, before the other witnesses respond, I did not mean it as any slight to General Myers. I apologize, General Myers, if I did. I was interested in the operational aspect of the commands, and I apologize. I always value your opinion.

The chairman does not like me to practice, as I usually do, running over the time allowed me rather significantly. I apologize, General Myers.

Chairman WARNER. We will now hear from the other combatant commanders.

Admiral FARGO. Mr. Chairman, Senator, this is something we are watching very closely, looking at all of the metrics. It is a concern. I think we are fortunate in the Pacific that the naval forces and the air forces have largely been reconstituted from their work in CENTCOM and so they are essentially full up. We have used those forces in the Pacific to compensate for the stress that we recognize is on the ground forces right now, and that is the reason you have seen things such as the bomber deployments to Guam, the rotation of the *John C. Stennis* into the western Pacific. She will be backfilled by *Abraham Lincoln* later on this year.

Senator MCCAIN. I was asking about effects on retention and morale.

Admiral FARGO. Yes, sir. The numbers right now remain high. The retention certainly in all of the armed services in the Pacific Command are above, well above, historical norm.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you.

General LAPORTE. Senator, it is hard to dispute the anecdotal comments of people who have had great separation. I reflect back on the separation that the World War II generation had in terms of family.

Senator MCCAIN. Which happened to be a declared war.

General LAPORTE. The issue of increasing the size of the military I think is more an issue of increasing the effectiveness of the military. That includes the size dimension and we are growing the Army. But it also includes an issue of increasing effectiveness relative to the organizational structure, the capabilities, and the access of those capabilities. Those are programs that I am convinced General Schoomaker is working very diligently.

In terms of the impact on retention, in my command, retention is extremely high. I will quote an example. We instituted a policy where we asked soldiers to increase their voluntary stay in the Republic of Korea. We called it the assignment incentive program. We began that program on 15 March. Up to today, we have had 8,700 soldiers and airmen voluntarily extend their tour of duty in Korea by 1 year and 2,000 of those extended for 2 years.

That is a volunteer willingness to accept personal sacrifice. I think that is a pretty good indication of the dedication of our young men and women.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you.

General Jones.

General JONES. Senator, in the European theater reenlistments and retention across the components appear to be satisfactory. We do have, we have had for some time, a greater reliance on Reserves and National Guards, to be absolutely truthful. However, we do have some good news coming with the situation in Macedonia being fairly well resolved, Bosnia is now coming to a closure in terms of our reliance on large numbers of U.S. troops, so I think that will help relieve some of the strain.

The greatest impact with regard to Afghanistan and Iraq with regard to European forces has been on the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force. We have seen, obviously, two full Army divisions committed in Iraq and we have other forces that are training now, getting ready to take a rotation back into Afghanistan.

One of the things that I think makes the retention picture and the reenlistment picture good is that Congress and the Department of Defense and the Services have worked together to I think create family support programs and quality of life programs that have really helped over the past 5 or 6 years, have been instrumental—I am always tremendously impressed at the support system that is available to the families, whether it is in Germany or in the continental United States.

Having said that, obviously there are only so many people in the force and if you use it at a cyclic rate you have to be very careful because at some point you could overuse it, and I think all of us are very sensitive to that.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.

General MYERS. Mr. Chairman, one more comment, if it is permissible.

Chairman WARNER. Yes.

General MYERS. With respect to Korea in particular, but our war plans in general, one of the things the Joint Chiefs of Staff do as we deploy forces around the world, particularly to the Central Command, is take a look at our ability to support those other war plans that we know we might have to fill. We look at this periodically to make sure we can do that.

With regard to the Korean war plan in particular, there should be no doubt that we have the forces to respond to that contingency if we need to do that. That is something that we measure and we look at regularly.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.

I will charge those responses, add it to my time.

Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much.

Welcome, Mr. Secretary. Listening to Prime Minister Allawi this morning and the Secretary brief to Congress yesterday, as the chairman pointed out, it seems like we are operating in two different worlds. Yesterday we heard from Secretary Rumsfeld and others that the military never lost a battle and elections are on schedule, and today we heard from Prime Minister Allawi saying that we are succeeding in Iraq. Notwithstanding what the administration says, the July National Intelligence Estimate makes clear that, as bad as things are now, they could get worse. As the press has reported, the intelligence estimate paints a very different picture.

For example, the Washington Post said last Friday, the intelligence estimate: "Iraq's prospect for stability and self-governance over the next 18 months were at best tenuous, according to U.S. Government officials who had read the report." The report identified serious problems in recruiting, training an effective Iraqi army and police force, and establishing a competent central government, rebuilding significant infrastructure.

Today the Congressional Quarterly said about the estimate: "It forecasts three scenarios for Iraq, ranging from continued violence at current levels to civil war."

Now, I am bringing this up, Mr. Secretary, because I listened to the report yesterday, then I went down and read the NIE report, and I have quoted the public documents that are out in the record now characterizing it.

The report also included some unclassified polling data that was collected by the CPA, and the CIA obviously felt it was valid enough to include as part of the intelligence estimate, and it certainly rings an alarm bell about the lack of support for our mission. I have an unclassified version of that page and it shows that over 90 percent of the Iraqis view us as occupiers, not liberators. It shows that nearly 50 percent of the Iraqis view insurgent attacks as an attempt to liberate Iraq from U.S. occupation. It says that over 75 percent of Iraqis believe that insurgent attacks have increased because Iraqis have lost confidence in the coalition, and the number of Iraqis who want us to leave immediately has grown dramatically—all in that chart—and support for the coalition has declined dramatically.

Yet President Bush dismissed the ominous parts of the estimate, saying the CIA was just "guessing" what conditions might be like. Today he said he should have used a better word, "estimate," not "guess."

The intelligence estimate is not the only alarming sign that conditions in Iraq have gone from bad to worse. During August, 900 American troops were killed or wounded. The numbers keep going up, not down. The same month our forces were attacked an average 70 times a day, far more than the previous year. The Schlesinger report, which you commissioned, says that senior leaders in the Department of Defense failed to see the insurgency growing in Iraq last year.

We know that after heavy fighting our troops withdrew from Fallujah, which has allowed the insurgents to regroup and gather strength. Other cities in the Sunni Triangle remain violent and dangerous.

Yet all we hear from the administration are rosy scenarios. The reality is much worse and the administration failed to plan for it. We seem to be closer to mission impossible rather than mission accomplished. The failures so far have made our job and the job of Prime Minister Allawi far more difficult.

So let me ask you, how do you explain the huge discrepancy between what you say and what we see, and how can whatever government is elected be seen as legitimate if large parts of the population do not feel safe enough to vote?

Secretary RUMSFELD. First of all, I do not agree with your premise that there is a wide disparity between what I say or what General Abizaid said yesterday and what the prime minister said or what the NIE said. Is the glass half empty or half full? Is it dangerous? Yes. Are people being killed? Yes. Is it a violent country? You bet. Were there 200 and some odd people killed in Washington, D.C., last year? Yes. Were they on the front page of every newspaper? Were they on the television every night? No.

Now, first of all on the data in the classified material you cited to—

Senator KENNEDY. Just on this point, just on your point about everything—

Chairman WARNER. Let us give the Secretary the opportunity.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Just a minute. This data is probably 4 or 5 months old, probably April, May, say May. So it is June, July, August, September.

Number two, the data that you cited comes from three cities—Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul. It does not come across the entire country.

Is the data probably right? Yes. Was it right then? Probably. Is it true today? I do not know. Do polls swing around depending on the circumstance? You bet.

Is this exactly what the terrorists want to have happen? Yes. They want to have the people of the country lose heart. They want to have the people of the country decide that the terrorists and the extremists are going to win and that the free Iraqi government and the coalition forces that are trying to help that country are going to lose, and it is a test of wills.

Now, I do not believe that you have heard from General Myers or me or others, even General Abizaid, a rosy picture. You cannot think it is a rosy picture when you see people killed every day, and we understand that. I think it is a mischaracterization.

Senator KENNEDY. Let me point out, this is what the President said, August 23: "We are making progress on the ground." August 24, the Vice President: "We are moving in the right direction in Iraq." September 14, Don Rumsfeld: "I am very encouraged about the situation in Iraq."

I could continue to read these. I am also talking about the growth of violence, and I am also saying that that poll was—I am not pulling that poll out. That was in the NIE report, Mr. Secretary. Evidently the CIA thought it was of at least some value.

Secretary RUMSFELD. It is.

Senator KENNEDY. So we ought to include it in the report.

Secretary RUMSFELD. That is fine.

Senator KENNEDY. The point that you cannot get away from is the dramatic increase in violence. You might be able to dismiss a poll, but we have this dramatic increase of violence.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I did not dismiss the poll, Senator.

Senator KENNEDY. I am talking now about the violence.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I said it was probably accurate when it was made.

Senator KENNEDY. Okay. Let us put it in whatever perspective you want.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Okay.

Senator KENNEDY. Let us get to the dramatic increase in violence. That is the violence has increased.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes.

Senator KENNEDY. No two ways about it.

Secretary RUMSFELD. That is right, I said that.

Senator KENNEDY. It has increased. It has increased and it continues to increase.

Secretary RUMSFELD. General Abizaid said it yesterday in the hearing you were attending. We all say that.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, what is the plan? What is plan B then? How are we going to get people out to vote with the dramatic increase in violence in these places? How are we going to expect that you are going to have a real election in Fallujah when you have the dissidents and the insurgents controlling it today? How are you going to have elections there?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Let me see if I can respond this way. The situation in Iraq is notably different in different parts of the country. It is not a single picture. It is quite different. The prime minister today said that he believed that in a large fraction of the total provinces elections could be held today.

Now, when the elections are held in January it may be that some of those provinces have higher levels of violence. But you can—I believe he is right, the prime minister, that you will be able to hold elections and that there will be elections in January. As he said today, everyone said you could not go past sovereignty. We did it. We passed it 2 days early. They said you could not hold a conference of 1,000 people and pick 100 people for the constituent assembly. They did it.

They have met every single benchmark politically. They are making progress. Now, they are making progress at a time when the people, the extremists, are trying to chop people's heads off. Does anyone think that is a good idea, to chop people's heads off, to encourage that? I do not. I think it is a terrible thing.

But it may be—I should not even say this, because I just do not know enough about it. This is something that the ambassador is working on. But let us pretend hypothetically that you get to election time in January and let us pretend that it is roughly like it is or a little worse, which it could be because you have to expect it to continue. They are not happy the way it is going. They do not want a government elected in that country. Badly they do not want that.

Let us say you tried to have an elections and you could have it in three-quarters or four-fifths of the country, but some places you could not because the violence was too great. Well, so be it. Nothing is perfect in life. So you have an election that is not quite perfect. Is it better than not having an election? You bet.

Senator KENNEDY. Are you planning to have more troops?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I do not have a plan for troops or more or less.

Senator KENNEDY. For the elections?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I know that General Abizaid has said that it may be that he will want some more troops. He is getting more troops every day. If you think about it, the Iraqi forces are now the biggest part, almost the biggest part, the second biggest part, of the coalition. We have 39,000 police trained, equipped, and on duty. You have 14,000 border guards trained, equipped, and on duty. You have 5,000 in the army trained, equipped, and on duty. The national guard has 38,000. The intervention force has 2,000. The special ops has 500.

That number will keep growing, so there will be more troops by time of election. It will be somewhere between 110,000 and 140,000, I would guess, Iraqi troops, forces of various types.

Coalition forces, I do not know. Some forces have said they will come in to help protect the U.N. Some countries are considering whether they want to bring in forces to help with the election. In the event General Abizaid decided he needs more forces to assist in the elections, like he has for example in Afghanistan, he will ask and he will get it.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.

I would like to take a minute of my time. I likewise was concerned about the NIE and I asked the Department of State to provide me with their comments, and I received the following, which I will put into the record. This is dated September 8, which presumably is quite current: "Polls show that a large majority of Iraqis have a positive outlook on their young democracy and the elections that are to take place by January 2005. More than 77 percent of respondents feel that regular fair elections would be the most important political right for the Iraqi people. 58 percent feel that the democracy in Iraq is likely to succeed."

Also, in meeting with the prime minister, all of us studied his distinguished biography. You talked about chopping off heads. Saddam Hussein tried literally to chop his off one time and he suffered a terrible injury, requiring over a year of hospitalization. I mention that only because when you look into the faces of the prime minister and the ministers that he had with him today, every one of those men are operating as best they can voluntarily, under extraordinary personal threats to them individually.

So I think they exhibit the will of the Iraqi people to succeed under these difficult circumstances.

Senator Allard.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to get back onto the subject of your Global Posture Review and kind of take us back to the very start. The previous administration I understand had examined whether to consider reordering their Global Posture, but had determined that such an effort would be difficult. What motivated you, Mr. Secretary, or the President, to consider reordering our global posture, and explain to us why this is so important in today's environment?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, anyone who looked at where our forces were left at the end of the Cold War had to know that they were not where they ought to be.

Second, we have to be respectful of taxpayers' dollars.

Third, it seems to me that we have to be respectful of the men and women who volunteer to serve in the military, and to the extent we can reduce stress on the force by reducing the number of permanent changes of station for people and create a life that is somewhat better for the spouses, so they will not have to change jobs so frequently, and for the kids that do not have to get jerked out of high school, that we owed it to them.

Fourth, we have found that, as we have gone along, our needs are different. We were planning to fight in place in Korea and Europe. We are no longer planning to fight in place. We know the odds are we are going to fight somewhere other than where we are



located. That means we simply must have the kind of usability of our forces. We have to be able to get them out of there and get them where they need to go and get them fast, and not have a big debate with a neighboring country about whether or not you can use rail across their country because their sensitivities are bothered by something.

We also want people where they are wanted. Our forces—we are going to have better recruiting and better retention if they are in places where the people want them there.

Furthermore, it seems to me that the 21st century does not call for the permanent deployment of heavy forces. We are going to have to be agile, we are going to have to move fast, we are going to have to be able to go where the problem is.

I would submit that no one on this committee asked Secretary Cheney when he was being looked at for Secretary of Defense about Iraq, and yet he ended up in a war in Iraq. No one asked me about Afghanistan. If that does not tell you that it is not possible to know where a threat is going to come from—we are going to have to deal with capabilities that enemies have that are increasingly lethal and dangerous, but can come from any number of locations.

As a result, I just felt compelled to push this. The President and I talked about it. It is an incredibly difficult task. It is so complicated and so difficult to deal with so many countries and so many committees of Congress. It is going to cost some money, let there be no doubt.

So it is not something where you get up in the morning and say, "Gee, I think I would like to go change the force posture of the United States of America." This is something we had to do, and we are doing it.

Senator ALLARD. Mr. Secretary, when do you think you will be able to implement the Global Posture Review? I would like to hear comments from the other members on the panel here. Then also, when do you anticipate the reorienting of our forces will be completed? Again, I would like to have the full panel respond to those two questions.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I can give you a short general answer and it is that I do not know. What we have to do is we have a theory as to where we prefer to be arranged and with what countries and in what ways. We have other choices. We have options. We will go to those first choices first, and if we can get an arrangement that is satisfactory in terms of usability and cost we will do it. If we cannot, we will go to our second choice and work that out. We will call audibles as we go along.

It will play out probably over a period of 6 to 8 years, is my best guess.

Senator ALLARD. Do any other members of the panel have any comments on when we start implementation? Yes, General Jones?

General JONES. Senator, some of the elements of the plan actually can already be considered to be under way. The Navy and Air Force component headquarters have begun—we have begun streamlining them. These are things that are important to do in order to modernize our headquarters and transform them into actual warfighting headquarters.

We have conducted exercises in Eastern Europe to test a rotational concept. So we are doing a lot of things to get ready for the majority of the work. We are negotiating—we are talking to our allies and friends and making sure that they understand the intent and how this is beneficial.

Also, in Europe this is extremely closely watched by our allies because it also affects the transformational plans of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We have many countries that we work with on a regular basis, particularly the newer members from the eastern part of Europe, who are very interested in reducing the size of their armies, principally, and transforming them into capabilities that are much more usable and much more expeditionary. The United States Army in Europe, which forms the bulk of our transformation, is really the model that others are looking for to emulate.

This is going to take a long time. It is not something you can rush into. But it is definitely something that we feel is worth doing.

Senator ALLARD. Admiral?

Admiral FARGO. Senator, just as General Jones has said, some of our efforts are already under way, and I think I mentioned in my opening statement that we have already moved two of the three submarines to Guam. We have rotational bomber elements in Guam right now. The Stryker brigades are being formed and trained and they will be in position early. We just broke ground on C-17 facilities in Hawaii.

So this is the early, the leading edge of this. I think the rest of it will occur probably over about a 10-year period. I think that is a fair estimate of how long it will take to conduct this complex and extensive change.

Senator ALLARD. I know my time has expired, but I just want to follow up this question if the chairman will allow me. The press has reported there will be 70,000 they think may be returning back to the United States. Can you comment about that figure that has been put out there, and if it is close to true, what impact it may have on what facilities we already have in this country?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I can comment on it. You have been given a report from the Department on this that has a classified attachment. The classified attachment will give you the details in each country that is a theory, a first choice.

Chairman WARNER. Excuse me. I have it here in my hand. I was about to mention it. It is in the committee files that arrived a few days ago and it gives an outline of those options together with the figures and the locations.

Secretary RUMSFELD. But we have said broadly, Senator, that 70,000 is about the right number that would be moving from an overseas post to a possession or a State of the United States, plus another 100,000 dependents. If I am not mistaken, the number of installations, meaning any kind of facility—a base, a radar antenna, radio antenna, could be a storage facility—we are going to go from something like 560 down to 360 outside of the U.S. Think of the advantage from a force protection standpoint—enormous.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator.

We now have Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Gentlemen, thanks for being here.

Mr. Secretary, I applaud you for going forward with the Global Posture Review and committing to implementing it. In a lot of ways it is long overdue. It makes sense as part of a general transformation of our military.

I noted, I believe in response to Senator Allard, that you said there is a lot of work to be done with many countries and many committees of Congress. I wonder which was harder work? [Laughter.]

You do not have to answer that question.

I wanted to ask you about what the fiscal implications of this Global Posture Review will be, both short-term and longer-term, insofar as you are able. In other words, I assume that in the shorter-term there are some significant costs associated with moving the personnel around, and I would like to hear something about that. But then what about the longer-term? Are there savings potentially involved here or not?

Secretary RUMSFELD. There are. If one thinks—I do not know what the average cost of a permanent change of station is, but if you think of the reduction in the total number of permanent changes of stations and moving vans and dependents, 100,000 dependents back in the U.S., it is significant savings.

Now, the cost is greater than the savings during the immediate period, which is always true. The same is true with BRAC. We do not know the number because we do not know which of the options we will end up landing on. But there has been a wild guess and I think it is in the material that has been given to you and I would rather not say it because I am sure it will be wrong. But it is a very, very, very modest percentage or percentage of a percentage of the Future Years Defense Plan.

Now, the Future Years Defense Plan is very big, so I am not suggesting it is a small amount of money. It is in the billions. But part of it will depend on how much other countries will pay and part of it will depend on—the other advantage, of course, is we will be filling bases that would then not be BRAC'ed.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Let me come back to another one of Senator Allard's questions. The total number redeployed is 70,000. Obviously not all, I presume, are coming back to the U.S. A number will be redeployed elsewhere.

Secretary RUMSFELD. The U.S. or U.S. possessions.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Secretary RUMSFELD. That is a net number worldwide.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So the net will not just be redeployed—the 70,000 is a number that will go to U.S. or U.S. possessions, not to other foreign countries?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Exactly. There will also be moves among foreign countries.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Secretary RUMSFELD. But that is in addition to the 70,000.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. I appreciate that clarification.

In terms of calculating the cost and considering the agility that, as you describe and have been committed to, that we need in our military forces, is there a concern that we should have that it will cost more in a time of crisis to deploy forces from the U.S. as opposed to forward-deployed positions around the world closer to potential crisis spots?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Let me say two things in that regard. First, let me go back to the first question. We always have to look at what it costs to do it. We also want to look at what the costs would be if we did not do it. The cost if we did not do it would be that we would continue for another 50 years malarranged in the world, arranged for the last century, not the current century, and have a considerably greater stress on our force. That cost is significant.

I am sorry, I lost your—

Senator LIEBERMAN. My question is, is there not a concern that if we move that many net numbers back to the U.S.—

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, in terms of deployment.

Senator LIEBERMAN. —that it will cost more to deploy them in a crisis.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Our people do not think so. For example, if you have to go from Germany up north and then around into the Atlantic Ocean and then down into the Mediterranean and then over to the Middle East, it is about the same distance as from the United States.

Second, we do not know where we are going to have to use these forces to fight and therefore you cannot know what the cost would be unless you know where it is you are going to be going. That is, as I have said, something that is difficult to nail down at any given time.

Senator LIEBERMAN. General LaPorte, I want to ask you a question because I have a question about Korea, but I also want to ask you a question because Senator Reed loves to hear you speak because you are from Rhode Island. [Laughter.]

The question is this. There have been concerns, as the Secretary and I think you may have said, about moving approximately 12,500 of our troops out of South Korea when the North Koreans, Kim Jong Il, seem to be in an aggressive, certainly unpredictable, posture. I wonder to the extent you are able to describe to us why we should not have those concerns. In other words, what will we continue to have on the ground in the region, that if there is some aggressive action, hostile action by the North Koreans, that we should not worry that we have 12,000 fewer boots on the ground there?

General LAPORTE. Senator, that is a very fair question. In Korea I often use a translator and Senator Reed thought I might need a translator for this committee. [Laughter.]

There are tremendous capabilities resident on the Korean Peninsula. As I mentioned, the Republic of Korea military is over 600,000 strong. They are a very capable military, well-led, well-equipped, highly motivated. We should never forget that.

In terms of the reduction of 12,500, the capabilities that are resident in the region that are provided by Pacific Command—there are seven United Nations bases, for example, in Japan. Those bases have tremendous capabilities, rapid reinforcement capabili-

ties, to the peninsula, as well as our strategic deployment capability.

So I am very confident that this reduction will not increase risk. Kim Jong Il has always had a strategy of provocation. For years that is what he does. He will continue to do that regardless of the number of forces that are resident on the peninsula.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me be specific on this one. Moving troops away from the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and Seoul south 50 miles, what are the plusses and minusses of doing that?

General LAPORTE. The plusses are we could not be tactically fixed by North Korea's artillery, first of all, because we would be out of the range of the artillery and we would have the operational agility to go where we need to go.

Second, it gives us better training opportunities. We went to ground 50 years ago and we stayed there for 50 years. We are used to being at the end of dusty trails. Today those camps are surrounded by urban development and we have become an irritant to the Korean people when we crank our helicopters, fire our tanks. So we need to move to an area that is less intrusive and gives us an opportunity to train better.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So moving south is not only not a diminishing of our capacity to stop a potential North Korean move on the ground south, it actually puts us in a better position to respond to it?

General LAPORTE. That is correct, Senator.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks. Thank you all.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Cornyn.

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I know I am not the only one who worries that in a political season about the debate over our policy in Iraq what impact the negativism and the doom and gloom that we hear preached in some quarters has on our troops. So I think we have a special responsibility, those of us who serve in public office, to make sure that we do what we do responsibly.

But it does have an impact on people all across America as well, because they wonder how much of this doom and gloom as opposed to what we heard from Prime Minister Allawi this morning about positive steps and progress in Iraq—what is the truth. For example, yesterday afternoon I had a constituent of mine call me from Lubbock, Texas, because he heard yesterday that it is possible that the President would reinstate the draft to handle the war in Iraq if reelected. This statement followed on a charge last week that the President is planning a surprise post-election callup of additional Guard and Reserve troops.

Mr. Secretary, would you state for the record, are there any plans for a post-election callup of additional Guard or Reserve troops, and is there any plan to reinstate the draft?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Let me take the first one on the draft and I will leave General Myers to talk about how we are managing our force rotation.

I am not supposed to get in politics, but it is absolutely false that anyone in this administration is considering reinstating the draft. That is nonsense. We have 295 million people in the United States

of America. We need 1.4 million people to serve in the Active Force. We are having no trouble attracting and retaining the people we need. If we were managing this force better—and it takes years to rearrange it properly. It has been malorganized, malarranged as between the active and the Reserve components, and we have too darn many people in uniform doing civilian jobs. If we have to increase the numbers above 1.4 million we can do it under the emergency authority.

We are not having trouble maintaining a force of volunteers. Every single person is a volunteer. We do not need to use compulsion to get people to come into the armed services. We have an ample number of talented, skillful, courageous, dedicated young men and women willing to serve, and it is false.

General MYERS. On continued callup of the Reserve component and the active duty, what we have done is try to build in as much predictability as we can, both for Active Forces and for our Reserve component forces. There will be more Guard and Reserve callups in November, in December, in January, and for as long as we need forces to provide to General Abizaid or any of the other combatant commanders that are sitting here with me.

So yes, there will be. None of them have been delayed for any reason. This is a process that has been consistent now for about the last year. There were callups in September. There will be some in October, there will be some in November. So yes, it will continue on as we continue to feed forces to the combatant commanders to do what they need to do.

But what we are really trying to do is get ahead of the whole process so we can provide predictability, particularly for the Reserve component, who have to in many cases leave civilian jobs and their families not near military installations and answer the call their country gives them. So we are trying to do that.

Senator CORNYN. I appreciate that very much.

Let me just ask one more question and this time it is about the subject upon which this hearing actually was convened, and that is Global Posture Review. Of course, there have been some questions about the interrelationship or the interdependence of that process and BRAC. Obviously that is something we are concerned about on a number of different levels.

But can you explain to me, Mr. Secretary—it is unclear to me, if this Global Posture Review, which I understand has been going on for 3 years or more, how it is that we will make sure there are accommodations here in the United States on existing military bases, how those two are going to dovetail in a way that makes sense?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, sir. It is really exactly this way. We have decided that it makes sense to bring back to the United States from all around the world, different places. We know those numbers. We feed that number into the BRAC process and it then becomes part of their deliberations as to where, which bases they should go to and how it ought to be arranged.

Had we not done this work over the past 3 years, we would not know what was going to have to come back and therefore there would have been a question mark in the BRAC process. The two are dovetailing perfectly and they link together tightly.

Senator CORNYN. Finally, I have heard it said that we are not out of troops, we are out of balance, and I think that is a thumb-nail sketch for what you described earlier with regard to the restructuring of our military, which I know is under way and General Schoomaker and others are working on. But I will say that we have already begun to see some evidence of that restructuring with recent announcements of the placement of modular brigades at Fort Hood and Fort Bliss. So this is a very dynamic period of time we are in here, where I think we are going to see a lot of change, but I think we are on the right track and I appreciate your efforts.

Thank you.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, gentlemen. Mr. Secretary, the Defense Science Board has reached a very startling conclusion: inadequate total numbers of U.S. troops. They briefed you, and also a lack of long-term endurance. They suggest some ways to cope with this: to trade combat capabilities for stabilization capabilities. That of course impacts mission performance if there is a conventional conflict. Depend on others, like the United Nations or other nations; that has been a dispiriting process over the last several years.

Even if we do all these things, their conclusion is extremely, I think, both provocative and startling: "If everything we recommend is implemented over the next 5 years, but we continue our current foreign policy of military expeditions every 2 years, we will begin two more stabilization operations without sufficient preparation or resources." They conclude by saying: "Anything started wrong tends to continue wrong."

That brings us back to points that Senator McCain and others have raised. Iran and North Korea are provocative. They very well might cause us to take military action. One hopes not. As you often say, there is also the surprises that we do not even contemplate at this moment.

As a result I find it again puzzling why you have not supported an authorized end strength increase, including those soldiers, particularly marines, in the regular budget process, obtaining the funds for them by looking at other programs outside of the Army and the Marine Corps, because if we do not do this I think we are running off the cliff, if you will.

Relying on supplemental appropriations is increasingly more challenging. The Army, I am told, has an \$8 billion requirement for equipment resetting, \$4.5 billion for maintenance, \$1.3 billion for ammo, in addition to personnel costs.

But I think the major point, the one I think the Defense Science Board concludes with, is that we have put ourselves in a strategic position where we may not be able to respond to obvious threats that we are seeing today.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, let me comment and then I know General Myers will want to comment. I thought the study was a good one, the summer study of the Defense Science Board, and I thought it was sufficiently interesting that I have had it briefed to

the Chiefs and I believe the combatant commanders and others in the Department.

Second, you said we have not supported an increase in strength. We have and we have an increase in strength under the emergency authorities. We have not supported an end strength increase, permanent end strength increase by statute, that is correct. The reason for that very simply is we do not need to do that and the Army prefers not to until they have a sense, General Schoomaker, until he has a sense of how he is able to transform the Army force from 33 brigades up to 43 and possibly 48. He believes—he does not know, but he believes that over a period of 4 or 5 years doing that he may be able to do that without a permanent increase in end strength because of the 20 or 30 other things we are doing, several of which I have mentioned here today.

Believe me, if we need more end strength we will request more end strength. We will either do it under the emergency authority to start with or we will come before Congress. The senior managers of the Department are doing I believe it is 35 or 40 different things to relieve stress on the force and it is having a payoff already. We have been able to achieve things.

We also, under General Schoomaker's theory, are going to move the spigot down on the rain barrel to be able to draw on more of the 2.5 million men and women who have volunteered, because we are only drawing on a very small fraction of them at the present time.

Senator REED. Mr. Chairman, we have had these discussions for probably 2 years now. It is becoming increasingly clear that your response is simply avoiding the obvious. If we have a long-term commitment in Iraq and other places, if we have to be prepared to react to North Korea and Iran, we cannot live supplemental to supplemental, the Army cannot. The equipment costs are piling up. We need an end strength because we have to put the budget behind that, not in a supplemental emergency capacity, but the money behind it, and that has to be done.

Your own Defense Science Board, individuals that you chose, individuals that you respect, individuals you tasked to look at this, have come back and said, not for the short run but the long run—I mean, it is their conclusion—this is a long-term problem of maintaining these forces.

Secretary RUMSFELD. It could be.

Senator REED. Mr. Secretary, you continue to say it could be. It is quite obvious.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, I am not pulling this out of thin air, my answers to you. What I am giving you is what the Chiefs in the tank conclude, what the senior levels of the Department have concluded. We would be happy to sit down and walk through the entire process with you. It is complicated. There are a lot of pieces to it.

Admittedly, there are uncertainties about whether—what can actually be achieved with the new national security personnel system. There are uncertainties as to how far down that rain barrel we can get that spigot. But if we cannot get it far enough because we just cannot manage better, then by golly you are right, we will have to go to an increase in end strength.



Senator REED. Mr. Secretary, a final question on this point. Did the Defense Science Board consider the changes that you are suggesting, modularity? Were they aware of them? Did they consider them?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I do not know if they were briefed to the extent of all the things we are doing in the Department. I doubt it.

Senator REED. So you had your experts study the issue of manpower and they were not aware of what is going on in the Department?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Knowing what is going on in the Department is—it is a big Department, Senator, as you are well aware. These are part-time people who come in and are given a specific assignment and take a period and study it, and they do a terrific job. To what extent they—if we gave them a quiz on all the things that we are doing in the Department to reduce stress on the force, I just am not in a position to answer your question.

Senator REED. Mr. Chairman, may I ask General LaPorte a question because again, I like the way he talks? [Laughter.]

Chairman WARNER. If you wish to put a question to General LaPorte, please feel free.

Senator REED. General, your comments about the adequacy of forces in Korea I presume are related to your current mission, which is deterrence of a North Korean attack. Would those comments change if you had to take military action to disarm North Korea?

General LAPORTE. I did not—

Senator REED. Take military offensive action to disarm North Korea; would your comments change with respect to the adequacy of the personnel and equipment?

General LAPORTE. That is a difficult question to answer—

Senator REED. That is why I asked. I think that is the question, though.

Chairman WARNER. Why do you not, General, give us a brief response and then provide a more extensive response for the record.

General LAPORTE. I will do that.

Disarming North Korea would require a significant amount of capabilities, not just ground component but all our components. We have significant capabilities to address that threat from North Korea.

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator REED. Thank you.

General MYERS. Mr. Chairman, could I add something—

Chairman WARNER. Yes, of course.

General MYERS. —just to try to help understand what we are talking about here. When we talk about numbers, numbers do not equal capability. We are trying to build capability. The Army plan is to build more units of maneuver, the brigade. That is a very good thing to do. We do look at this, the Joint Chiefs do, and we talk to the combatant commanders. We ask ourselves, do we have enough forces, because it is a very serious issue. We understand that.

The Secretary has authorized the United States Army to go 30,000 above its authorized end strength to properly man it to do the expansion in capability that it needs. That will take them through early 2007, at which time they will see if they need a bigger Army.

We are on a glide slope or on a ramp right now that is about as fast as you could do if you authorized whatever number you want to authorize. It takes you time to recruit them and train them. But we are on a slope that is probably above anything that could be authorized right now, and it will take us until 2007 to figure out if this is enough: what does the world look like?; is it as predicted by the Defense Science Board, whatever it was?; every 2 years will we have to be utilized in some sort of stability operation?; and we will know.

Capability does count. I think General LaPorte will tell you that a couple years ago, just 3 years ago, we were very worried about the artillery that sat in North Korea behind the mountains, that could range in some cases all the way to Seoul, South Korea. It was a very big problem and the way we were going to solve it was a lot of counter-battery fire from surface units.

The Joint Direct Attack Munition global positioning system-guided solves a lot of those problems. Now we can drop it all-weather. These shoot-and-scoot systems the North Koreans have now are very vulnerable to air power and other precision artillery systems. It is almost—and that battle has changed dramatically, I think General LaPorte would probably agree.

So as we talk about numbers, as we talk about this and that, we have to remember we are talking capability in the end.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, General.

Thank you, Senator Reed.

Senator Chambliss.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here. To General Jones and Admiral Fargo and General LaPorte, I would hope that you will express to the men and women serving under you how much we appreciate their service to our country.

Mr. Secretary, there has been some conversation in the media over the last couple of days about the potential for the reinstatement of the draft. I had my staff check and there appears to be some legislation on the House side introduced by Congressman Rangel and some legislation on the Senate side introduced by Senator Hollings. As far as I know, neither one of those pieces of legislation has moved one inch.

Is there any ongoing discussion at the Pentagon about the potential for the reinstatement of the draft?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Not a word.

Chairman WARNER. Senator, the Secretary had that question earlier and gave us a rather Trumanesque response to it, and he may well follow it up by letter. But I am sure that he might add a word here.

Senator CHAMBLISS. I appreciate that. I am sorry I missed the first answer, but I am glad you got to answer it twice.

Also, Mr. Secretary, there has been some conversation here earlier in the questioning relative to the status of the police forces in

Iraq, also the Armed Forces in Iraq, and there have been some comments in the media about statements that have been made relative to the size of both of those force structures and whether or not the numbers that have been given are accurate.

I took the liberty of going to one of your Web sites today, [www.defendamerica.mil](http://www.defendamerica.mil), and I pulled up two sheets, one of which on page 22 at that Web site states "Police Forces, Current Status." This document gives the number of components that have been authorized, the number on duty, the number in training, the weapons they have, the vehicles, and so forth and so on.

I look at page 23, it is titled "Armed Forces, Current Status." Again, with respect to the Iraqi Army it gives the number authorized, the number on duty, the number in training, the number trained, the weapons, vehicles, so forth and so on.

Is this public information that folks like me who do not know much about how to use a computer can pick up as easy as I picked this up today?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, sir. It is readily available and it ought not to be a mystery to anybody.

Senator CHAMBLISS. When you give out numbers or the Department gives out numbers relative to the size of the Iraqi police forces or the size of the Iraqi Armed Forces, are these the numbers that you use and do you consistently update these numbers?

Secretary RUMSFELD. We do. General Casey and General Petraeus work with General Myers and the Joint Staff to update them I believe every 2 weeks.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you. These appear to be data as of September 13, 2004.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent to introduce these two sheets of paper into the record.

Chairman WARNER. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]



## Police Forces – Current Status

FORCE	COMPONENT	MANNING			TRAINING			EQUIPPING												
		AUTH	ON DUTY	UN-TRN	IN-TRN	TRN	REQ	O/H	WEAPONS	VEHICLES	COMMS	BODY ARMOR								
IRAQI POLICE	IRAQI POLICE	135K	84,950	40,176	3,479	35,295	213,185	93,083	22,395	5,922	97,565	13,240	135,000	32,941						
	CIVIL INTERVENTION FORCE	4,800		0	0	0	11,400	0	1,002	0	10,240	0	4,800	0						
DEPT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT	EMERGENCY RESPONSE UNIT	270	83	0	116	33	1,020	500	59	0	352	300	270	270						
		32,000	16,798	2,000	485	14,313	42,801	16,312	8,271	1,768	6,271	1,827	28,826	4,000						
TOTAL		172,070	101,031	48,176	3,964	49,631	268,296	110,035	31,726	7,722	86,428	15,172	168,696	49,781						

39% OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

40 - 69% OF REQUIREMENT

70 - 100% OF REQUIREMENT

SOME RADIOS ARE ON HAND BUT THEY ARE AN INTERIM CAPABILITY ONLY

22 September 2004



## Armed Forces – Current Status

FORCE	COMPONENT	MANNING		TRAINING			EQUIPPING									
		AUTH	ON DUTY	UN-TRND	IN-TRN	TRND	WEAPONS		VEHICLES		COMMS		BODY ARMOR			
							REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H	REQ	O/H
ARMY	IRAQI ARMY	27,000	12,599	0	7,910	3,742	23,608	15,432	2,298	1,708	3,596	1,021	20,849	6,332		
	IRAQI NATIONAL GUARD	61,504	41,461	0	2,189	39,272	68,760	37,635	2,142	727	11,209	427	62,032	23,320		
	IRAQI PREVENTION FORCE	6,554	7,317	0	5,469	1,928	9,850	3,300	593	152	1,798	1,683	6,584	2,741		
AIR FORCE	IRAQI SPECIAL OPS FORCE	1,967	691	0	75	576	1,898	1,274	180	67	1,212	115	1,920	505		
		502	182	0	39	1,445	303	0	34	4	21	0	502	0		
COASTAL DEFENSE FORCE		409	412	0	130	282	486	12	15	15	156	1	409	0		
		77,175	52,922	0	15,832	46,980	103,983	57,853	4,421	2,733	13,764	3,157	71,152	32,803		
TOTAL																

39% OR LESS OF REQUIREMENT

40 - 69% OF REQUIREMENT

70 - 100% OF REQUIREMENT

SOME RADIOS ARE ON HAND BUT THEY ARE AN INTERIM CAPABILITY ONLY

Data as of 13 Sept 04

23

N/P

Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Secretary, I noted your comment in your written statement about restructuring the Reserve components to achieve a more appropriate distribution of skills and create an environment in which reservists and guardsmen will mobilize less often, with more predictability. I want to commend you for that approach, especially in your and the Department's efforts to shift the reservists into career fields that are heavily used in order to reduce the burden on certain specialties.

It is a fact that approximately 38 percent of our selected reservists have not been mobilized at all since September 11, 2001. This does not appear to be an overuse of the Reserve. However, the fact

that many of our reservists have been deployed for long periods of time while most of them have not been deployed at all indicates to me that you are on the right track, that we need more people in the high-demand career fields.

Could you update us on how these rebalancing efforts are going and how it will affect the ways in which the Guard and Reserve are used in coming years?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, sir. The Army has the biggest task and it I believe has already accomplished somewhere between 10,000 and 20,000 of rebalancing between the active component and the Reserve component. Is that about right?

General MYERS. That is about right.

Secretary RUMSFELD. They are aiming, the Services generally are aiming, at a number of about 10,000 a year over the coming period, where they will be moving skill sets and balancing between the active and the Reserve components so that the same people do not get called up too frequently, and because we will then have, after rebalancing, more people in the Active Force who have those skill sets, that we now can reasonably predict are going to be needed in the 21st century.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you.

General Jones, you made reference in your opening statement to the need for strategic lift, both sealift and airlift, to project power in the European theater and how this need will grow and transform as EUCOM moves to more dispersed bases and operating locations. How would you assess your current airlift needs specifically and what limitations, if any, do you foresee in both the inter- and intra-theater airlift in the coming years?

General JONES. Senator, as we transform the force, one of the things that I like to point out is that we are transforming it to become more strategically useful. One of the key elements in making the force of the future effective is to balance the force that we have forward deployed with the rotational forces that will be required in various spots in order to maintain our influence, take into account our alliance obligations, the coalitions, the crises, and the like.

So to me one of the most important elements of transformation is the fact that, while we will be able to return a number of forces and their families to the United States, the transformation of the Services, notably the Army in particular, into more expeditionary forces means that we will have a greater strategic effect across a broader area, not just in Western Europe, where we have been for 50 years. In my theater it is relatively straightforward to see that we will be engaged at greater distances to the east and I believe that it is fair to say that there are upcoming challenges in the southern part of our area of responsibility, notably Africa, that are going to consume much of our time.

I think one of the critical elements in achieving new capabilities will also be found in the mobility and the correct positioning of our prepositioned equipment, both at sea and on land, and also ensuring that our strategic airlift and sealift remains modern and adequate to do the job. This is not just true in Europe; it is true in all of the other combatant commanders' geographical areas of responsibility.

It is clear that the investment that we made in the C-17 is having dramatic effects and this is really a capability that we just simply could not do without. I believe that we will continue to watch to make sure that that very increasingly important component of our overall ability is sufficiently resourced and modernized to make sure that it is the engine that delivers the forces where we need them.

So on that score I am confident that we have thought that through and it is an essential component of all of our proposals to transform our capabilities.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Nelson.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary and gentlemen. I appreciate very much your being here today. Mr. Secretary, as you look at the transformation and capabilities, I think Senator Reed's question about what kind of capabilities would be required in South Korea, whether it is defensive or offensive, are you making any distinctions between offensive and defensive capabilities when we look at the total transformation, reduction of troops, changing of locations of our commands in the various parts of the world?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, I think General LaPorte should answer the question and I will be happy to yield to him. But first let me just say, I think I need to emphasize this: It is in the 21st century, I honestly believe it is a mistake to count things and equate them with capability. It simply is not the case.

Senator BEN NELSON. I agree with you.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Second—and this is not directly to your question, but, Mr. Chairman, I have to say this—deterrence depends on the perception. It is what is in a person's mind. We have had discussions today about whether or not the United States military is capable of fulfilling its assigned missions. Let there be no doubt, the United States military is capable of executing skillfully and swiftly its assigned missions, and people ought not to go away in the world with any different perception as a result of the kinds of questions and discussions that have been taking place here today.

The chairman and the chiefs and the combatant commanders address this on a continuing basis. They do a series of things to determine how capabilities would be moved, how tasks would be accomplished. They know what they are doing and they are confident that the United States can fulfill its assigned missions.

Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Secretary, in that regard, I assume that is one of the reasons why Strategic Command now has both offensive and defensive capabilities across the board with the military; is that a fair question?

Secretary RUMSFELD. No, it is not the reason. It was simply a matter of command assignments that seemed to make sense to the chairman and to the chiefs and me.

General LaPorte, you may want to respond on the other piece?

General LAPORTE. Sir, I would just add to what the Secretary said. We are a combined force, a Republic of Korea-U.S. force, and both nations have tremendous capabilities. Our operational planning is across a wide spectrum of potential scenarios. I would be

glad to give you detailed briefings on those, but it is a capability that I am looking for as a commander, not some raw number, because there are more intangibles relative to capabilities.

Senator BEN NELSON. I appreciate your answer. Thank you.

General JONES, I think NATO announced yesterday that they are going to be expanding their training mission from 50 officers to perhaps 300 officers in Iraq, and this is to train Iraqi security forces before the January election. I know that it probably was not an easy task to get that increase in support.

What does this bring to NATO's Iraqi commitment right now in terms of numbers?

General JONES. The overall estimate in terms of the troop strength required to execute this mission is about a brigade, roughly about 3,000 total, to do the force protection requirements, to do the infrastructure, logistics, and the trainers.

So the piece that was in the newspaper pertained to the trainers and I would say that that is a fairly soft number. The real number is being developed virtually as we speak, now that the North Atlantic Council (NAC) has spoken and said to proceed with the concept of operations, and that will be developed within the next few weeks.

Senator BEN NELSON. Some critics have said that NATO, much like our Guard and Reserve units, is stretched too thin. Do you think that is true or do you think that is false, about NATO?

General JONES. The answer to that question is that this is an alliance of 26 sovereign nations. There are over two million people, two million Europeans, wearing uniforms. The fraction that is deployed is probably no more than about 60,000, maybe less.

What needs to happen in the alliance, as I have said before this committee, is a transformation, and NATO is trying to do that. The United States plays an important leadership role in showing the way and in leading and supporting. NATO is trying to make a serious contribution. It is making a serious contribution in Afghanistan. It is wrapping up the Bosnian deployment after a number of years. Kosovo is still very much a commitment that takes about 18,000 troops.

We are still involved in providing security, backup security, for the Greek Armed Forces in the Olympics. There is an ongoing very successful naval expeditionary operation in the Mediterranean that really constitutes NATO's primary counterterrorism operation.

So the alliance is doing more. It is transitioning from a static, reactive, linear posture that was required in the 20th century and it is moving into answering the requirements of the 21st century. The NATO Response Force is probably the most important transformational program that is ongoing. So I think that as we become more usable and as nations transform and their forces become more usable and more expeditionary, despite the fact that their numbers will go down, their capabilities will go up, and we are looking forward to that progress.

Senator BEN NELSON. So they are focused on capabilities rather than pure numbers of equipment, personnel, et cetera; is that accurate?

General JONES. That is correct. The problem is what they have now is pure numbers and we are trying to change that metric.



Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General MYERS. Senator Nelson, let me just clarify one thing. You asked the question about Strategic Command and perhaps why we assigned certain missions, was it offense or defense-related.

Senator BEN NELSON. No, I meant combining them so we had the capacity to look at both aspects of the military.

General MYERS. Sir, I think the reason that we wanted to combine Space Command and Strategic Command and give them some new missions was because of the perspective that both those commands had before we merged them and the perspective they would need afterwards, and that was the global perspective. So every mission that they have been given has a huge global component, and we thought we needed one of our unified commands to be responsible for that. So that was more the issue than the offense and defense.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is for General Myers and General Jones. If it became the policy of this country to announce that we would withdraw from Iraq in 4 years or that would be our goal, what effect, if any, do you think it would have on current operations, the terrorism mentality, and our allies in Iraq who are fighting for democracy?

General MYERS. I think it would be playing into the hands of folks like Zarqawi and the former regime elements that are trying to keep progress in Iraq from happening. I think if we announce our intentions to withdraw it would be detrimental. I think we would see an increase in violence. If they thought there was a goal line in sight, that is what they would march to.

So that is why we have said, I think, in front of the committee consistently that, when asked on troop strength in Iraq and Afghanistan, that we have maintained that it will be what the combat commander needs based on the situation on the ground.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with that, General Jones?

General JONES. Sir, I do. I think it is extremely important to maybe look back on history. For instance, in Bosnia I think the international community certainly wanted to solve that problem quicker than we did, but it has taken over a decade and we are coming to a conclusion.

I think it is very difficult to predict and not wise to announce end states that you might not be able to deliver on.

Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Secretary, it is very important to me that we give an honest assessment about where we are going and how can we get there in Iraq, and we will get to the globalization effort here in a moment, not because I am unsupportive. I am very supportive. But the likelihood of violence, to me, is going to increase because of the elections here and there.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I agree.

Senator GRAHAM. You made a comment that I think needs to be explored a bit. What is the likelihood in your opinion of substantial parts of Iraq being ungovernable by January and what can we do to change that dynamic beginning now?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I think that by January there will be elections and that they will be successful elections, although very likely imperfect elections. I think that you are right, the level of violence may very well increase between now and the Iraqi elections. I suspect that if there were areas—first of all, the prime minister of Iraq and General Abizaid and General Casey and the coalition partners all understand that you cannot, over a sustained period of time, permit safe havens and sanctuaries within a country that will allow the enemies of that country to continue attacking it and destroying it. They understand that.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you.

Secretary RUMSFELD. If there were to be an area where the extremists focused during the election period and an election was not possible in that area at that time, so be it. You have the rest of the election and you go on. Life is not perfect.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you.

To the globalization effort, General Jones, are the Germans okay with the idea that we are going to be reducing our forces in Germany, and by how much will we reduce our forces under this plan?

General JONES. There is in security circles general agreement as to the validity and the necessity of implementing this plan. The thing that makes the argument, the portion of the argument that makes it compelling, is that this is not just a troop reduction; this is genuine transformation, and that the U.S. Army in Europe in particular, which is much of the German preoccupation, is actually going to be transformed with the advent of more expeditionary brigades, one Stryker brigade, and the like.

Senator GRAHAM. Are the Germans okay with the plan?

General JONES. To my understanding, at the Federal level they are okay. Obviously there are some local mayors whose economics differ a little bit on that, but at the national level and at the military level I think we are fine.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Can I make two quick comments, please? The German coordinator for U.S. relations said, "This is positive. Let us not make a crisis out of something that is in reality a success story. It is an expression of the fact that the Cold War is over and that Europe's division has been eliminated."

Second, I have met with the Minister of Defense of Germany on several occasions. He is doing exactly the same thing. He is adjusting his force. He is reducing the number of locations, and he is doing it in coordination with us.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you.

General, regarding Korea, is Taiwan okay with what we are doing in Korea?

I am sorry, I cannot read his name. I apologize.

Chairman WARNER. Do you mean to address that to the Admiral?

Senator GRAHAM. The General in charge of Korea. I did not want to mispronounce your name.

General LAPORTE. Admiral Fargo might be—

Chairman WARNER. Admiral Fargo.

Senator GRAHAM. I am sorry, I apologize.

Chairman WARNER. He has of course jurisdiction primarily over Taiwan.

Admiral FARGO. I think that when you look at the Pacific you need to look at how we maintain a level signal—

Senator GRAHAM. No, my question is, is Taiwan okay with what you are trying to do.

Admiral FARGO. I have not asked Taiwan that question and would not.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you.

Now, one word about what you are trying to do—

Chairman WARNER. That is an important inquiry. I do not want to have it too chopped up. Did you have adequate time to understand the question and reply to it?

Senator GRAHAM. He said he did not talk to Taiwan.

Admiral FARGO. I have not discussed that with Taiwan.

Chairman WARNER. All right.

Senator GRAHAM. Now, my concern is you are a reformer, Secretary Rumsfeld, and I appreciate that and I think we need it, and that is why I support BRAC, and you are trying to do some things with the civilian aspects of the military, that I think are long overdue.

I have a general concern. The fight is expanding and, whether we like it or not, at least to me this signals that we are coming home, and I see the fight expanding and it has many tentacles in terms of the expansion. So I will go slow, evaluate, but I am concerned about how it may affect some old friends and it may be sending the wrong signal politically at absolutely the right time because we are going to need old friends.

One last comment. In terms of the force structure and numbers and capability, all I can tell you is that over the last 2 years I have seen more dispirited people than I thought I would see in uniform in terms of the burden they are carrying. When I went to Kuwait, getting ready to go into Iraq, I had dinner with nine young South Carolinians, all of them reservists, in a truck maintenance command, and all nine are getting out. So I hope that does not continue to happen.

Thank you.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Let me just quickly answer your first question. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, asked if this implied a weaker U.S. commitment in the world, said: "Absolutely not. The Cold War is a thing of the past." The Foreign Minister said that "Japan welcomes the review of the U.S. military framework." South Korea said: "The South Korean government has been well aware of the plan." Australia said: "We see this initiative as a positive."

So I do not believe that anyone who gets up and takes a fresh look at the world could honestly believe that it makes sense to stay locked in the 20th century. We will be more mobile, more agile, more lethal, and better able to live in the world that you have properly described.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

General MYERS. Mr. Chairman, we have a list of those quotes by different foreign officials, to include some press quotes. Could we offer that for the record?

Chairman WARNER. Without objection, you may insert at this point into the record that important information.

[The information referred to follows:]

UNCLASSIFIED

INSERT FOR THE RECORD  
 SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
 HEARING ON: GLOBAL REVIEW OF THE MILITARY FORCES STATIONED OVERSEAS  
 DATE: 23 SEPTEMBER 2004  
 PAGE #118, LINE #11  
 PAGE 1 of 2

The information follows:

Official

GERMANY: Karsten Voight, German PM Schroeder's coordinator for US relations: "This is positive: let's not make a crisis out of something that is in reality a success story...it is an expression of the fact that the Cold War is over and that Europe's division has been eliminated."

ITALY: Minister of Foreign Affairs Frattini, when asked if US plans imply a weaker US commitment: "Absolutely not. The Cold War is a thing of the past."

JAPAN: Statement by the Foreign Ministry: "Japan welcomes the review of the US military framework that will better suit the global security environment and further contribute to peace and stability."

SOUTH KOREA: Minister of Foreign Affairs Ban Ki-Moon, when asked if Seoul had been consulted: "The South Korean government has been well aware of this plan," and he continued by dismissing fears of a security vacuum on the Korean peninsula.

AUSTRALIA: Minister of Defense Hill: "...we see this initiative as a positive development for both regional and global security. It will improve US capability to contribute to international efforts to defeat global threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, and enable the US to engage more effectively in regional contingencies."

RUSSIA: Minister of Defense Ivanov, when asked about US presence in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: "I don't see anything alarming in these plans."

Press

GERMANY: Deutsche Welle and Frankfurter Allgemeine - noted the need for NATO to improve its own capabilities in conjunction with US changes.

UK: BBC, Financial Times, and The Economist - favorable and detailed discussion of the strategic rationale and implications.

- BBC: "...not a sign that the US is retreating into an isolationist 'Fortress America.'"
- Financial Times: "...it is hard to argue with the logic of the moves"

UNCLASSIFIED

INSERT FOR THE RECORD

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

HEARING ON: GLOBAL REVIEW OF THE MILITARY FORCES STATIONED OVERSEAS

DATE: 23 SEPTEMBER 2004

PAGE #118, LINE #11

PAGE 2 of 2

JAPAN: Japan Times and Asahi - praise for the strategic rationale

- Japan Times: "...today's security landscape differs markedly from that of the Cold War...military forces need to be quicker and more mobile, capable of deploying around the world at a moment's notice. The planned redeployments are designed to facilitate that objective."

Chairman WARNER. Senator Dayton.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I would like to join with the others in saluting you and thanking you for your dedicated defense of our country and your leadership. I support your plan to consolidate our forces that are deployed worldwide. I look forward to the next phase of your recommendation, which is their reassignment to Minnesota. [Laughter.]

One of the ways we can, as Senator Graham said, reduce the pressures on our Active Forces as well as our Reserves and our National Guardsmen and women is to get the Iraqi forces to do what the military and security forces of any country under any form of government must do, which is to patrol their own streets and establish law and order and provide it and safeguard their highways and defend their borders.

Mr. Secretary, when you testified before this committee last February 4, you stated that—this is a direct quote: "We have accelerated the training of Iraqi security forces, now more than 200,000 strong." The figure that was referenced in the documents provided then, actually I believe slightly before then, and subsequent to that statement that I have seen, confirmed that figure. Then to my knowledge, the first time it was stated publicly, on September 14, 7 months later, is that that number is down now to 105,000 that are trained, equipped, and manned up, Iraqi security forces.

I am confused by what exactly this redefinition of what constitutes "security forces" is. But that is a big disparity, sir, from 206,000 down to 105,000.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Let me explain it as clearly as is humanly possible. We said there were 206,000 security forces. Since then we have subtracted 74,000 Facility Protection Service people that are reporting to the various Iraqi ministries and are now classifying them as security forces. They obviously are providing security for facilities, but they are not police, they are not border patrol, they are not army, and they are not counterterrorism or National Guard activities. So that is one difference.

The other difference is within the 206,000, as we said, was a mixture of people that were trained and not trained. Now the number we are using now is 100,000 today that are manned, trained, and equipped. They have the equipment, they have the appropriate

training. There are more than that on duty, the ones who are not fully trained and do not have full equipment. That number is scheduled in January 2005 to be 145,000.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you. Taking then that number, 100,000 that are now equipped and trained—and I do not know what the current estimate is of the insurgency forces, say for example under direct control of Zarqawi. If there are those numbers, though—I have never seen a published report of the insurgent strength estimated anywhere near approximately that number—why are not those security forces of Iraq going after someone like that, and if he is holed up somewhere like Fallujah, where he is reputed to be, if the intelligence tells you and them where he is, why are not 50,000 or 75,000 or whatever number it takes going in there?

I can understand why our forces should be respecting certain sites in that city or that country, but why are they not doing what they should be doing to protect their own country and stand up for it? I guess as a corollary to that, as long as they know there are 138,000 of the best, the most courageous fighting forces in the world, our own soldiers, in there doing their work for them, what is to motivate them to take those positions instead?

Secretary RUMSFELD. There are currently about 100,000 Iraqi security forces, there are currently 138,000 U.S. forces and about 23,000 coalition forces, for a total of 261,000. They are all engaged in providing security in that country.

You say why are not the Iraqis doing anything? Well, the Iraqis—

Senator DAYTON. I did not say “anything,” but I said why are they not going after these pockets.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I will answer.

The Iraqis have had 721 Iraqi security forces killed in the process of providing security in Iraq since May 1, 2003. They have had 678 killed since September 1, 2003.

Senator DAYTON. We have had over a thousand of ours.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Since the beginning.

Senator DAYTON. 2003.

Secretary RUMSFELD. The comparable number is that since May 1, 2003 the United States has lost 670 and the Iraqi security forces have lost 721. So they are not sitting in their barracks with their fingers in their ear. They are out there doing things. It is tough, and they are getting killed and they are getting wounded and they are still standing in line to sign up to join the army and the police and the border patrol, because there are enough people in that country that want to secure the liberation of that country.

Senator DAYTON. If there is a pocket of resistance, again in Fallujah—that is from reports I have read—that are whatever number, a couple thousand, whatever the number, I do not know, strong, and if that is where somebody like Zarqawi is reputed to be holed up and operating from, then why are not again whatever necessary troop strength of the Iraqi forces going in there to wipe that force strength out there, the insurgent strength out there?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The decision has been made to handle Fallujah the way it has been handled by the Iraqi political leadership in the country and the U.S. military leadership and political leadership in the country. As I indicated earlier, all of those indi-

viduals understand you cannot have a safe haven in Fallujah or anywhere else in that country over a sustained period of time.

Now, given the fact that they understand that, it suggests to me that they will do something about that. The reason they did not do it at the time they were cocked and ready to do it I believe—and Dick, you might want to comment on this—at that moment the U.N. representative, I believe it was Mr. Brahimi, was in the process of putting together the government that would transition away from the Iraqi Governing Council to the Interim Iraqi Government, and the Governing Council that existed at that time and Brahimi, as I recall, were strongly opposed to doing anything at that moment.

Senator DAYTON. What about this moment now, sir?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I think I will leave that to the commanders on the ground, and I have already indicated to you that they are fully aware you cannot leave a sanctuary in that country, and that is exactly what Fallujah is today.

General MYERS. Senator Dayton, let me just add. You focused on a really bad person, Zarqawi, and let me just assure you in this open hearing that we are doing all we can to take care of that situation. As the Secretary said, we are going to leave that up to the operational commanders on the ground.

I will tell you in the last 2 to 3 weeks we have killed a handful, I think it is six, of his lieutenants. We continue to go after that organization very hard. It is a very dangerous organization and it is the one that we know in at least one case was responsible for the beheading, probably in the other cases as well. They have no respect for any human life—Muslim, Christian, Jewish, whatever, man, woman, or child. This is a very, very bad threat. We understand that and will take appropriate action.

Senator DAYTON. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your response and I would just say, responding to my colleague Senator Graham—and I understand the reservations about citing a period of time of 4 years, but our colleague Senator McCain, who has greater expertise than I, has cited a possible period of time of U.S. force involvement there of 10 to 20 years.

I would just submit again that, in my view, as long as the Iraqis know that the best fighting forces in the world, our own, are going to be there doing the heavy lifting and the dying and the leading and draining our own resources here, they are going to—they may not entirely, but they are going to be holding back from what any government, any country, has to do with their own citizens, their own armed forces, which is protect and defend their own country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General MYERS. Senator Dayton, if we go back to April and May when we had the uprising by Sadr's militia, at that time we said the performance of the Iraqi security forces was certainly uneven. Very few units performed well, but some did. Most did not. One of the reasons they did not, a couple of the reasons, is they did not have proper equipment at that point; they also did not have the proper leadership.

If you look at the same uprising around al-Najaf this time, it was just a flip-flop. In fact, the estimate from the commanders in the field is that 70 percent of the Iraqi units that participated per-

formed very, very well. Some did not perform well, but 70 percent did. So that situation is turning around.

We have to do our job, which our promise has been to properly train and equip them. As the Secretary said earlier, that is the easy part. It is the soft stuff, it is making sure they have proper leadership and that leadership has a trail all the way up to the national level. That still has to be accomplished. That is not accomplished at this point. We are working very hard to do that.

Senator DAYTON. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Talent.

Senator TALENT. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

I would probably ask General Schoomaker this if he were here, but since he is not, General Myers, let me ask you this. Would you say that the Army of today across a broad spectrum of requirements is more or less capable than the Army of 20 years ago?

General MYERS. No, I would not.

Senator TALENT. It is substantially more capable, is it not?

General MYERS. Absolutely.

Senator TALENT. The Army of 20 years ago I think had 18 active divisions in it and the one today has 10 active divisions.

General MYERS. Right.

Senator TALENT. What I wanted to illustrate is something General LaPorte said. It really is not a question of numbers, except insofar as numbers tend to suggest capabilities. I chair the Seapower Subcommittee and actually it was the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) who brought this to my mind. I was having breakfast with him one day and he said: Look, would anybody argue that the Navy of today is less capable than the Navy of 20 years ago, when we had almost 600 ships? Because I was harping on him about the numbers of ships. Mr. Chairman, you know how strongly I feel about numbers of ships.

So it is not that numbers are irrelevant. It is just that you have to consider it in terms of capabilities.

One other point I will just state for the record about the history of end strength, Mr. Chairman. This is something some of us have noticed, been noticing for a long time. We went from 18 to 14 to 12 in the base force of 1992, and then when I came in in 1993 at the same time the Clinton administration came in they reduced it to 10 active duty. You remember that, Mr. Chairman.

I was very concerned about it at the time, not that the Army would be incapable of performing a mission, because I think our Army will perform any mission we ask them to perform, but that in circumstances like this we might all be a little bit less comfortable about how far out on the margin of risk we were.

I am very pleased that you have agreed, at least temporarily, to an increase of 30,000, which would get us back in terms of numbers to the equivalent of 21 active divisions. I am just going to suggest that at a certain point when you can calculate what you really think you are going to get from these efficiencies, not what in theory you could get but what you really think you are going to be able to get—what we are learning about the needs, capabilities we



need for civil administration and the kind of thing we are doing in Iraq—that maybe we have a hearing on the subject of what kind of end strength we need.

I will just suggest, Mr. Chairman, with great respect that it might be good to do it at a time other than 6 weeks before a general election. I think I would have a little bit more confidence in the tone of the hearing.

I did want to ask a couple of things, though, about the posture of where our forces are going to be, which is what the hearing I thought was about. Two points, and I will get the questions out and then you can address them.

One of them is, I have been very intrigued with the CNO's Sea Power 21 and Sea Basing concepts, the idea of being able to in effect base at sea. Now, how does that figure in the repositioning of forces, if you have thought it through to that extent?

Number two, if we are going to pull back from the traditional bases in places where we are no longer as wanted and where it is harder to get force projected—and I think I agree with that on strategic level—does this mean we rebase in third world countries from which we think we can project power? Are we confident enough in the stability of those countries to be able to do that?

Maybe you just could address that. You probably have not worked it out on a level of detail, but I would be interested in hearing your thoughts on it, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Just a couple of quick comments. With respect to the Chief of Naval Operations plan, which I am very much a supporter of—I think Admiral Fargo might be the best one to answer this. I just realized you are an Admiral, are you not? [Laughter.]

Senator TALENT. Yes, I should maybe have referred this to the man in the dark blue suit there. [Laughter.]

Secretary RUMSFELD. He has developed this surge capability which significantly increases our capability around the world, and he has done it by managing the way maintenance is done and overhaul and repair and that whole cycle. He has shifted the entire cycle. He has also done some forward basing.

With respect to the—and I will let Tom comment on that. But with respect to rebasing in third world countries, let me draw a distinction that you will find in these papers, which is probably imperfect. But a base I think of as a fixed, permanent place with families and a long life. We are doing two other things, forward operating sites and forward operating locations, and they are not bases. They are rotational locations. We fall into the use of the word “base” and I almost said “rotation base.”

But they are places where we can train, they are places we can exercise. They are locations we could deploy from if that were desirable. In some cases there might be prepositioning. We would have well-developed arrangements, cross-accessing agreements. We would have status of forces agreements with those countries, that we would know what we could do and what we could not do out of those locations.

But in terms of the kinds of heavy division fixed bases we have had in Germany, the answer is no, we are not thinking of that in

some of the other countries, and we would have much lighter footprint and less investment.

Do you want to?

Admiral FARGO. Yes, sir, let me add to the Secretary's comments. Certainly, with respect to the Pacific, sea basing makes great sense for a couple reasons. The first is that nobody's crystal ball is clear where we are going to have to fight next. It is just impossible to predict. If we look to—as we mentioned earlier in the hearing, if we looked a few years back and tried to predict where we are at right now, we would not have. If we try to look 4 or 5 or 10 or 20 years forward, we probably would not have great success there. So being able to sea base provides us a great deal of flexibility.

The second piece is that access is problematic and you do not know whether you are going to have access in certain places at certain periods of time. So the sea base once again provides you great flexibility.

I think the third point is, to the extent that you can sustain forces from the sea gives you huge advantage. So partnering with not only the Marine Corps, but also the Army, and standing up the joint program office which the Navy has for the sea base I think is going to provide exactly what we need, which are new operating concepts for the future.

Senator TALENT. I agree. My time is up. I will just add this comment. I agree, I really like the CNO's plan. However, if we are going to reposition or keep forces somewhat lower on the grounds that we can project faster, if we in essence have force enhancers, then we must fund the force enhancers.

Let us not make the mistake we made in the 1990s, where we cut the Army thinking that we would make each soldier more lethal and less vulnerable, and then cut the modernization programs that were going to make each soldier more lethal and less vulnerable. We do not want to make that mistake again.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.

Senator Clinton.

Senator CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, currently in the conference committee on the defense authorization bill there is a provision concerning the opportunity for Guard and Reserve members to access TRICARE in order to have health insurance. We learned that about 20 percent of our Guard and Reserve members do not have health insurance.

Senator Graham and I along with Senator Daschle and others introduced this legislation. We were successful in passing it in the Senate. We continue to be told that the Department of Defense opposes it. Could you explain your opposition to what I see as a critical part of ensuring that the Guard and Reserve members who are being called up on a continuing basis will have, along with their families, access to health insurance where they do not currently have it?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I would like to ask General Myers, who is up to speed on this, to comment on it. But one of the things I have discussed with Dr. Chu, the head of the Department of Defense Personnel and Readiness Office, and with the Chairman, is what

I believe to be the need for us to look on a macro basis at how we manage our force, the Active Force, the Guard, and the Reserve.

What has taken place over recent years is that, for a variety of reasons, incremental benefits have been added in large measure to the Guard and the Reserve and the Retired Force, less so to the Active Force. The cost of each person has been incrementally changing, and we are getting to the point where the cost of Guard and Reserve relative to the active is something that needs to be addressed so that we can manage it in a way that is proper from the standpoint of the taxpayers and appropriate from the standpoint of the people we need to volunteer to serve in the Armed Forces.

Rather than—my personal view is—and as I say, I want Dick to answer this. But I think that what happens, each time there is a new proposal here, then it is passed and then there is another proposal that comes along to create some sort of equity across the board, and the imbalance that is evolving is something that I know this committee needs to address, just as we need to address, and we want to do that together.

Dick, do you want to respond precisely on this point?

General MYERS. Precisely, I do not know. But Senator Clinton, I can respond. I think the Joint Chiefs of Staff are worried about a couple of things. One is cost. This will not be cheap and healthcare costs, as we know, have had a history of going up in a way that is almost unpredictable.

There is an equity issue that is brought up as well. The equity issue is, "Gee, I am serving on active duty, I serve 365 days a year I get healthcare for me and my family; somebody that serves part-time gets the same healthcare benefit," which is one of the better and bigger benefits that the United States military gets. So that is brought up from time to time.

Nobody is saying we do not need to change the way we provide healthcare to the Reserve component. We found that out in these massive callups, that indeed many reservists are not ready for active duty. Any proposal that would ensure that reservists on an annual basis get a physical paid for by the United States Government would be a very good thing, because we would then know what kind of force we have out there and we would not have to reject people as they showed up at the mobilization station because they are not healthy.

My understanding is DOD has a proposal, a counterproposal, that would put in place another program to test for a while, and I think it would be my view that we ought to proceed fairly slowly here, mainly due to the cost. It is not an issue of providing the right benefits to the Reserve component, but it is a huge cost issue.

Senator CLINTON. I know that it is a huge cost issue, but we have heard a lot of discussion today about capability and about needing to equip our men and women in uniform, and I for one feel very strongly that it is clear we are going to continue to rely on the Guard and Reserve, and when you have 20 percent without health insurance and then, I guess not coincidentally, you have 20 percent who are found to be unready when they are activated, that is a cost and it is a readiness issue.

We are going to continue to press our point because we think that the best investment we can make is in these men and women

that we are sending out and, given the way transformation is proceeding and given the pressures on the existing force, it certainly seems to me that it is no longer fair to exclude, if not fail to help, those who are in the Guard and Reserve.

Secretary Rumsfeld, over the weekend I am sure you saw, because there was a lot of publicity, about a number of very distinguished Republican Senators, including Senators Lugar, Hagel, McCain, Graham, and others, raising very serious questions about our status in Iraq, using strong language: Senator Lugar talking about incompetence in this administration, the lack of planning is apparent; Senator Hagel referencing his belief that no, we are not winning, and how did we ever get into this situation.

When you look at the statements that have been made in the past by you and others in the administration, it is very difficult to track the predictions and the expectations that were presented to this committee, to others in Congress, and certainly to the American people with where we are today.

We now know from books that have been written with the full cooperation of the administration that shortly after September 11 war plans were begun with respect to Iraq. That was not information shared with Congress, nor with the American people. In fact, as late as August 2002 the administration was still saying there were absolutely no plans to go into Iraq, and we know what happened then.

In a recent article reporting on the work of the Defense Science Board and their concerns about our ability to maintain ongoing stability operations, there is a paragraph that refers to a widely reported phone call in which William Moody, a senior Pentagon policy official, hinted with congressional aides from both parties that a second Bush administration may carry its preemptive war strategy to five or six other nations beyond the current axis of evil.

Mr. Secretary, I respect and appreciate your long service to this country, but if there are such plans, if there are such discussions, do you not believe that Congress and the American people ought to be informed?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, let me take some of that in pieces here. First of all, you said "you and others" have made predictions. I tend not to make predictions. You have been in a lot of committee hearings with me and I tend to be fairly careful about what I say.

Second, there is no one I know who would characterize what I have said about Iraq or Afghanistan or any other aspect of the global war on terror as painting a rosy picture. I have not painted a rosy picture. I do not believe it is a rosy picture. I think it is a dirty, tough, ugly business, and I have said so from the beginning.

Next, you raise the question of plans from books, you say. The job of the Pentagon is to have plans. That is what we do. There have been plans for Iraq for goodness knows how many years, every administration. There have to be plans. There have to be contingency plans. We owe that to the President. We owe it to Congress. We owe it to the American people. That is what they do.

When General LaPorte or Admiral Fargo or General Jones take these tasks, they have the responsibility of going to the shelf, looking to see what contingency plans there are, coming in, making a recommendation to the Joint Chiefs: We think these are appro-

priate or not appropriate, we need to freshen them up, we need to change them, we need to add some excursions on different things. There have been plans in the Department of Defense ever since there has been a Department of Defense.

The kinds of things you read in books are either misinformed, uninformed, or mischievous. One ought not to say: Oh my goodness, were there plans? Of course there are plans. That is what we do.

The quote about the Defense Science Board, I do not know anything about it, but I can assure you that anyone at that level would have no knowledge and would certainly not be involved, and those decisions are decisions for a President. I work with the President every day. I was with him this morning. I have never heard anything like that out of his mouth, nor has anyone heard anything like that out of my mouth.

So the fact that there are some staff people reporting that somebody hinted at something is really not something one ought to give credence to.

Chairman WARNER. I understand you very clearly, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Senator, for your questions.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I hope that anyone who believes that there is a problem with the progress that is taking place in Iraq today was there listening to the Prime Minister this morning. He was very outspoken. I would further say that I have been over there quite a few times and as I observe the transition in Afghanistan and the training of the Afghan troops from us to the Afghans—and the Afghan National Army is now being trained by the Afghans—I saw the pride on their faces as they were training out there and I thought: That is a model for Iraq and that is what is going to happen.

I agree with Prime Minister Allawi this morning when he said that the press is not giving us a fair shake; we have great successes. He expressed appreciation on behalf of the Iraqi people.

I have two questions for General Jones and then one you may have to answer for the record from each one of you because it may take a little bit longer. First of all, General Jones, we talked, now it has been years ago, about the subject that we are addressing today and how significant it is that we readdress this thing and start looking to the future, the cost of sustaining families in Western Europe, the problems we are having right now with the environmental restrictions that keep us from adequately being able to train our young troops over there.

I took the time to go to some of the eastern countries. I was in the Ukraine, I was in Bulgaria, I was in Romania. In talking to the military leaders there, they want us there. They are going to—they offered to billet us. They offered things that the Europeans never did, the Western Europeans. It just makes more sense to have shorter deployments and have them over there where you can do it. Some time we should put—maybe you have done this already—kind of a cost analysis of how much money can be saved if we are able to make this transition.

Now, I see two problems—and I apologize for not being here for your opening statements and I was told that you talked about

maybe 8 to 10 years before we can do this. The two problems as I see it: They are very patient. They have great training ranges. I watched them on the training ranges. But they have to make their own realignment decisions and things, and they cannot do that until we give them some indication as to what new host countries might be out there. So that is one of the concerns I have.

The other is two of the countries I just mentioned have applications for entrance into the European Union. There are some chapters and protocols on the environment that they would have to either have exempt or be grandfathered in, and they do not want to be held up in their opportunity as they see it to get into the European Union—I do not see this as an opportunity, but they do—by not being able to do this until they have an indication as to whether or not they might be a host country.

Now, so addressing those two, you Mr. Secretary or anyone else, is there anyway or are you already negotiating with some of those to the point where they can go ahead and make those decisions, even though it may be 8 years before we fulfill this transition? General Jones?

General JONES. Senator, we have been in close contact with a number of countries. We have done site surveys. We have made some recommendations as to how we might proceed with regard to the types of presence that we might be able to implement in Eastern Europe. These are very attractive to us, but we have repeatedly said that these would be more on the order of expeditionary type bases, not relocating, for example, Ramstein and larger main operating bases.

But absolutely, without question we are very interested in working with our Eastern European allies and friends who are now part of the alliance and are working very closely with each one of the Service components.

I think that the time frame for specifically identifying where it is we would like to go will be fairly short. This is all keyed to BRAC and so I think we are talking about months, months and certainly not years. The implementation piece might take a little bit longer because that is a little bit—that is a little bit tougher. But I think the nations where we will finally wind up establishing forward operating sites or cooperative security locations will be identified fairly quickly.

Senator INHOFE. Well, okay, because they expressed that concern over there.

General JONES. I am familiar with it.

Senator INHOFE. Of course, they want to continue on with their application and the environmental provisions and chapters and protocols would make a difference.

The second thing is, I know it is in its infancy right now, but I have taken a great interest, tying back to the successes we are having in teaching the Afghans to train themselves, using that same model of course in Iraq, and now getting down potentially to the five African brigades. I know that you are not in a position to be very specific about that. I want to compliment General Wald. I have spent some time in the countries where I believe might be the locations for these.

But the concept, as we put the squeeze in the Middle East—and I have spent two trips down in Djibouti, recognizing that the Horn is where they are all going to be going in, Mr. Chairman, and going throughout Africa. I see this as something that really needs to be expedited, we need to get into, because I do not say “if that happens,” I say “when that happens,” I would like to have these brigades out there so that they would be able to respond and we would not have to be sending our troops over.

Would you like to make any comments about that?

General JONES. I think you hit on something that is extremely important. We have some cooperative security locations in Africa right now. We have five of them: one in Senegal, Ghana, Gabon, and Uganda. We are proposing some additional sites. We have done site surveys on many others so that we have some flexibility, if you will, an inventory.

General Wald and his interest and leadership and your interest also in visiting has stimulated the momentum to develop this global peacekeeping operation initiative and to help emerging forces help themselves. The whole region of the pan-Sahel, for example, is being actively engaged and we are seeing countries being able to secure their borders a little bit better, and I think the support to the African security proposals with helping Africans help themselves is the way to go in the future.

Senator INHOFE. Again I compliment General Wald. I spent quite a bit of time talking to him just last week on this, and we want to be kept up.

I know my time has expired. Let me just ask a question for the record so they can respond, if that is all right, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. We will do that.

Senator INHOFE. With all the problems that we have over there—and I think each one of you would want to answer in your own area; General Myers, for example, our restrictions we have right now, our lift assets, capability assets, refueling and all of that—do you think we really need to get significantly faster into some of these programs so that we can—like more C-17s, so we could accommodate that? No one ever dreamed back when our first bunch of C-17s came in what would happen in Bosnia and Kosovo and Afghanistan and Iraq.

Also, I have been very proud back in the late 1990s of General Jumper when he admitted that our modernization program was not moving fast enough and the Sukhoi strike vehicles actually were better than our F-15s and F-16s in certain areas. So do you think it is desirable to try to move those modernization programs on a little faster?

Lastly, General LaPorte, I have been very interested in the Future Combat System and I know that we are doing as well as we can right now, but I would like to have your assessment as to when those are going to be fielded and is that going to be soon enough.

I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to follows:]

General LAPORTE. In July 2004, the U.S. Army announced plans to accelerate the delivery of selected components of the Future Combat Systems. Although the Army has not published a specific unit distribution plan, fielding to units is slated to begin in 2010.

In the interim, the transformation of the Eighth U.S. Army and the remainder of United States Forces Korea will continue as planned. Our ability to rapidly reinforce the Republic of Korea's armed forces, in concert with the DOD Global Posture Review, will continue to provide adequate deterrence, and if needed the ability to defeat any attack on South Korea.

My assessment is that the Future Combat Systems' projected fielding timelines are consistent with United States Forces Korea's currently projected transformation planning, and will support our continued deterrence capabilities.

General JONES. U.S. European Command (EUCOM) works closely with U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) to ensure our theater strategic lift requirements are known. How those requirements are met, and accordingly the pace of aircraft modernization programs, is a responsibility vested in the Service Chiefs and TRANSCOM.

EUCOM's Theater Transformation Plan is designed to mitigate the need for strategic lift by having war reserve material at a number of pre-positioned sites throughout the area of responsibility (AOR). The pre-positioned equipment, in conjunction with en-route infrastructure at the (Joint) Main Operating Bases, will provide the National Command Authority the flexibility to respond to crises across the full spectrum of conflict. Additionally, EUCOM's Theater Security Cooperation program is intended to increase U.S. presence and secure access across a broader portion of the EUCOM theater thereby increasing stability and diminishing potential conflict.

EUCOM has and will continue to work closely with TRANSCOM to ensure our strategic lift requirements are able to support the operational concept which underpins our transformation initiative.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you. We will take that for the record.

The chair observes that there are three members that have not had the opportunity the witnesses are prepared to afford them, but we will not go to a second round of questions. We will keep the record open through tomorrow close of business for purposes of submitting such other questions as my colleagues may have. Thank you very much.

Senator Bill Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, gentlemen, for your public service.

General LaPorte, it has been widely reported that in this reorganization, realignment, that there is a recommendation or a decision to reduce the number of our troops in South Korea by 12,000. What I would like is your judgment: What kind of signal does that send to North Korea?

General LAPORTE. Senator, first of all, we are an alliance. We are a Republic of Korea-United States alliance. The Republic of Korea forces number over 600,000 active, with the ability to mobilize to 3 million forces. So the reduction of 12,000 in terms of total numbers is based in those parameters.

But it is not the boots on the ground that is the critical issue. It is the capabilities that the force has, both resident to the peninsula, which is significant—in my opening statement I talked about 150 systems enhancements that Congress has paid for and are in the force and are coming into the force. The Republic of Korea has a similar modernization program relative to its capabilities.

We have significant regional reinforcement capabilities from Hawaii, Guam, Japan, that can rapidly project forces to the peninsula. Then we have our strategic deployment capability and we have demonstrated repeatedly our ability to do that.

So I think we are sending a very strong message and a very strong message of our increased commitment to the Republic of Korea.



Senator BILL NELSON. There is another interpretation of that, particularly at this critical time where we have to be successful in getting North Korea to understand that we cannot allow them to be a nuclear power. Although I agree with you on the repositioning of the forces further south, your enhanced training capability, it seems like at this time that it is the worst possible time to suggest that there might be a diminution. Even though, as you say, it may not be true in total force projection, nevertheless it is a signal and I worry about that.

Thank you for your response.

Mr. Secretary, I am sad to say that we have a fourth hurricane that is headed toward Florida, and we have been visited by the others. I was just there and Pensacola got hit pretty hard. Earlier Patrick Air Force Base had gotten hit by Frances, which was the second hurricane, and that was about \$33 million, and that was included in the President's supplemental request that will be added to the Department of Homeland Security bill. Just for example, it did not hit Patrick that much. It did \$125 million of damage to the Kennedy Space Center.

But when we come to Pensacola Naval Air Station, it got hit pretty bad. The preliminary figures are just for the Navy, including Whiting Field, \$850 million, and then when you take the Air Force in the area—Eglin, Hurlbert, and some of the Air Force at Pensacola—you are talking in terms of over a billion dollars just of structural damage.

Now, of course they are looking to their Senator from Florida to produce, but I need some help. Now let me just add one other thing. There was this crazy rumor going around in the last 2 days that we have had to stamp out, that, Homestead Air Force Base that got hit pretty hard—well, of course it was basically totally destroyed during Hurricane Andrew 12 years ago—that therefore, since Pensacola got hit so bad, that it is now a candidate to be closed.

Would you give me some security of knowing that for this billion dollars on structural—this does not include equipment—that we can get this going and get it going soon? I might say, for the sailors and the airmen, they are up and running. Pensacola is going to open on Monday for flight training and they have already got the Air Force installations in the area, that were not hit as bad, up and running. Your comments, please?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, I know Pensacola well. I went through flight school there. I was stationed there as a flight instructor and then an instructor of flight instructors, and I was stationed at Whiting Field as well.

It has been very badly hit. The Navy in Florida in the first hurricane had losses. The second hurricane had losses. This one, as you pointed out, is big. When you total it all up, I do not know where it will come out.

But I have not even heard the rumor that you have heard. I do not know if you have, Dick?

General MYERS. No, I have not heard that rumor.

Secretary RUMSFELD. So obviously—

Senator BILL NELSON. I think we have put it down.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Good.

Senator BILL NELSON. I mean, it is kind of silly. But how about rebuilding?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I do not doubt for a minute but that the President and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) will be talking to the various departments and agencies and making a judgment as to how to manage, as they have during the previous two situations, the various losses that have existed. I have not been involved in that discussion, but it is a pattern. It seems to me if one connects the dots one can assume that that will take place with respect to the most recent one as well.

Senator BILL NELSON. OMB is going to come to you because it is the Department of Defense that is suffering these losses.

Secretary RUMSFELD. All I have seen is the first rough cut and they said almost every building in the place was damaged.

Senator BILL NELSON. Would you be supportive of rebuilding?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Oh my goodness, absolutely.

Senator BILL NELSON. That is what I want to hear.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. With that, thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Secretary, I would like to bring us back to the Global Posture Review, the purpose of this hearing, and just say to you thank you. Early last year, January or spring a year ago, 13 Senators, I know Chairman Warner and Senator McCain and others, signed a letter I circulated calling on you to review our force structure worldwide and expressing the view that we were committed too strongly in areas that no longer represent clear threats to us.

As a matter of fact, I think we have been slow to get around to it. I know you had a war to fight and all of you have. I am glad that you are moving forward with it. This is great news, to bring 50,000, 60,000, however many thousands of troops home to America to be with their families, to help achieve what General Schoomaker desires, and that is a soldier to be stationed in a base for up to 7 years before he has to move again. Those are great things that are all a part of your plan to transform our military, to make it more effective, more efficient, and keep dollars at home.

As somebody said earlier, I hope some of those troops come to Alabama. I do not know; they may not. But I would like it, and certainly they will be paying taxes in the United States and supporting the economies of the people in the United States. So generally, I think we are all supportive of that.

General Jones, early this year I traveled with Senator Lott to the NATO accession conference and we went through Germany and met with Chancellor Schroeder and told him that we were doing our BRAC in the United States and we were going to be looking at Germany, and there were no hard feelings and it was not pique that we were dealing with, but I did not think that we were going to be able to maintain the number of soldiers there that we have been. He smiled and said he fully understood that and he was reviewing his force structure.

Earlier this year, Senator Chambliss and Senator Enzi and I visited you in Europe and we visited 12 installations to deal with this very issue of realignment. I was very impressed with the depth of

consideration you and your subordinate commanders have given to this issue and how much care you have given it. But I find it impossible to believe that we need this many troops in Germany after World War II has been over 60 years.

But first, my question to you is, describe for us briefly how much time and care you have given to it and describe for us how our allies have been consulted all along this way? It is not a unilateral act. Finally, is it not important that our allies transform also so that we can mesh their capabilities with ours?

General JONES. Thank you, Senator. The time spent—this is a project that started almost 3 years ago, I believe, Mr. Secretary. Certainly I have been in my position now for 20 months and we picked up on that from the first day. We have gone through a complete review, for example, of all of our installations. Even in advance of execution, I think we were able to reduce our military construction bill by about \$300 million just last year because we identified facilities that in a transformed European theater would no longer be useful.

So we have actually started. We are collapsing headquarters. We are eliminating the duplications that we have in theater. We are spending a lot of time thinking about where the forces of the future might be best used. So EUCOM right now is, for example, working on a post-transformation phase to try to determine what might be the request that we would come in to the Department of Defense and to the Joint Chiefs on to augment the permanent based forces that we have left with rotational forces in some of the emerging areas in Africa that will be increasingly more important and much further to the east, where in the Caspian, for example, we have interests that will be emerging and will be part of our theater.

We will need strategically agile forces to be able to do that. The value of transformation is that where they come from does not matter as much any more. You do not have to have the mountain of logistics. What we are trying to do is use the "tooth" portion of our forces in a more agile and usable way. So I think this transformation will do that.

Allies have been consulted with openly, consistently, both in the theater and from Washington.

Senator SESSIONS. You have personally done that?

General JONES. Personally.

Senator SESSIONS. Personally met with them?

General JONES. Personally.

Senator SESSIONS. Regularly?

General JONES. Regularly.

In my NATO assignment the word "transformation" is also being used, and most of our allies are keying on our experiences in transformation to shape their force as well. There is not any country that I know of in the 26-member alliance of NATO that is not watching what the U.S. Armed Forces are doing closely.

One of the things that we have to guard against, of course, is that it is not misinterpreted, that it is not interpreted as a withdrawal from a very important area, 91 countries; that it is not an indication that we are less interested or that we are not going to support NATO as we have in the past. Those things are being dealt with every day.

But for the people who understand the future military transformation, both in the United States and in Europe, this is work that has to be done. In Germany, at the national leadership level there is support for this because, as you pointed out, they are doing exactly the same thing. In their own way, across the entire North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries are doing the same type of thing.

So at the end of the day, if we do this right and we develop the NATO Response Force and we get a U.S. basing paradigm that is firmly anchored in the European and African theater, but that is also able to be more usefully deployed because where the forces come from will not matter nearly as much, we are going to be able to do some very exciting things in the future.

But I think the point that I am particularly excited about is the fact that it is not just the U.S. transformation, that there are parallel transformations in the 25 other countries and also partner nations who are keying on this, the new agility as well, and understanding that the paradigms of the 20th century no longer apply.

Senator SESSIONS. I think you are the right person to help make that happen and I salute you for it. I know how carefully you work at it.

General LaPorte, I have been to Korea twice and I know how bad some of the conditions are there. If you bring those troops back below the DMZ further, build new facilities, and reconfigure them for more effective military responses, will we not end up with a better quality life for the soldiers that are going there?

General LAPORTE. Absolutely, Senator.

Senator SESSIONS. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.

Senator Bayh, you may well be the wrap-up. Mr. Secretary, might I ask that you avail the opportunity for Senator Levin and I to speak to you a few minutes at the conclusion of this hearing?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Yes, sir. There are a couple of things I would like to say at the end. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. We will be glad to receive them.

Senator Bayh.

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me first, gentlemen, say I admire your fortitude. It has been a long hearing. Mr. Chairman, I hope this is a case of saving the best for last. Maybe it is just the last for last. But in any event, I do appreciate your time today and your service to our country.

I apologize for having had to step out. We had some important business before the Intelligence Committee. So if my line of inquiry is redundant, I regret that.

But I would like to follow up on something that Senator McCain raised in his questioning and Senator Nelson touched upon just briefly, and that is the subject of both Iran and North Korea. As you are well aware, there are ominous signs from both. The Iranians seem to be hell-bent upon acquiring a nuclear capability. They may play rope-a-dope with the global community for a while, but it seems pretty clear they are intent upon going forward.

North Korea, as has been mentioned, appears to be in the process of scheduling tests for missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead and as best as we can assess is already a nuclear power.

There do not appear to be any good options. Both apparently seek nuclear weapons for strategic reasons that are unlikely to be altered by either incentives to do the right thing or disincentives to do the wrong thing or diplomacy. So I would like to start my questions first, Mr. Secretary, to you. What is your opinion about the consequences to the United States' security of an Iran possessing a nuclear capability and/or a Korea possessing the capability of delivering a nuclear device to the continental United States, which does not exist today but may very well in the years to come?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Senator, those are two problems, needless to say, that people in Congress and the executive branch worry through on a regular basis. It is increasingly a more dangerous world. As we have gone through the past several decades, 2 decades, 3 since I was Secretary of Defense the last time, we have seen any number of countries become nuclear powers.

The effect of that is that it is a more dangerous world. It also highlights something terribly important and that is that no country, no country, including the United States, has the ability to deal with this terrible problem of proliferation of these increasingly lethal technologies. It takes cooperation among a lot of countries, and that is why the President proposed the Proliferation Security Initiative.

But unless a lot of countries, important countries, come together and impose on those countries that are doing what North Korea is doing and doing what Iran is doing the kind of—I do not want to use the word “sanctions,” but—persuasion, that they clearly see it in their interests not to do something like that—

Senator BAYH. Forgive me for interrupting, Mr. Secretary. I did want to ask the uniformed officers a couple questions. But I take it that this would not be a good development for the United States' security interests, particularly since Iran we have identified as the foremost state sponsor of terrorism in the world and North Korea has an erratic regime, to say the least?

Secretary RUMSFELD. True.

Senator BAYH. Thank you.

Gentlemen, as the Secretary indicated, you are in the business of planning and among the planning has to be planning for worst case scenarios. Since this is about our global posture and capabilities, if worst comes to worst—here is the question I would like to ask you. If we were to decide that it is unacceptable for our national security to have a North Korea capable of delivering a nuclear device to this country or for Iran to possess such weapons, and we had tried diplomacy, we had tried sanctions, we had tried incentives, et cetera, but none of those things had worked, if we concluded that this was unacceptable to us, do we have the means to do something about it?

If we had to forcibly disarm North Korea, General LaPorte, are we currently capable of doing that? Do you have the forces necessary to accomplish such a thing, given our commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere?

General LAPORTE. First of all, Senator, we are an alliance, a military alliance, in Korea. So the Republic of Korea and the United States stand shoulder to shoulder. The capabilities that have been developed in this alliance just over the past 2½ years

that I have been in command are very significant, from our intelligence capabilities, command and control, to the platforms associated with it.

These capabilities can be brought to bear in different scenarios. So it is a very, very capable force that we have.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I think in an open hearing it is preferable just simply to say that the United States and through working with Congress has capabilities to protect and defend the interests of the United States of America.

Senator BAYH. I am glad to hear that.

I am concerned, Mr. Secretary, that these are substantial threats, and we are going to try a variety of other things. It never ceases to amaze me why some other countries do not see it as more in their interest and bring a greater sense of urgency to restraining these developments. But, taking a hard-eyed look at recent history, they just do not seem to be bringing the necessary urgency to the table, and we may be faced with the very difficult—I said there are no good options here.

We may be faced with the very difficult decision of: Are we willing to accept a world in which those capabilities exist, and if we are not, do we have the ability to do something about it. I am delighted to hear your answer and in a different setting perhaps we can hear some of the details. But it is something that does concern me.

General Myers, I was going to ask you the same about Iran, but I will not because you have been here a long time and there was one other question I wanted to ask, unless you just felt you needed to add something.

General MYERS. I feel compelled to at least add something to the debate. I do not disagree with your characterization of Iran and North Korea. We know they are poorly led and not taking care of their people right, and they are involved in all sorts of things, missile proliferation in the case of Korea and other things, counterfeiting and terrorism, in the case of Iran.

But my contribution would be, those are very serious threats. As I would rank threats today, I would rank them below the extremist threat that we have been dealing with. I think that by far has to be dealt with.

Senator BAYH. I agree, that is a greater—that is more immediate.

General MYERS. Perhaps long-lasting.

Senator BAYH. But weapons of mass destruction, of course, is a threat, while maybe perhaps not as immediate, of a different magnitude, and the possible nexus between Iran and some of these groups is very well known.

General MYERS. Proliferation is a serious, serious issue.

Senator BAYH. North Korea has been proven to be willing to sell about anything to anybody for hard money.

General MYERS. I do not disagree.

Senator BAYH. I just have one last question. Mr. Secretary, this is for you again. I get asked by the press, from time to time and from some others about Vietnam and Iraq and is this another Vietnam, et cetera. I personally think it is not an apt analogy for a variety of reasons.

But there is one aspect of it I wanted to get your answer to since I am asked about it so often, and that is the term "Vietnamization," which as you will recall back in that time our hope had been that we were going to upgrade the capability of the Vietnamese government through training their police forces, their military, their intelligence, so that we could gradually withdraw our own. Indeed, we did eventually withdraw, but they were not able to sustain themselves for very long.

Why is the situation in Iraq going to be different?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I agree with you that the Vietnam analogy is imperfect in a lot of ways. I guess you never know what the future will hold, but clearly any time any country occupies and frees a people from what was and points them in a direction to what might be, there is a question mark. There was a question mark on Japan, there was a question mark on Germany, there was a question mark on Italy, whether they were ready for democracy.

Bosnia has been a question mark. People said they would be out by Christmas of that year, as I recall, and here it is what, 5, 10 years later. You cannot know with certain knowledge what will happen because your goal is not to make it happen. Your goal is to create an environment where the people of that country can make it happen. We cannot do it for them. We have to take the hand off the bicycle seat, and when you take your hand off the bicycle seat they might fall.

I do not think they are going to. I think they have a good crack at it. They have money, they have oil, they have water, they have intelligent people, and they have lived in a rotten, vicious dictatorship for decades. I believe the natural state of man is to want to be free, and I think they are going to make it.

But can we train up their security forces fast enough so that they can create an environment that they can have elections and that they can go forward and have the kind of prosperity that will make people want to bet on their future? I think we can. I think they can. But I know we cannot do it for them. We can only create an environment that they can do it.

Senator BAYH. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Secretary, we will give you such time as you desire, but I would like to comment that we have had a very long hearing. Twenty two of the 25 members of this committee have availed themselves of the opportunity to participate in this hearing. I think that you have been most responsive and I thank you and your witnesses, and I believe that the program, which was the primary consideration of this hearing will be wholeheartedly adopted by Congress which will support the President and yourself in this effort.

So I thank you.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have three quick things.

First of all, the global posture effort has been a 3-year effort to come up with these proposals, and Andy Hoehn, who is sitting back here next to Powell Moore, is the individual in the Office of the Secretary of Defense who has been masterminding it and has worked very closely with the combatant commanders and with the Joint Chiefs and the Joint Staff and has done a superb job.

Second, I doubt if Admiral Fargo will be back before this committee. He is making plans for, I believe, November to go into private life. He is a superb naval officer. In fact, he is a superb military officer.

Senator LEVIN. I have been trying to interpret that smile on his face all day long. [Laughter.]

Secretary RUMSFELD. He has done for this country in his most recent assignment, when I have had the privilege to work with him, an absolutely superb job and we are all deeply grateful to him.

Chairman WARNER. May I associate myself with those remarks. I rather imagine our first contact you were an ensign or a lieutenant junior grade, would that be correct?

Admiral FARGO. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Admiral.

Chairman WARNER. And your family, Admiral, very much.

Admiral FARGO. It has been my pleasure to serve.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Last, we came to talk about force posture and we end up talking about Iraq a lot and it bothers me in this sense. I think it is a mistake to look at Iraq and Afghanistan through a soda straw. They are part of something much bigger, much broader, and much more dangerous. The aggregation of extremists and people who are determined to reorder the world and attack the state system through terrorizing people—we call it a global war on terror, but in fact terror is simply the weapon of choice. It is a struggle in this globe between extremists and people who believe in freedom and want to live lives their own way and refuse to be terrorized.

There is no way to make a separate peace and to the extent we do not understand that this is a test of wills, to the extent that we do not understand it is going to take a long time, to the extent that we do not understand that it is not going to be ugly and messy and that people are going to die, we are making a big mistake.

It is a serious business and General Myers is exactly on the mark. What bothers me is when heads get chopped off I see people saying, "oh my goodness, why did you not stop them from chopping off that head," instead of saying, "when heads get chopped off, think of the people who are doing that, what kind of people are they?" What does it say about the kind of world we would be living in if we followed the counsel of people who say toss it in, it is not worth the pain, it is not worth the losses, it is not worth the money?

It is worth it. All you have to do is sit, imagine yourself with a Taliban rule in country after country, with soccer stadiums where they go out and have public executions. That is not the kind of world we want.

Looking at it in pieces misunderstands it, it seems to me. So I hope that we will, to the extent we have hearings, that we have hearings on the big problem and we talk about the big problem and not think we are addressing it in a useful way if we deal only with little pieces.

Chairman WARNER. May I say that yesterday, thanks to your office, I had the opportunity—Senator Levin was unavailable—to



spend almost an hour with General Abizaid and he showed me a detailed briefing on precisely the subject that you mentioned. I indicated to him, and perhaps the Secretary can arrange for our committee to be briefed on that very point that he raised, and he has it graphically and statistically and factually supported in great detail, but nevertheless in a classified document.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Happy to do it.

Chairman WARNER. We will do that. I recognize that we do our best here, but as you well know, I have served under seven chairmen in this committee and the freedom to ask questions has always been accorded to our membership.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Absolutely.

Chairman WARNER. I recognize that had we done it in a more structured framework perhaps we could have conveyed from this hearing an equally stronger message. But I agree with you, but I would just close with my own observation, and that is as we witness these frantic, unbelievable atrocities, whether it is in Afghanistan or Iraq or the Chechens, what they went through, these same people are trying to come across our borders and inflict such harm in this country, and thank God we have men and women of the Armed Forces beyond our shores who are taking the risk and giving their lives and limbs, with the support of their families, to prevent that from happening.

I thank you, Mr. Secretary. Again, I have known many secretaries, served under three. It is a lonely, though, and often thankless job. I commend you, sir. Thank you.

Senator LEVIN. Could I have a word?

Chairman WARNER. He is going to come to the desk.

Senator LEVIN. I know, but I just wanted to comment on his comment. It is obviously a heartfelt comment. I do not think anyone agrees with you in terms of your characterization of the people who carry out atrocities.

Secretary RUMSFELD. You mean you do not think anyone disagrees?

Senator LEVIN. Disagrees.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I thought you said "agrees."

Senator LEVIN. I hope I said "disagrees."

Chairman WARNER. It has been a long day and he has had a tough week.

Senator LEVIN. I hope I said "disagrees," but if not thank you.

Chairman WARNER. The record will reflect that.

Senator LEVIN. I think in your comment, though, here something else comes through which is not healthy, and that is a suggestion that people who might have proposals for trying to change a negative dynamic which exists in Iraq somehow or other are playing into the hands of our enemies. The enemies are clear, and I hope you are not suggesting that.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I am not.

Senator LEVIN. I hope, General, you did not suggest that today, either.

General MYERS. By what, sir?

Senator LEVIN. Suggesting that people that have other proposals for dealing with an enemy are not playing into the hands of the enemy.

General MYERS. No, no, sir.

Senator LEVIN. What bothers me, Secretary Rumsfeld, is that when you say that throwing in the towel is not acceptable, that is not the only alternative.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Of course not.

Senator LEVIN. When you hold that up as being the alternative to continuing to do what we are doing, it seems to me you are looking through a straw, you are narrowing a vision. We have to look for options to try to change a dynamic which is not a good dynamic there. That does not mean cut and run and that does not mean that somehow or other people want to just throw in the towel.

But there are ways hopefully of avoiding, if nothing else, throwing fuel onto that fire. There are ways of hopefully giving incentives, perhaps pressuring the people of Iraq into recognizing that what you describe is a horrendous, unacceptable future and that they have to want a nation as much as we do. They have to act to control the violent ones inside their midst. We cannot do it for them. We can help them, but we cannot take on this responsibility by ourselves.

If they do not want, we will call it "democracy," although it is more complicated than that, if they do not want democracy at least as much as we do, they are not going to get it. They have to want it as much. A lot of them are dying for it, by the way, and I do not want to in any way minimize the courage of those people in Iraq who are putting their lives on the line to try to create a nation. I do not want to minimize that.

But it is going to take a massive effort on the part of Iraqi leaders in all of their groupings to put an end to the terrorists in their midst.

Secretary RUMSFELD. Exactly right.

Senator LEVIN. There may be ways that we can promote their doing so. By the way, there is something else here at play. We have to look for ways, we have to be open to ideas, to try to find paths to getting other Islamic countries to recognize that they have a stake in Iraq becoming a democratic nation. So far, in my judgment, because of the way we proceeded—and you are not going to agree with that part, but nonetheless—and so far we have not attracted Islamic countries to send in some troops and some police to help create a nation.

It seems to me we all ought to be together on at least an effort to try to persuade, cajole, entice, and/or use carrots and sticks to get other nations to come in and take some risks to create that nation. We are taking risks there, big risks, and creating a nation there is a useful goal. I could not agree with you more. The people who commit these atrocities are as horrendous individuals as I have ever seen or ever heard of probably except for the even more massive murders when we think of Hitler and World War II. But nonetheless, I cannot think of anything much more despicable than what we see on Al-Jazeera.

But I would just urge you not to suggest in your words when you hold out the horrors that are right there that alternatives to try to address this problem and to reduce this negative dynamic and to bring in much more forcefully Islamic nations into that effort to create a nation, and to try to bring the Iraqi people to take risks

more than already have—and I emphasize because I know that there are a lot who are dying there to create a nation—more than already have, that when people suggest alternative courses or alternative emphasis that somehow or other they are playing into the hands of the enemy.

That is the one thing I would hope that you would avoid.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I did not even suggest that.

Let me just say a couple of things. Number one, I agree completely that the Iraqis have to do this. Number two, we have worked from the beginning of this effort in the United Nations to get other Islamic countries to come into that. The Iraqis have resisted it. They did not want Turks in there helping and they have resisted other countries. They have their own reasons. It is a complicated part of the world. But we have been very much in the mode of trying to get Islamic countries to join that effort.

I would say one other thing we have to do, and that is to get more people like Karzai and Allawi and Musharraf leading the moderate cause in the world against those extremists. Those men are all subject to death threats. They all have prices on their heads. They all have enormous courage. They all have tremendous leadership skills. They are beginning to form a pattern in that part of the world.

Think of that. Think of the courage of Musharraf in his country to do what he is doing. Think of Karzai and think of Allawi. We have examples popping up in that part of the world where there were not examples of that type of leadership, and that is a pretty exciting thing.

Chairman WARNER. We thank you, Mr. Secretary, and we thank each of your colleagues and we wish you well. We are adjourned. [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

##### CONSULTATION VICE COORDINATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, I am impressed with the number of consultations that the Department of Defense has had with the Department of State in 20 countries and the ambassadorial-level consultations that have been conducted in 30 countries on 5 continents. However, if the plan is based on cultivating long-lasting relationships with numerous countries, should not the Department of State be the leader in their development instead of the Department of Defense?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Department of Defense expertise was central to the drafting of an effective and flexible plan for our global defense posture, and the Department of State was and remains a full player in the broader review process of our posture changes. Secretary Powell and senior officials from both departments have all been fully engaged in the comprehensive diplomatic consultations that have accompanied the public announcement of our posture changes. Both departments fulfill critical needs in talks with our allies and partners.

2. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, I am concerned about the level of coordination that you have had with the Department of State in the development of your Global Force Posture. How does the Global Force Posture fit within the context of the larger political and economic policies and foreign policies we are pursuing in both Europe and Asia?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The Departments of Defense and State have maintained exceptionally close coordination during the global posture review process, regularly participating together in interagency discussions of the proposals and in consultations with allies and Congress on our plans. Without exception, consultations in foreign capitals and on Capitol Hill have included representatives from both departments. The Department of State's appreciation for how posture changes should fit

into our broader policy goals in Europe, Asia, and other regions was critical to shaping and strengthening the plan as it was developed.

#### SAVINGS FROM GLOBAL FORCE STRUCTURE

3. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, your September 17, 2004 Global Force Posture report states that it will make “our alliances more affordable and sustainable.” What savings are you expecting to achieve from reducing foreign basing by 35 percent?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Eliminating excess infrastructure overseas will result in cost savings over time, as the United States will lower its overall overhead and maintenance costs as a result of fewer bases, facilities, and installations. Relying relatively more on a rotational presence of U.S. forces, instead of permanently stationed forces with their families and a bigger overall U.S. “footprint” in host nations, will help us to make our alliances sustainable by keeping them affordable.

#### CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

4. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, the changes you are proposing contain broad and far-reaching implications for our Nation, our allies, and our military. How will the committees with jurisdiction be able to oversee and affect the implementation of this 6 to 8 year realignment effort when you are asking us to bless the entire plan at its inception?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Although our current plan provides a clear way forward for global posture changes, our posture will continue to evolve over time. As stated in our September report, Congress is a full partner in our process to strengthen our global posture, and will remain so.

#### AVAILABLE STRATEGIC AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT

5. Senator MCCAIN. General Myers, your proposed Global Force Posture is based on the assumption that you can deploy forces rapidly from the Continental United States (CONUS) to anywhere in the world. Do you have the high speed sealift, at-sea connectors, and strategic airlift, today, that will allow us to deploy from CONUS faster than from our current forward-deployed locations?

General MYERS. Under the Global Force Posture, in most scenarios we can deploy forces rapidly from the CONUS. Using our existing and programmed strategic lift capabilities, we can move CONUS-based forces several days faster than we move forward-based forces today. This is because our strategic sealift assets are homeported in CONUS close to our heavy maneuver forces. Conversely, heavy maneuver forces that are forward based today require sealift to transit from CONUS, pick up those forces at their forward location, and then transport them to area of operations—requiring more time than a direct movement from CONUS.

With regard to high-speed sealift, the DOD has not yet fielded a high-speed sealift capability; however, the Navy and Army will field intra-theater high-speed vessels beginning fiscal year 2011. Further, the Navy currently has additional R&D funding in the POM for strategic highspeed sealift development and the Air Force continues its programmed acquisition of the C-17 airlifter. These programs are essential to our National Security Strategy force-planning construct and the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) 10-30-30 planning goal.

#### REDUCED ENGAGEMENT

6. Senator MCCAIN. General Myers, the Global Force Posture will replace forward presence with periodic exercises. How will we maintain our level of engagement with reduced familiarity and personal contact with our allies?

General MYERS. One of the goals of the global posture strategy is to promote the expansion of allied roles by encouraging new partnerships. A key ingredient to maintaining and increasing U.S. level of engagement lies in the combatant commander’s ability to improve their existing theater unique Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs by cultivating new as well as standing relationships. The COCOM’s ability to place U.S. forces in strategic locations, allows the U.S. to influence regional security ultimately preventing war.

Global posture strategies will incorporate assured readiness through efficient global force management practices. In the recent past, the U.S. has been very successful in developing coalition relationships through rotational presence in exercises such

as: Immediate Response, Cobra Gold, Ulchi-Focus Lens, and Bright Star exercises. Expanding on these bilateral and multilateral exercises, combatant commanders will continue to build upon the interoperability between U.S. and allied forces and help spur allied transformation initiatives. These exercises will also test our ability to project forces, exercise the defense transportation systems, and evaluate our en route infrastructure's ability to receive, stage, and integrate U.S. forces in various environments. There is no realistic simulation for this experience.

Our new global posture strategy will not only increase coalition warfighting skills aimed at deterrence, it will also allow for U.S. forces to influence and access areas where we can better battle ideological terrorist underpinnings. In short, our new strategy implies realigning forces, not necessarily withdrawing them.

#### PERCEPTION AND TIMING FOR U.S. TROOP REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE

7. Senator McCAIN. General Jones, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has strained some of our relations with European allies. I am concerned about the timing for the implementation of the Global Force Posture. Is this the best time to start realigning our posture in Europe?

General JONES. Yes, it is imperative that we begin to realign our force posture across our theater to more accurately reflect today's security environment. The fundamental objective of our plan is to increase United States European Command's strategic effect through a fundamental realignment of basing concepts, access, and force capabilities.

In no way does our posture realignment signal a reduced commitment or interest in our theater. Moreover, our European allies understand the rationale for changing our footprint. We have communicated with our alliance partners on many levels the need to adopt new methods to better protect our collective interests in today's international security environment to include the realignment of our forces and bases in theater. We simply cannot afford to remain in a defensive posture that is no longer relevant. Transforming the theater will strengthen our commitment to the NATO alliance and serve as a model upon which our allies can base their own transformation. This mutually beneficial arrangement can increase the ability of the alliance and partner nations to respond to security challenges well into the century.

The timing of our realignment is critical as well. In the Secretary of Defense's September 2004 Report to Congress; the "Global defense posture changes will have direct implications for the forthcoming round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)." It is my belief that BRAC and global posture transformation are interdependent processes, and that this is an optimum time to begin implementation of our proposed plan. When completed, our realigned posture will improve our ability to meet our alliance commitments and global responsibilities.

As we proceed, we will retain the flexibility to adjust the scope and breadth of our transformation as strategic circumstances dictate. We will work closely with Congress to ensure that you remain full partners in this important endeavor.

#### PERCEPTION AND TIMING FOR U.S. TROOP REALIGNMENT IN THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

8. Senator McCAIN. Admiral Fargo, the Global Force Posture is a demonstrable shift of focus from Europe to the Pacific, which may well be warranted. What signal will the realignment of forces within your theater send to China and our allies in Asia?

Admiral FARGO. Thank you, Senator, for the opportunity to comment on this extremely important matter.

In Asia and the Pacific, vibrant economies, burgeoning populations, maturing democracies, and military modernization only serve to add momentum to regional transformation and increase the need for new security strategies.

In response to this changing environment, Pacific Command undertook efforts, with the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to operationalize our national security strategy and strengthen both our global and theater defense posture.

I believe that China, as well as our friends and allies in the Asia Pacific region, will interpret the realignment of our forces as a signal of our enduring commitment to peace and stability in the region. The realignment of our forces is intended to enhance our capability to respond to contingencies, to long-standing security commitments in the region, and to defeat terrorism and other transnational threats.

We must continue to assure our friends and allies, and dissuade and deter potential adversaries. Overall, the realignment of forces should signal to our friends and others that the U.S. has long-term interests in the Asia-Pacific region and is adjusting our force structure to reflect those enduring interests.

## PERCEPTION AND TIMING FOR U.S. FORCES-KOREA TROOP REDUCTIONS IN ASIA

9. Senator McCAIN. General LaPorte, for over 50 years U.S. forces have maintained a stalemate on the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). What signal do you think we will be sending to Asia as a whole with the troop reductions you have planned?

General LAPORTE. The reduction of American troops from Korea should not be viewed as a lessening of our commitment to the Republic of Korea or Asia, in actuality the converse is true. The enhance, shape and align transformation plan of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) is congruent with the Defense Department's new Global Posture Review, which leverages our improved capabilities to increase our readiness and deterrence, while supporting an enduring United States military presence in the Republic of Korea and Northeast Asia. This message has been clearly explained to America's allies and friends in Asia, who have expressed their appreciation for our improved efforts at maintaining stability in the region while considering their unique situations.

In Korea, our planned enhancements, realignments, and troop reductions are intended to strengthen our combined defense of the Republic of Korea while creating a less intrusive military footprint. No longer is the number of troops on the ground an appropriate metric for measuring U.S. combat capability and American commitment. The reduction of troops from the United States Forces Korea is representative of a combined transformation of capabilities. This transformation empowers Republic of Korea forces with missions and tasks that they are both willing and capable of performing, while simultaneously unencumbering U.S. forces to enable strategic flexibility for both within the Pacific region and globally.

10. Senator McCAIN. General LaPorte, I understand that the Army is announcing this afternoon that the 3,700 person 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 2nd Infantry Division will be temporarily relocated from Korea to Fort Carson, Colorado, upon their return from OIF in the fall of 2005. How will this announcement be perceived by Seoul after their government has requested a 2-year delay in force reductions on the Peninsula?

General LAPORTE. Troop reduction consultations between the United States and the Republic of Korea have been ongoing since early June of this year. The deployment announcement of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, like other troop reduction announcements that are forthcoming, represents the harmony of our ROK-U.S. joint consultation efforts.

Specifically, on August 20, 2004, at the conclusion of the 11th meeting of the Future of the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance Policy Initiative (commonly called FOTA), Richard Lawless, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for Asia and Pacific and his negotiating counterpart Dr. Ahn Kwang-Chan, Deputy Minister of Defense (MND) for Policy held a joint press session in Seoul, where, among other items, they announced the deployment of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 2nd Infantry Division to Iraq. During this joint press session, Dr. Ahn indicated that the 2nd BCT would not be returning to Korea as its deployment was a portion of USFK's permanent troop reductions.

On October 4, the ROK MND and U.S. DOD concluded USFK troop reduction consultations, publicly announcing on 6 October a 5-year reduction plan that includes a USFK reduction of 5,000 troops in 2004, 3,000 troops in 2005, 2,000 troops in 2006, and 2,500 troops between 2007 and 2008. The duration of this reduction plan is in harmony with the modernization plans of the ROK military, and has been well received by the ROK government.

## QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

## MILITARY CAPABILITIES STANDARDS

11. Senator COLLINS. Secretary Rumsfeld, in your testimony you state that "sheer numbers of people are no longer appropriate measures of commitment or capabilities." One of the six principal strategic considerations in the Global Posture Review states that "effective military capabilities, not numbers of personnel and platforms, are what create decisive military effects and will enable the United States to execute its security commitments globally." While I understand your point, Iraq demonstrates that numbers do matter. As I'm sure you will recall, General Eric Shinseki, then the Army Chief of Staff, warned prior to the war that it might take several hundred thousand troops to secure post-war Iraq. Had General Shinseki's advice been heeded, would we currently be dealing with the level of insurgency we see now?

Secretary RUMSFELD. While numbers do matter, applying the correct capabilities to the problem remains the most appropriate response. I believe we have the appropriately-sized multi-national force, which in concert with expanding capabilities demonstrated by the growing Iraqi security forces, will continue to be the right force for executing the military component of an effective counterinsurgency.

The current level of insurgency is a combination of several factors—fighters comprised from former regime elements, religious extremists, and others, each of whom also receives support from the criminal elements present in the country. These groups have exhibited the capability to organize and execute operations against coalition forces, Iraqi security forces, and most recently against Iraqi civilians. Some operations indicate a small level of cooperation among the various groups, although they are more likely due to convenience rather than shared ideological aims.

Effective counterinsurgency, however, requires more than a military response. In fact, the military component should be a supporting arm to the more pressing lines of operation such as economic development, infrastructure enhancement, and the development and sustainment of good governance and a strong judicial system. General Casey and Ambassador Negroonte have correctly identified these elements—in support of the Iraqi Interim Government's aims—to continue to reduce the level of the insurgency by progress in creating jobs, supporting the electoral process, and improving the infrastructure while conducting security operations to eliminate the hard-line insurgents and retain control of key areas of the country.

To achieve these aims requires us to continue to support the efforts of the Multi-National Forces-Iraq, our country team, and the efforts of our coalition partners to provide the overt backing to the Iraqi Interim Government and create irreversible positive momentum. The capabilities we provide—security forces, money, expertise, diplomatic initiatives, and others—provide a synergistic effect that is greater than the single factor of number of soldiers on the ground.

---

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

##### IRAQI MILITIAS

12. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, at the Department of Defense briefing on April 12, 2004, General Sanchez, with General Abizaid at his side, said "the mission of U.S. forces is to kill or capture Muqtada al-Sadr." Is killing or capturing Sadr still the mission? If not, when did it change and why?

Secretary RUMSFELD. A number of things have happened regarding Muqtada al Sadr since Lieutenant General Sanchez made the statement to which you refer. The most important is that subsequent to the August 2004 confrontation in Najaf between U.S. forces and militiamen loyal to al Sadr, al Sadr and his lieutenants have entered the Iraqi political process and have largely ceased their former violent activities. Al Sadr's connection to the murder of Grand Ayatollah Al Khoie and other crimes are in the jurisdiction of the Iraqi Interim Government.

13. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, what is your strategy for dealing with Sadr's Mahdi army and other militias?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Our strategy is to attempt to disband all Iraqi militias and to bring the constituencies they represent in the Iraqi political process. Our preference is to do this through negotiation where possible. But if any militia engages in hostile action towards U.S. and coalition forces we are prepared to forcibly disarm them.

##### IRAQI VETO

14. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, is there an Iraqi veto on U.S. actions?

Secretary RUMSFELD. No. U.S. and coalition forces that comprise the Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-I) are in Iraq at the invitation of the Interim Iraqi Government, and operate under the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546. UNSCR 1546 provides a unified command authority for MNF-I, under which Iraqi forces serve as equal partners alongside forces from more than 30 nations. Although MNF-I commanders work in close consultation with the Interim Government through participation in organs such as the Ministerial Committee for National Security, Iraqi leaders do not have a veto over the actions of coalition forces in Iraq.

## AFGHANISTAN

15. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, is the U.S. troop strength and funding sufficient to stabilize Afghanistan and allow elections to proceed, to reverse the drug trade, and to capture Osama bin Laden, and if so, why haven't we done any of these things?

Secretary RUMSFELD. U.S. troop strength is sufficient to accomplish the U.S. strategic goals in Afghanistan. The U.S. has helped the Afghan government prepare a comprehensive presidential election security plan involving U.S., coalition, and Afghan security forces. U.S. efforts to counter the Afghan drug trade are underway: the U.S. approach is that counternarcotics in Afghanistan is a law-enforcement mission for which the military can play a supporting role. However, a successful counternarcotics program is a long-term enterprise, requiring a concerted effort in a number of areas over time. The U.S. supports the U.K. as the international lead for Afghan counternarcotics. Efforts to capture Osama Bin Laden continue.

## MILITARY TACTICS IN IRAQ

16. Senator LEVIN. General Myers, earlier this week, Iraqi terrorists beheaded yet another American citizen in Iraq. Upwards of 250 Iraqis have been reported killed in the last few days in suicide attacks, car bombings, roadside ambushes, and kidnappings. Meanwhile, the U.S. has made airstrikes against Fallujah, which evidently have not caused the terrorists to stop their attacks, but have reportedly resulted in dozens more Iraqi civilian deaths. U.S. officials assert that most of the Iraqis being killed in airstrikes are terrorists—many Iraqis appear to believe otherwise. It seems to me that our military tactics are not working in Iraq—and in fact it seems as though these airstrikes, while they may kill a few bona-fide terrorists, also cause more Iraqis to hate the U.S., and result in more of them being drawn in to the fight against us. Don't you agree that such attacks may be counter-productive and may be producing more support for the insurgency, and perhaps creating more terrorists and insurgents than we are killing?

General MYERS. Recent airstrikes in Fallujah have all been against credible terrorist targets. In each, collateral damage was mitigated through precise planning based on confirmed intelligence and the use of precision-guided munitions. Analysis of potential collateral damage is part of pre-strike approval process and commanders consider planning aspects such as timing and type of munitions to minimize potential for civilian casualties. All means available are used to prevent collateral damage.

Military operations are a viable and effective mechanism for dismantling the Zarqawi network. These strikes are surgical in nature. While it is possible that individuals located nearby may have been injured, it is Zarqawi and his fighters that place the people of Fallujah at risk by hiding among them. Information on civilian casualties should be carefully scrutinized for accuracy. Some stories of civilian casualties are prefabricated and part of a Zarqawi propaganda campaign. Intelligence from previous strikes have concluded the following techniques are used by Zarqawi associates to misrepresent events:

- Ambulances taking supposed civilian casualties to the hospital several hours after the attack has occurred.
- Blood displayed for effect and in a manner inconsistent with the number of casualties described or known.
- Using civilians as human shields to include capturing civilians against their will when under attack.
- In one recent strike (September 28), Fallujah hospital officials reported casualties before a coalition strike occurred. Although witnesses reported coalition forces had fired rockets into the city, coalition forces only fired illumination rounds.
- In an October 8 strike on a Zarqawi safe house, hospital officials reported mass casualties from a coalition strike, including claims that a wedding party was being held at the location. However, prior to the operation, no activity related to such a gathering was observed or noted by intelligence collection. After the strike, no personnel related to any rescue attempts for a wedding party was observed or noted.

These precision air strikes have not only been effective in dismantling the Zarqawi network, these airstrikes and other MNF-I operations have disrupted the Zarqawi network, thus limiting Zarqawi's tactics of intimidation, death, and destruction in Fallujah. Regarding public support, the overwhelming majority of Fallujah's citizens have been repulsed by the atrocities that Zarqawi and other extremists



have made commonplace in Iraq. The foreign militants are thought to produce the car bombs that now explode around Iraq several times a day, and Zarqawi's organization has asserted responsibility for the slaying of several Westerners, some of which were shown in videos posted on the internet. In his most heinous crime, Zarqawi claimed credit for the September 30 car bombing of more than 34 children at a ribbon-cutting ceremony in Baghdad for a sewage treatment facility. Recent negotiations in Fallujah between the Iraqi Interim Government and local leaders indicate the desire for stability and security in Fallujah. The citizens of Fallujah are tired of terrorism and the pain Zarqawi has inflicted on the city.

#### WAR ON TERROR

17. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, in your global war on terrorism memo of October 16, 2003, that was leaked to the press, you asked "Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us?" Given the level of violence and the number of attacks against coalition forces and ordinary Iraqis today, how would you answer your own question?

Secretary RUMSFELD. We and our Iraqi allies are winning. Coalition and Iraqi forces are seeking out the enemy and taking the fight to them. We are also working to mitigate the effects of those enemy attacks that our offensive operations do not stop. A new Iraq is taking shape and it offers the Iraqi people a more hopeful future than they have known in the past 35 years; the Iraqi people want to move forward into that hopeful future, not return to their terrifying past. The majority of Iraqis support the new Iraq and recruiting for the Iraqi security forces remains strong. I think many potential or past insurgents have been deterred or dissuaded and we see evidence that the enemy's recruiting within Iraq has become much more difficult.

#### INTERNATIONAL TROOPS IN IRAQ

18. Senator LEVIN. General Myers, high level military officers have told me that national governments are placing severe restrictions on the international troops deployed to Iraq. What is the nature of these restrictions?

General MYERS. Several countries have imposed restrictions on the types of tasks their forces in Iraq can perform. In many cases, limitations were required in order to get parliamentary/legislative approval for the commitment of forces. In other cases, there are legal limits on the types of tasks a particular nation can perform. Most of the restrictions center on the ability to conduct offensively oriented missions such as raids, ambushes, and attacks outside of assigned operating areas.

19. Senator LEVIN. General Myers, do restrictions placed on international troops in Iraq limit their usefulness?

General MYERS. Requirements to gain national level authority for cordon and search missions, raids and counterterror operations have limited force effectiveness and complicated command and control. Simply put, the operational constraints placed on some forces make it difficult to deal effectively with the security challenges we face.

20. Senator LEVIN. General Myers, have you made any effort with your coalition counterparts to remove these restrictions?

General MYERS. In April 2004, I sent personal letters to 23 of my multinational force counterparts asking each of them to review the rules of engagement they were operating under. In particular, I asked them to approve the use of force (including deadly force) to prevent interference with the mission to establish a safe and secure environment in Iraq as well as the use of force against military and/or para-military forces declared hostile by the multinational forces in Iraq. I also asked that the ability to conduct these operations not be contingent on prior approval from national authorities. While some countries modified their rules of engagement, most responded that they were unable to for political or legal reasons.

#### IRAQ ELECTIONS

21. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, do you agree with U.N. Secretary-General Annan's statement that under the current security conditions in Iraq it is difficult to conduct credible elections?

Secretary RUMSFELD. I agree that it will be difficult logistically to conduct elections in an environment in which Baathist and al Qaeda terrorists are willing to commit horrifying atrocities in order to prevent Iraqis from expressing freedom on political expression and selecting a representative government. But we do not have to look any further than the terrorists' own words to see that they feel any election in Iraq would be credible. In the letter written by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to his al Qaeda associates in Afghanistan, which we captured January 2004, Zarqawi wrote that democracy would be suffocating to his murderous campaign in Iraq. The terrorists fear that Iraqis will regain a sense of ownership of their country after years of Saddam's tyranny, and will be more willing to fight back. Thus, it is quite likely that we will actually see a surge in attacks as the terrorists attempt to derail the electoral process in Iraq.

But just because something is difficult does not mean it is not worth doing. On the contrary, I believe that the terrorist campaign of violence and intimidation is a sign of how strategically significant holding elections will be, and why we are on the right track in Iraq.

#### STRATEGIC LIFT REQUIREMENTS

22. Senator LEVIN. General Myers, what impact does the proposed global force structure have on our strategic lift requirements?

General MYERS. We are currently in the middle of a mobility capabilities study that will help us determine the mobility capabilities that we need to support the defense strategy. This study is designed to look at the entire defense transportation system from the point-of-origin to the foxhole and to help determine not only our strategic lift needs but also what we need to support the forces within the theater. The study is projected to report out in March 2005.

23. Senator LEVIN. General Myers, how many additional, or how many less, airlift aircraft and sealift ships will be necessary to support the proposed global force structure?

General MYERS. We are currently in the middle of a mobility capabilities study that will help us determine the mobility capabilities that we need to support the defense strategy. This study, which is focused on 2012, is due to report out in March 2005. It will address the impacts of the Global Force Posture and will help us determine what we need to transport our forces.

#### BUDGET CONTROL OVER CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

24. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs recently completed marking up a bill on reforming the Intelligence Community. The bill would make a number of reforms, including creating a new "National Intelligence Program", and adding substantial authority to the position of National Intelligence Director to control funds and personnel (civilian and military) within that program. Included in the National Intelligence Program would be all of the funding for the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office. Do you believe that a new National Intelligence Director should have budget control of all funding of these agencies?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Since the August 17 hearing, the President has issued Executive Order 13355, "Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community," which expands the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence over reprogramming of intelligence funds. On September 8, the White House announced that the President supports providing this expanded authority to a newly created National Intelligence Director.

#### IMPACT ON DEPLOYMENT TIMES

25. Senator LEVIN. General Myers, one of the key questions with respect to these proposals is how they impact our ability to support operations in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) region where the chances of instability leading to the use of the military are the highest. Please provide, in both classified and unclassified form, the Department's analysis of this issue, including how long it took to deploy our forces, people, and equipment, from Germany to the CENTCOM region for Operation Iraqi Freedom, along with your analysis of how long it would take to deploy those same forces from the United States in a comparable scenario.

General MYERS. [Deleted.]

## RELIEF FOR NEAR-TERM STRESS ON THE FORCE

26. Senator LEVIN. General Myers, today our entire active Army, and a significant portion of the National Guard and Reserve, is tied up with our deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. Does this plan do anything to improve our ability to support these current force levels if we are forced to do so for years to come?

General MYERS. The Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) are not designed to increase force levels. However, it will facilitate more effective use of the force to respond rapidly globally.

As we restate the force to meet expeditionary demands, we will facilitate more time in the United States for families and fewer moves for our service members. Over the next decade IGPBS will result in the closure of hundreds of U.S. facilities overseas. This will in turn bring home up to 70,000 uniformed personnel and nearly 100,000 family members and civilian employees. Service members will have more time on the home front and fewer moves over a career. Military spouses will experience fewer job changes and have greater stability for their families.

There are several other initiatives underway within the Department of Defense to relieve stress on the force, and thereby improve our ability to support operational demands, by making more of the current force available for deployments and high demand activities. These include, but are not limited to, military-to-civilian conversions, rebalancing of the Reserve components, and Army modularity.

The Department is converting 20,070 military positions to civilian or contractor positions in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. These conversions occur in positions where the work is not deemed inherently military in nature. This makes more military personnel available to the Service Chiefs for more critical military tasks. The Department is studying the feasibility of expanding this initiative in fiscal year 2006 and beyond.

Rebalancing of the force is an ongoing activity within the Department. We are currently assessing our force structure and rebalancing within the Reserve components and between the active and Reserve components. The purpose is to move forces from low demand to high demand specialties thereby improving readiness and deployability. From fiscal year 2003 to 2009, approximately 58,000 positions will be rebalanced in this manner. These rebalancing efforts will shift forces to critical specialties such as civil affairs, psychological operations, military police, Special Forces, and Intelligence while divesting Cold War structure to enable the global war on terrorism capability.

The Army is shifting from a division-based force to a modular combat brigade centric construct. In doing so, the Army will increase its operational capability from its current 33 brigade force to a 43 brigade force with the flexibility to add additional brigades if required. This effort began in fiscal year 2004 and is scheduled for completion in fiscal year 2010. By adding 10 (or more) additional active brigades, the Army will increase the rotation base of units available for deployment and further reduce the burden on active and Reserve soldiers.

Military-to-civilian conversions, rebalancing of the force, Army modularity, IGPBS, all combined, have a significant positive impact on the force. They greatly increase warfighting capabilities where gaps currently exist, and increase the rotational base of units available for deployment. The net result is a reduction in the OPTEMPO on active and Reserve component soldiers, more time in the United States for families, and fewer moves for servicemembers.

## COST OF THE PROPOSALS TO REALIGN OUR FORCES

27. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, please provide your analysis of the likely cost of these proposals to realign our forces over the next 5 years, to include a description of the elements that will affect costs and savings such as relocation costs, military construction costs here in the U.S., the impact on military pay and benefits such as permanent change of station and family separation payments, the impact on repositioning and logistic operations, and the impact on our mobility requirements.

Secretary RUMSFELD. The changes to global posture under consideration are focused on positioning U.S. forces to better meet 21st century challenges—and particularly to conduct the global war on terrorism—while helping to ease the burden of the post-September 11 operational tempo on our Armed Forces. The new posture will base and deploy U.S. forces and prepositioned stocks to enhance global responsiveness.

Cost estimates are continually being refined as implementation plans develop. The range of current estimates is \$9 billion to \$12 billion in net costs for all projected posture changes through fiscal year 2011.

Many of the force realignments under consideration fall within the scope of the BRAC process. The estimate for such "BRAC-related" moves is \$5 billion to \$6 billion in net costs. This estimate includes relocation and construction costs in the United States, changes to military housing allowances, as well as savings from closing overseas facilities. As precise locations are identified—and plans mature—more detailed cost assessments will be prepared.

#### IMPACT ON TROOP ROTATION PLANS AND FAMILY SEPARATION

28. Senator LEVIN. General Myers, please provide the Department's analysis of the impact of these proposals on troop rotation plans and of the extent to which it will increase or decrease family separation.

General MYERS. One of the key aspects of the DOD force deployment goal for global sourcing, to include Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, is the dwell time concept. Dwell time ensures the members of the military deployed to any contingency operation spend an equal amount of time at home station as they do while deployed. The goal for dwell time is, at a minimum, a 1:1 ratio (e.g., one day at home station for each day deployed). Whenever possible, forces are chosen to deploy based upon longest home station dwell time. This goal is a result of DOD analysis of recent troop rotations.

#### INTELLIGENCE REORGANIZATION

29. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, I have a number of concerns about the intelligence reorganization bill being marked up in the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs this week. Please provide your views on this bill.

Secretary RUMSFELD. I support the position put forward by the President.

#### KOREA—REDUCTIONS WITHOUT NORTH KOREAN CONCESSIONS

30. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, why are we proceeding with withdrawing troops from the DMZ and reducing the total number of U.S. forces in South Korea without seeking some sort of concession from North Korea, including, for example, a withdrawal of North Korean troops from their side of the DMZ?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Our realignment of troops in Korea is long overdue. For more than a decade, ROK forces have had the overwhelmingly predominant role of securing the DMZ, while we have maintained only a small force actually on the DMZ in the vicinity of Panmunjom. The mission of that small security force is now being transferred to the ROK.

The realignment of the U.S. Second Infantry Division into areas further south not only recognizes the ROK's predominant role in their defense, but also allows us to consolidate our forces and leverage their increasing capabilities.

These increasing capabilities, of both the ROK and U.S. forces, is what allows us to confidently redeploy a portion of the U.S. troop presence with no decrease in the deterrent and defense posture of our combined force. Indeed, when the realignment and our capability enhancements are fully examined, there is a net increase in our overall deterrent and defensive capabilities.

The leadership in North Korea understands this.

#### STATIONING FORCES IN CENTCOM REGION

31. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, is it your intention at this time to permanently station combat forces in the CENTCOM area of responsibility?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Our intention is to provide presence without permanence in the CENTCOM AOR. We will have a robust network of headquarters to oversee a rotational presence of our rapidly deployable forces so that we can continue to assure our allies and deter aggression in this critical region. We will rely increasingly on forward operating sites and host-nation cooperative security locations to enable us to have rapid access into various parts of the region without impinging on local sensitivities via a large military footprint.

#### LEGAL AND POLITICAL RESTRICTIONS IN BASING COUNTRIES

32. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, your testimony states that an absence of legal and political restrictions is a factor on where we want to station our troops. It is easy for nations to indicate up front that they intend to be agreeable to letting

us stage from their countries to conduct military operations. But when a specific contingency arises in the future, aren't you going to have to go back to those host countries and get specific approval for that specific operation?

Secretary RUMSFELD. It is vital to have comprehensive legal and logistical arrangements in place, prior to a contingency arising, with a broad range of friends and allies so that we have maximum flexibility to pursue operations globally—so that the absence of support from a single ally does not hinder our ability to prosecute a contingency operation.

33. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, is this plan optimized for small-scale operations?

Secretary RUMSFELD. This plan provides us the flexibility to prosecute the full range of military operations globally.

34. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, your testimony describes the need to transform our forces to meet asymmetric challenges and states a desire to shift from having our forces arranged to fight large armies, navies, or air forces to one that can respond to small enemy cells. Is this plan built around the assumption that we need to shift the focus of our military to increase its ability to conduct smaller scale operations against terrorists or guerilla movements, and that we can and should de-emphasize our capability to conduct larger scale military operations against nation-states?

Secretary RUMSFELD. This plan is built around the assumption that we must continue to transform our military capabilities to be able to meet the full range of challenges that may confront us, both large scale and small scale, and both traditional and non-traditional. Our overseas posture will emphasize rapidly deployable early-entry capabilities in forward locations, with heavier follow-on forces concentrated in the United States, from where they will have global reach.

#### U.S. ABILITY TO HANDLE ANOTHER CONFLICT

35. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, the war in Iraq and the continuing, unresolved conflict in Afghanistan are putting enormous stress on the U.S. military, especially the Army. Prior to these wars, our military strategy was based on being able to counter an unforeseen conflict, such as one started by North Korea. How would the U.S. respond to such an unforeseen conflict and where would we get the extra troops to support such a third war?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Our current defense strategy calls for the ability to conduct two nearly simultaneous overlapping campaigns to swiftly defeat aggression and deny an adversary's strategic objectives. If the Armed Forces were required to do this while still engaged in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, current forces in place would remain and we would globally source capabilities to the second conflict as appropriate. In your example, we are already in the process of realigning our forces on the Korean Peninsula to better posture ourselves to support the Republic of Korea in the event of North Korean aggression. The capabilities we would employ would depend on the nature of the North Korean aggression and the needs of the Republic of Korea, consistent with our treaty obligations.

36. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, how would we make more troops available in time without sacrificing our current efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The Department of Defense has several strategic initiatives underway that will address this issue. First, the Department is in the process of transitioning the force management process from a regional to a global system. Global Force Management (GFM) will ensure the Secretary of Defense is presented allocation recommendations to support combatant commander requirements in terms of force availability and associated risk. GFM will also prioritize combatant commander requirements to ensure ongoing operations are sourced to the required levels while offering mitigation options to counter assumed risk. In short, GFM will ensure OIF and OEF are sourced to the level required by the combatant commander.

Second, the Department is instituting myriad OIF/OEF lessons learned initiatives to reduce stress on the force. This includes military-to-civilian conversion, active component/Reserve component (AC/RC) realignment, force structure adjustments, and transformation initiatives in the U.S. Army that will increase the number of combat brigades from 33 to 43. These initiatives—once implemented—will combine to reduce stress on the force to ensure current operations can be sustained without adversely affecting long-term readiness.

Finally, DOD is in the process of assessing U.S. military presence and missions around the world. The Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy will realign the global posture to address the current geo-strategic environment. The end result will be the rebasing of approximately 60,000 U.S. servicemembers from overseas to the continental United States. This realignment will ensure more of the force is trained and ready to support rotational requirements—to include OIF and OEF.

37. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Rumsfeld, given current end-strength, how long do you believe the Marine Corps and Army can sustain current rotation schedules in Iraq before both Services are severely damaged?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The DOD force deployment goals for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom were developed to ensure the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps can maintain the current rotation schedules. Additionally, the Joint Staff and U.S. Central Command continue to plan for future deployments in order to make certain the Services can provide anticipated force levels without degradation to recruitment, training, and readiness. This planning is conducted collaboratively with the Services.

---

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

##### LOCATIONS OF NUCLEAR-POWERED AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

38. Senator BILL NELSON. Admiral Fargo, in your discussions with the Japanese government regarding the Global Posture Review, did you raise the issue of the permanent stationing of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in Japan and has a firm decision been made yet? If not, what is the status of negotiations or discussions with the Japanese government or military regarding this issue?

Admiral FARGO. Thank you, Senator, for your interest in this sensitive issue. Replacement of the *Kitty Hawk* (CV-63) has been a separate item outside of our posture review discussions with the government of Japan (GOJ). The final decision on *Kitty Hawk's* replacement has not been made but we hope to replace her with one of our most advanced, most capable carriers. Such a replacement would maximize the ability to meet future security concerns, communicate a strong deterrent to would-be aggressors, and demonstrate our indelible commitment to the alliance and the defense of Japan. As with other force posture decisions, a change would be managed in full consultation with the GOJ.

39. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Rumsfeld, since arriving in the U.S. Senate, I have consistently argued that the Nation needed to reduce its strategic risk in the stationing of aircraft carriers on the Atlantic coast by committing to no fewer than two bases capable of home-porting nuclear aircraft carriers. The Navy has resisted congressional pressure on this issue as far back as the 1980s, while at the same time it established a second Pacific coast nuclear carrier base in San Diego, California. I find this an interesting contrast in strategic purpose and programs between the two coasts and over the security of the carrier fleet. From a strategic perspective, why would we need two nuclear carrier bases on the Pacific coast and not on the Atlantic?

Secretary RUMSFELD. The Navy currently has two east coast carrier home ports to meet U.S. strategic objectives, one conventional and one nuclear capable with the future retirement of U.S. conventional carriers, the DOD is evaluating and considering the potential of having two east coast nuclear capable carrier home ports.

40. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Rumsfeld, on March 2, 2004, in a question for the record, I asked Secretary England if the Navy had performed any analysis of the current strategic conditions, force protection, and risk relative to the establishment of a second base on the Atlantic coast for nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. In his response he stated this was underway as part of the U.S. military's Global Posture Review. Has this review identified a requirement for strategic dispersion of the east coast nuclear aircraft carrier fleet?

Secretary RUMSFELD. There are proposed moves in the Global Defense Posture Report to Congress that address moving the relocation of aircraft carriers and carrier assets. However, the dispersion of aircraft carriers within CONUS was not a subject of the report. Any relocation determination of CONUS carriers will be dependent on recommendations from the upcoming BRAC process.

## U.S. RELATIONS WITH SYRIA

41. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Rumsfeld, the Washington Post reported on Monday, September 20 that a U.S. delegation, led by William Burns, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, met with Syrian officials to discuss efforts to stabilize Syria's 450-mile border with Iraq. I returned from the region in January 2004, and Secretary Powell and Ambassadors in the region all impressed upon me that this issue—Arab fighters flooding Iraq across the Syrian border—should be our paramount security concern. What military engagement is possible with Syria on the border issue?

Secretary RUMSFELD. An interagency U.S. delegation headed by State Department Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs William Burns and Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman met in Damascus with Syrian leaders on September 11. The purpose of the visit was to convey a blunt message to President Asad regarding Syrian behavior in Iraq. We told President Asad that U.S.-Syrian relations would face further deterioration should Syria continue to undermine stability in Iraq. If Syria wanted to avoid a crisis in our relations, Syria would have to prevent the movement of jihadis and insurgents to and from Syria, and clamp down on insurgents organizing in and operating out of Syria. President Asad assured us that it was his intention to do so, but said he required assistance. Our current military engagement with Syria on border security is really a test. We are working with the Syrians and the Iraqis to establish patrolling mechanisms and intelligence sharing on border-related issues. Of course, border security is just a symptom of the larger problem: that former Iraqi regime elements have been operating without constraint from Syria. We are watching Syrian actions closely, and will continue to do so in the coming weeks, to ensure that the effort is sustained.

42. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Rumsfeld, what in your view are the prospects for cooperation given Syria's behavior in the past?

Secretary RUMSFELD. Syria remains an authoritarian government that administers a robust clandestine WMD program, and is a state sponsor of terrorism and occupies its neighbor, Lebanon. For the past 1½ years, elements within key institutions in Syria have been making great efforts to undermine the stability of Iraq. Syrian cooperation with Iraq and the U.S. would be a welcome change in Syrian policy.

[Whereupon, at 6:17 p.m., the committee adjourned.]













BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY



3 9999 06351 903 5



